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1 Introduction 
“Moving beyond storytelling” (Watkins & Hicks 2009). 
 
Recent advancements in the project evaluation literature bring with them the great promise to 
revolutionize development cooperation (DC) and enhance its effectiveness. Aim of the field is 
to establish credible knowledge on what works. As Khandker et al. (2010b: 3) observe:  
 
“Programs might appear potentially promising before implementation yet fail to generate expected im-
pacts or benefits. The obvious need for impact evaluation is to help policy makers decide whether pro-
grams are generating intended effects [and] to promote accountability in the allocation of resources 
across public programs.” 
Main driving force of this development was the pressure project implementers came under by 
popular works claiming development cooperation doing “so much ill and so little good” 
(Easterly 2006) or even delivering “Dead Aid” (Moyo 2009).  
At the heart of project evaluation is the problem of the counterfactual: “[O]bject of in-
terest is a comparison of the two outcomes for the same unit, when exposed and when not 
exposed to the treatment” (Imbens & Wooldridge 2009: 6). Therefore, a statement on the ef-
fect of a project with certainty could only be taken by a change in the time dimension – 
through a comparison of the exact same individuals’ performance with and without the pro-
gram given exactly the same context. Additionally, the very same observation should be con-
ducted on the surrounding vicinity if one were to obtain the impact on the non-participants 
with certainty as well. As this is obviously impossible, the project evaluation literature aims at 
finding methods for approaching this counterfactual as far as possible. The last decades saw a 
quickly growing literature on methods and best-practices, summarized in various works: ex-
perimental (e.g. Duflo et al. 2008) or non-experimental (e.g. Blundell & Costa Dias 2000), 
from a practical side (e.g. Khandker et al. 2010b) or with a detailed reference to the technical 
literature (e.g. Imbens & Wooldridge 2009), additional to the references in various textbooks 
(e.g. Angrist & Pischke 2009, Stock & Watson 2007, Wooldridge 2009). Leading develop-
mental institutions are pushing for a widespread adoption of structured project evaluation in 
DC following clear cut norms and standards – be it OECD recommendations for the macro 
level (OECD-DAC 2010) or World Bank documents with concrete techniques for practical 
evaluations (e.g. Baker 2000). The drive for effective, results oriented evaluation has even 
reached the discussion in parliaments (e.g. Perrin 2011). 
Effective DC is back on the agenda. The crucial issue is “to fill gaps in understanding 
what works, what does not, and how measured changes in well-being are attributable to a par-
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ticular project or policy intervention” (Khandker et al. 2010b: 3). This change bears the prom-
ise of maximizing the effectiveness of scarce funds for the benefit of the poor and the poorest. 
For this, evaluators have a broad range of qualitative and quantitative techniques at their pro-
posal as well as their fruitful combination by so called ‘Q-squared approaches’ (Kanbur & 
Shaffer 2007). But in approaching the counterfactual, quantitative approaches allow for a 
generation of evidence on a large scale. This thesis will therefore concentrate in Chapter 2 on 
a review of the most promising methods in the field of econometric program evaluation, 
which are aiming at quantitatively measuring the causal impact of a (development) interven-
tion. The core question of this part subsequently is: How can causality be proven through 
quantitative methods? Attached to this question is the central problem of selection bias or 
endogeneity in program placement, a problem that routinely affects any attempts to evalua-
tion. Thus, it will be crucial for an answer to the above mentioned question to identify meth-
ods that allow controlling for or circumventing this selection bias.  
 
Chapter 3 will apply some of these econometric methods to data on a development program in 
Bangladesh.1 As will be argued, sound project evaluation is essential for finding viable 
pathways in fulfilling the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the United Nations 
(UN), especially MDG 1, the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger (UN 2000). The 
scene of non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs) conducting many small-
scale projects could provide an important field of experimentation for effective DC on the 
ground as well as for methodologically sound program evaluation. One such project is the 
Income and Food Security for Ultra-Poor (IFSUP) project initiated by the German-based 
NGDO NETZ Partnership for Development and Justice (NETZ)2. It aims at sustaining the 
livelihoods of the very poorest segment of society in three districts of northern Bangladesh, 
intervening with 4,800 households. The project for this uses a three-pillar approach to 
enhance financial and human capital, reduce vulnerability to shocks and a transform the local 
social context in a pro-poor direction.3 The project is in line with a general move towards 
more effective social protection policies in developing countries (Barrientos 2011, Ellis et al. 
                                                 
1 In this, Chapter 3 is building on past analysis of the same project in Rudolph (2010, 2011). Appendix 1 will 
describe this point of departure. 
2 The project was jointly implemented by the NGDOs ‘NETZ Partnership for Development and Justice’ together 
with its Bangladeshi partner organizations (PNGOs) ASHRAI, ‘Jagorani Chakra Foundation’ (JCF) and ‘Sa-
balamby Unnayan Samity’ (SUS). 
3 The first part of this thesis is already referring to IFSUP for the illustrating of the applicability of different 
approaches to the counterfactual. Appendix 2 therefore provides a general overview on the project and its popu-
lation in case a more thorough understanding on the approach of IFSUP is necessary. Even further, Appendix 3 
anchors the project in the context of Bangladesh and its northern districts. 
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2009) and a focus on asset accumulation for providing pathways out of poverty (Moser 2007, 
Moser & Dani 2008). It thereby is one of several pioneering projects centering on asset 
transfer for the poorest segment of society.4  
It will be the goal of Chapter 3 to quantitatively evaluate the impact of IFSUP on the 
targeted population in various dimensions. An answer is thought to the core question of the 
second part, whether data on IFSUP can link the project to changes in outcome variables. For 
establishing causality, data on a control group of 1200 households will be used as counterfac-
tual. But the estimation of the counterfactual is not clear cur: Endogeneity in program place-
ment and attrition problems will be addressed through methods such as Manski bounds 
(Manski 1990, 2007) and difference-in-differences (Imbens & Wooldridge 2009: Chapter 6.5) 
as described, amongst other methods, in the first part of this thesis.  
As shall be demonstrated, IFSUP has generated a positive impact on outcome vari-
ables indicating food security, expenditure, socioeconomic status, physical asset holdings 
(both productive as well durable), and savings. Outcomes on health indicators are not conclu-
sive. It will be argued that the threefold estimation strategy is leading to internally valid re-
sults. Nonetheless, it is too early to draw conclusion on the sustainability of the intervention. 
 
For a relevance of evaluations to the social sciences and knowledge in general, the gener-
alizability of results is crucial. Chapter 4 will therefore address the concept of external valid-
ity: How can a transferability of results to other contexts be plausibly established in theory – 
and is this the case for the project at hand? In comparison with related programs, IFSUP adds 
to the picture of positive evidence for an asset-based approach to ultra-poverty reduction. This 
as well supports calls for a more prominent role of promotional elements in social protection 
schemes. 
 
Chapter 5 concludes this thesis. The arguments laid out support the overall case of a rigorous 
evaluation of development programs with a credible counterfactual. Only credible evidence 
can underpin the search on what works in poverty alleviation. 
                                                 
4 See for a first overview of different projects in the social protection field Barrientos et al. (2010), for asset 
transfer projects espescially pp. 54 & 72. 
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2 Methods for Impact Evaluation: Overview on the State 
of Quantitative Impact Analysis 
“Suppose you have 10 premises, 9 of them almost certain, one 
dicey. Your conclusion is highly insecure, not 90% probable” 
(Cartwright 2007: 14). 
 
The first part of this thesis, as outlined, focuses on the question of ‘How can causality be es-
tablished by quantitative methods?’. In the following (Chapter 2.1), differences in the applica-
tion of quantitative methods will be addressed and delimited against qualitative approaches. 
Shortly, foundations of the method in probabilistic theory will be outlined. Afterwards, in 
Chapter 2.2, the focus will rest on the question of how to establish the judgment that a project 
works: The self-selection or endogeneity problem will be described as major confounder in 
establishing a counterfactual, a measure how the targeted population would have fared with-
out the program. It will be argued that the credibility of impact estimation strategies depends 
on their case for successfully establishing this counterfactual. The Rubin Causal Model 
(Rubin 1974) will be used for analyzing the problem. Subsequently, different methods are 
outlined that account for or circumvent possible selection bias. Chapter 2.3 describes the ran-
domization approach that provides for a clear-cut solution under ideal circumstances – issues 
in implementation and possible problems such as ethical considerations are subsequently ad-
dressed. Chapter 2.4 describes non-experimental (or observational) methods that allow for 
controls (matching methods, regression discontinuity designs, higher-order difference meth-
ods) or circumvention of the bias (instrumental variable methods, bounds for the selection 
bias, sensitivity analysis, control function methods). In the discussion of these methods, the 
IFSUP project will be used for illustration of evaluation problems where feasible. A special 
emphasize will be put on higher-order differences and Manski bounds as these will be applied 
for the evaluation of IFSUP. Chapter 2.5 will address common problems to the application of 
these approaches (confounders such as spill-overs or questions of heterogeneous impact) and 
discuss them in comparison. Chapter 2.6 concludes with the debate on a hierarchy of methods.  
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2.1 Understanding What Works and Why it Does 
The question of impact evaluation is always twofold: What works and why does it so? This 
question alone separates impact evaluation from mere operational evaluation and monitoring 
systems. While monitoring systems provide the data5, the monitoring is no evaluation as such. 
Monitoring systems in this are prerequisites for later impact evaluation, especially if they in-
clude the monitoring of the performance of a control group.6 Operational evaluation on the 
basis of monitoring systems deducts whether the achievement of project targets was fulfilled – 
from the number of beneficiaries reached to the amount of inputs disbursed and output levels 
achieved. But impact evaluation is more: It tries to establish the counterfactual and compare 
outcomes of participants under the project to what they would have achieved otherwise. Thus, 
as Khandker et al. (2010b: 18) note, “[o]perational and impact evaluation are complementary 
rather than substitutes.” In their definition 
 
“[o]perational evaluation relates to ensuring effective implementation of a program in accordance with 
the program’s initial objectives. Impact evaluation is an effort to understand whether the changes in 
well-being are indeed due to project or program intervention. Specifically, impact evaluation tries to de-
termine whether it is possible to identify the program effect and to what extent the measured effect can 
be attributed to the program and not to some other causes” (Khandker et al. 2010b: 18, e.i.o.). 
Impact evaluation in this view provides answers to the question on ‘what works’. Added to 
this must be the question of ‘why’: The core conceptual debate in impact evaluation is then 
centered on the question where to place the focus. White (2009: 282) in this light contrasts 
“black-box” approaches centering around the ‘what’ with “[t]heory based impact evaluation” 
interested in the ‘why’: The ‘what’-focus implies an evaluation of average effects for the av-
erage population, the ‘why’-focus an emphasis on the processes transmitting these effects, the 
surrounding theory and heterogeneity in treatment responses.  
Related to the call for a focus on processes, the debate surrounds the perspective the 
evaluator should take. Beyond the interest in the mere effect of the single intervention lie 
questions of significance for the understanding of human coexistence: Out of this perspective, 
it is then crucial to “ensure that studies which may serve as program evaluations for partners 
provide more general lessons for social scientists. Scholars will benefit from linking empirical 
studies to more general theoretical work, using that work to guide hypothesis formation” 
(Humphreys & Weinstein 2009: 376).  
Also underlying this debate is a methodical question concerning the normative basis 
the researcher adheres to in his view of poverty, leading to the choice of different methods.  
                                                 
5 Through primary assessments of the project area, the targets to be achieved, indicators to monitor these targets 
as well as the means to keep track of them. Monitoring by this as well fulfills the role of providing a guideline 
for the concrete project implementation and adjusting the policy in case of need (Khandker et al. 2010b: 11f.). 
6 See Perrin (2011) for an overview on a results-based approach to monitoring that recognizes these mechanisms. 
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2.1.1 The Distinction between Qualitative and Quantitative Ap-
proaches 
Following Kanbur & Shaffer (2007), qualitative analysis often implies an approach to poverty 
denying universal, external benchmarks. ‘Truth’ on the poor has to be founded in arguments 
or discourse that at the best follows equal participation, taking care of e.g. power relations. 
This still allows for rankings and comparisons of poor and non-poor households, yet based on 
perceptions of the respective community members in a given area with methods such as par-
ticipatory poverty assessment (comp. for an example Kadigi et al. 2007).7 Central is the try to, 
as best as possible, refrain from imposing one’s own conceptual categories on others. In this 
view, as Chambers (2009: 243f.) puts it, 
 
“[t]he starting point would be to ask about the political economy of the evaluation: who would gain? 
Who might lose? And how? And, especially, how was it intended and anticipated that the findings 
would make a difference. This might well require a brainstorming workshop with staff from the funding 
agency. “ 
On the other hand, a quantitative and empiricist method is taken by the consumption poverty 
approach, the “‘gold standard’ in applied poverty analysis in the developing world” (Kanbur 
& Shaffer 2007: 185).8 In this conception a definition of poverty is constructed following a 
certain level of (non-)fulfillment of basic needs beyond the individual. Methodologically cen-
tral is the interpersonal comparison of utility. Modern utility theory argues that it is possible 
to empirically derive a valid poverty line (as well as subsequently trends and causes for pov-
erty) insofar as it is based on an intersubjectively observable assessment of relevant consump-
tion data (Kanbur & Shaffer 2007: 190). If these normative assumptions9 are accepted, quan-
titative approaches have the merit of providing an approximation to the counterfactual with 
enormous potential – at least under ideal conditions. But the quantitative researcher has to 
remain cautious in generalizing his results: The context dependency of an intervention is not 
only important on the individual level10 but as well in transferring results to different social 
and cultural contexts – a question that will turn up again when discussing the problem of ex-
ternal validity of evaluations (comp. Chapter 4).  
                                                 
7 This approach derives from a discursive normative framework with reference to the Frankfurt School around 
Habermas and Apel, inspired by Kantian thoughts (Shaffer 2002: 59), and tries to found its results in “dialogue 
[as] a necessary means for arriving at normative conclusions” (Kanbur & Shaffer 2007: 191). 
8 As Shaffer (2002: 59f.) outlines, this approach is based on naturalist normative theory, which derived histori-
cally from the moral theory of David Hume. See Shaffer (2002: Section 4 & 5) for a short overview. 
9 Revealed preference theory allows deriving levels of well-being and poverty, money metric utility allows for a 
numerical representation as preferences are represented by consumption expenditure. Subsequently, this allows 
for „the aggregation of persons or households below the poverty line and comparisons of well-being across per-
sons or households“ (Kanbur & Shaffer 2007: 191). 
10 This is clearly complicating the comparability of answers to questions such as ‘Is your husband opposing the 
violation of women’s rights’ between individuals in the IFSUP data-set, as the respective answer will depend on 
the level of women’s rights existing as perceived by the women in question. 
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The weighting of the roles that qualitative and the quantitative methods shall play in 
project evaluation is thus contested. Bamberger et al. (2010) emphasize that both qualitative 
impact assessments as well as mixed methods have to be kept in mind as important alterna-
tives to a quantitative approach, depending on the evaluation context. Khandker et al. (2010b: 
19, e.i.o.) on the other hand argue in line with the widespread conviction that “qualitative as-
sessment on its own cannot assess outcomes against relevant alternatives or counterfactual 
outcomes.” A popular combination of approaches in this latter understanding would give the 
qualitative approach the role of identifying pathways of the causal effect while the quantita-
tive is seen as way of choice in establishing credible evidence of the counterfactual.  
While this combination in a ‘Q-squared approach’ can create the normative tensions 
pointed to above, it as well generates promising insights: Not only, but importantly an in-
depth understanding of motives and situations by qualitative research as well as quantitative 
information to empirically test general hypotheses (Kanbur & Shaffer 2007: 183). As the 
practical part of this thesis is relying on quantitative analysis with a ‘what works’-focus, the 
question of an in-depth understanding of pathways is troublesome – partly, this can be solved 
by resorting to theory, as outlined below; partly it has to be kept for further research. 
2.1.2 The Role of Theory 
In line with proponents of a participatory approach to poverty, Deaton (2010b: 3, e.i.o.) calls 
for a greater focus on processes: He argues that “[f]inding out how people […] escape from 
poverty is unlikely to come from the empirical evaluation of actual programs […] unless such 
analysis tries to discover why projects work rather than whether they work.” Related is a call 
for a broader focus for impact evaluation: As Humphreys & Weinstein (2009: 376) empha-
size, the relevance of program evaluation rests on a look beyond the mere analysis to ques-
tions of broader interest to the understanding of human (co-)existence. Quantitative methods, 
especially social experiments as the emerging quantitative method of choice, are then a tool 
with very high potential. Deaton (2010b: 13, e.i.o.) argues for a linkage between the single 
evaluation, the processes surrounded and a general understanding of social mechanisms 
through the use of theory: “[F]ormulate hypotheses and derive predictions, what I have re-
ferred to here as ‘acid tests,’ that are hard to explain if the theory is not true, so that we seem 
to learn at least something when the predictions are confirmed”. If empirical work is unin-
spired by theoretical considerations the case is less clear-cut whether evaluation results are 
causal relationships or only statistical artifacts. He therefore advocates a hypothetico-
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deductive approach:11 According to this understanding, theory and data are connected through 
a mutually reinforcing process. Theory is leading to (natural) experiments and their economet-
ric analysis, which is then (partially) falsified and in this process theory reformulated and 
strengthened.  
But it has to be kept in mind that the empirical evidence generated in this process is re-
lying on the “weakest link principle” (Cartwright 2007: 14, e.i.o): Its great promise is the 
proof of a causal relationship between factors and outcome and a confirmation or refutation of 
the theory to be tested. But for this to hold, the researcher is usually required to make assump-
tions for the validity of empirical results and their applicability in a broader context. The de-
gree of the weakest assumption then determines the overall weakness of the argument. 
“[G]iven the background assumptions, the hypothesis follows deductively from the results 
[…]. But if you want credit for this benefit of a clinching method, you must be able to show 
that the conjunction of your premises has high probability in the case at hand” (Cartwright 
2007: 15, e.i.o.).12  
 But the role and value of theory is not undoubted: Khandker (2010b: 20f.) sees a clear 
distinction between an approach to evaluation through structural models predicting the behav-
ior of participants and outcome of the intervention – what he calls “ex ante evaluation” – and 
typical ex post analysis. Although these approaches can be combined, there certainly is no 
need for it. Even further, Banerjee (2006b: 19) (concerning the generalization of empirical 
results) observes a complementary relation in the use of theory against the use of empirical 
evidence: “[W]e could reduce our dependence on theories by running more experiments.”13 
This view is taken up by DiNardo (2008), who argues that experiments, in a broader sense 
evaluation as such, serve foremost for clarification if faced with theoretical ignorance: 
 
“Whatever the validity of the view that one cannot experiment in advance of ‘theory’ in the natural sci-
ences, in the social sciences, it is clear that no theory has the same standing as, say, general relativity in 
physics. […O]ne does not need a ‘correct’ theory at hand, nor an understanding as rich as that found in 
some of the natural sciences to find an experiment useful. Experiments are just ways to use things we 
(think we) understand to learn about something we do not.” 
Latest methodological approaches aim at a combination of general theory and empirical evi-
dence already in their basic approach to estimation: Heckman & Vytlacil (2005) follow the 
idea of an underlying pre-determined structural model that the researcher aims to estimate as 
comprehensively as possible depending on the data at hand. Thus, the concrete contribution 
                                                 
11 A detailed overview can be found in Cartwright (2007). 
12 This weakest link principle is the most important underlying limitation of quantitative research and especially 
important for abstractions from the single experiments as will be discussed in Chapter 4. Additionally, it influ-
ences the debate on an underlying hierarchy of methods as will be argued in Chapter 2.6. 
13 One has to note that Banerjee is in other contexts recognizing the distinct role of theory, even in a normative 
sense for policy advice (comp. e.g. Banerjee 2002). 
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the empirical data can make to the theoretical framework is made evident; at the same time, 
clear limits are set by the theoretical framework for the interpretation of the data beyond their 
direct applicability.  
Duflo (2008: 3902f.) notes an important value added by such an approach involving 
structural modeling: Evaluation usually contributes only to the understanding of total deri-
vates of an intervention – the total effect after all agents affected have “re-optimized”. Of ad-
ditional interest to the policy maker may be the total welfare effect, though, to judge an inter-
vention against possible alternatives – this is better understood by looking at partial derivates, 
excluding the re-optimization process from analysis through ceteris paribus assumptions. For 
the IFSUP case, this would be of direct interest: A massive capital influx such as the assets 
transferred through the project is certainly affecting household choices – if households were 
to offer less work on the wage labor market due to the IFSUP intervention, they would substi-
tute away from other income sources. The total derivate then measures impacts of the assets 
transferred in relation to earlier external income opportunities. If one assumes, however, a 
situation of labor shortages in which these external income opportunities are open for other 
community members, a total derivate is underestimating the welfare change that actually oc-
curred. This is just one example of how the overall welfare effect of the intervention as meas-
ured by partial derivates can differ from total derivates.  
2.1.3 Causation in Quantitative Project Evaluation 
As implied in the discussion so far, measuring effects by quantitative methods is relying on 
probabilistic prediction. Interest lies in the distribution of outcomes of a certain variable the 
intervention is, deliberately or not, supposed to be influencing: Even though projects claim to 
cause increased well-being in a given population covered, this is not literally correct. They 
usually increase the probability14 of a certain target group to be (in whatever respect) better 
off than without the project. Thus, the causality between intervention and envisaged outcome 
is generally understood as probabilistic effect. As Suppes (1970: Chapter 2) outlines, the attri-
bution of event A  to have caused event  is not a straightforward task. Prima facie, only 
few conditions are necessary (
B
Suppes 1970: Chapter 2): A causing event must precede its out-
come in time, . The occurrence of the causing event needs to be probable, . 
And most important, the occurrence of the event  conditional on 
21 tt < 0)( 1 >tAP
B A  must be more probable 
than the occurrence of  otherwise, . But this prima facie attribution B )()|( 212 ttt BPABP >
                                                 
14 See Cartwright (2007) for a summarized or Pearl (2009) for a detailed overview on the basis of quantitative 
program evaluation in probabilistic theory as formalized by, amongst others, Suppes (1970). Comp. as well 
Manski’s (2007: Chapter 1) introduction to conditional predictions. 
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establishes only a correlation between both events – event A  might have caused event , but 
it must not. It could especially be the case that the correlation is only due to a third factor  
(a “spurious cause” in the terminology of Suppes (
B
0tC
1970: 21, e.i.o.)).15 In the IFSUP case, the 
intervention might have caused higher incomes for the project participants, as noted e.g. by 
NETZ (2009a: 2): „The average family income per capita per day, adjusted for inflation, in-
creased to 30,1 Taka”. But only looking at the intervention group and their income might be 
misleading, as other factors are potentially confounding the prima facie conclusion: This 
separation of causes is of high practical concern. Two highly influential studies (Khandker 
2005, Pitt & Khandker 1998) indicated a very positive impact of microcredit and were much 
cited in favour of the method: As e.g. Li et al. (2011: 404) state, through exactly these studies 
“microcredit’s potential in reducing poverty has been thoroughly examined [for Bangladesh]”. 
Much less cited are though studies that have shown how these conclusions could be a prime 
example of confounding spurious causes with evidence: Reanalysing the data, they estimate 
that the positive effect of the very same microcredit intervention may just as much rely on the 
fact that microcredit villages are different from non-microcredit villages (Roodman & 
Morduch 2009: 24, 31, 36). The intervention of the microcredit institution A  is then corre-
lated with the probability of finding higher incomes (event ) but only because some attrib-
utes C  are causing both the introduction of microcredit programs as well as implying positive 
economic dynamics.
B
16 Roodman & Morduch (2009: 4) therefore emphasize that  
 
“when studying causality in social systems with strong endogeneity, claims of non-experimental identi-
fication need to be held to demanding standards. The experience also casts doubt on the power of so-
phisticated parametric techniques to compensate for the lack of such.” 
Further complicated is the attribution of cause to an event by the general existence of “sup-
plementary causes”17 (Suppes 1970: 33, e.i.o.) in social systems that accompany the causer 
but are not causal in themselves.  
This being the case, the researcher has to isolate the intervention effect on the subjects 
next to other factors accompanying or even interacting with the variables of interest. Only 
then an intervention can be attributed to the observed higher probability of a differing level of 
the outcome variable of interest. The higher this probability in comparison is, the larger the 
project impact. The fact that a project is supposed to cause a certain effect, its impact, must 
                                                 
ABPCABP15 As Suppes (1970: 21) outlines, this would imply 12012 ttttt )|()|( = . In reality, it will usually be the 
case that both event A as well as C will have an influence on B, while influencing each other. The task of the 
researcher would then be to disentangle the causal relationships and isolate the effects.  
16 This could for example be better infrastructure, implying better accessibility for the microcredit institution as 
well as better marketing opportunities for the villagers.  
17 As Suppes (1970: 33) outlines, this would imply an event A and an event C to raise the probability of event B 
in joint occurrence, thus . ))|();|(max()|( 1212112 ttttttt CBPABPCABP >
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therefore be stated in terms of probability or, as usually conducted, in an overall aggregation 
such as by analysis of mean developments as later in this thesis.  
Figure 1 displays the stylized distribution of a variable over three different popula-
tions. The distribution of group 3 exemplifies a group where an intervention aimed at increas-
ing this variable took place. The distributions of group 1 and group 2 are possible control 
groups. Central part of program evaluation is an estimation of the average treatment effect 
(ATE) (e.g. Khandker et al. 2010b: 26): The ATE reflects a shift in the mean allocation as 
evident in Figure 1. The distribution representing the intervention group and its mean is very 
distinct from the distributions of control group 1 and 2. But for a convincing assertion on the 
ATE, a crucial assumption must hold: Only the project occurrence may separate the groups, 
all other social, political and individual factors being at least on average equally distributed 
within these groups – this assumption is the crux of impact evaluation.  
Figure 1: Exemplary distribution of a factor X within three populations 
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The graph shows the distributions of the density of an arbitrary variable X for three different populations
interpreted as control and target groups.
Stylized analysis of a causal effect
 
If this assumption can be accepted, the probability aspect shows itself when choosing a ran-
dom member of either of these groups: The probability of a higher value of factor X is higher 
for drawings from the intervention group. But the large overlap for the distribution invalidates 
a comparison of singular observations. Therefore, the mean over all individuals in all three 
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populations can be compared as indicator of the typical project effect – “[e]ven though other 
definitions of typical are interesting” (Rubin 1974: 690). Subsequently, Figure 1 as well indi-
cates how a comparison of effects through ATEs can loose important information: While a 
comparison of group 3 both with group 1 and group 2 leads to the same conclusions concern-
ing the ATE, the apparent compression of distribution 3 in comparison with 1 does not appear 
in an ATE analysis.  
Last but not least, these measurements are typically relying on probabilistic conclu-
sions. As cost efficiency usually prevents full population surveys, the drawing of samples 
allows then with a certain probability18 an inference on the probable distributions of variables 
within the populations – and thereby on the probability that the event in question caused the 
outcome it was intended to cause as well as its magnitude.  
2.2 Bypassing the Counterfactual-Problem 
Obvious problem for non-refutable ATEs is the physical impossibility to observe the same 
individuals in the same context and at the same time but with different levels of treatment. 
Two obvious possibilities come to mind to bypass this counterfactual-problem: First, a com-
parison of the same units at different points of time – which requires a good case for structural 
conditions not changing over time; second, a comparison holding time constant but observing 
different units – which requires a good case for the similarity, at least on average, of the units 
under observation.  
Both approaches are difficult in practice: In the case of IFSUP, data for both ap-
proaches would be present, but unobservable factors complicate their clear-cut application. A 
major confounder for the unit constant, time varying approach is for example a severe hike of 
food prices during the project period, as illustrated in Figure 2: The graph outlines the devel-
opment of national retail rice prices from 2006 to 2011, bars indicating the recall periods for 
the IFSUP baseline and impact data concerning questions on food security. Food security and 
hunger are directly related to market prices, as market prices influence the “trade based enti-
tlements” and the “exchange entitlement decline” (Devereux 2001: 246) of the poor. A simple 
before-after comparison of outcomes in IFSUP can therefore be expected to show only a con-
founded estimate of the project impact, as the hike in rice prices would diminish the project’s 
effects and not even show off in the data analysed.19
                                                 
18 Significance levels are by this derived that assess the probability of estimates not having occurred by chance. 
19 This entitlement approach by Sen (1981) offered a new way of thinking about the relationship between hunger 
and its relationship to the individual’s position on the market through ‘entitlements’. Although his approach is 
much criticized for laying to much focus on the economic aspects of food distribution, “it shifts the analytical 
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Figure 2: Development of Bangladeshi retail rice prices per kilogram in taka (national average). 
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Retail rice price (national average) of coarse rice (per kg) in Bangladesh inbetween January 2006 and January
2011. Bars frame food security related recall periods for the baseline and impact survey of IFSUP.
Data source: Management Information System and Monitoring Unit, Directorate General of Food, GoB,
online at http://www.fao.org/giews/pricetool/, accessed 08.03.2011.
Retail rice price per kg
 
Similarly, a major confounder of a time constant approach such as earlier analysis of the IF-
SUP data (comp. Appendix 1: The Point of Departure in IFSUP Analysis) are structural dis-
similarity between the group of participants and the group of controls that might not even be 
present at the point of departure: The IFSUP project is expected to have changed the migra-
tion dynamics within these groups, which leads to differences in the observed populations 
against the actual population of interest, again confounding results. As analyzed in Rudolph 
(2010: 36),  
“[i]n the IFSUP case it could e.g. well be that the drop outs of the control group were due to those who, 
not being held by the promises of the project’s asset transfer, took their chances in migration […] In this 
case, the over- or underestimation of the project impact would depend on the [poverty] strata of mi-
grants: Were it the most able, taking their chances, the project impact is actually overestimated – were it 
the very endangered, being forced to migrate out of desperateness, the project impact would be underes-
timated. It is open for further research to apply controls for these possible effects.” 
These examples indicate how “[f]inding an appropriate counterfactual constitutes the main 
challenge of an impact evaluation” (Khandker et al. 2010b: 22). And this challenge is substan-
tial in practice: Tedeschi & Karlan (2010) report for example how leading development or-
                                                                                                                                                        
focus away from a fixation on food supplies […] and on to the inability of groups of people to acquire food” 
(Devereux 2001: 246). Additionally, the exchange entitlement approach sheds light on how market processes can 
create hunger without the food supply changing through the relative value of the poor’s income (Devereux 2001: 
246). In this light, the conclusion of the rice price hike negatively influencing the project participants would of 
course be premature, if the relative wage rate is not accounted for – but it cannot be ruled out either.  
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ganizations promote flawed approaches with doubtful internal validity, where groups are 
compared that are not (reasonably) identical in expectation.20  
For a solution to these problems, most methods available draw on the time constant 
approach comparing a control and beneficiary group – additionally, the internal validity of 
estimates can be increased, if methods incorporate additional unit-constant elements by look-
ing at differences for the observations over time.  
2.2.1 Self-Selection as Core Obstacle in Practice 
The starting point for much of the econometric literature are the mentioned problems of en-
dogeneity in program placement or self-selection: Oftentimes, it is not clear how the selection 
into the participant and control groups has taken place and whether they are really comparable 
in all aspects relevant for the intervention pathway (Imbens & Wooldridge 2009: 6). And even 
if it is clear how individuals got into the groups it may be unclear who remains in the sample.  
The classical self-selection problem occurs, if individuals by themselves opt to take 
part in the project. Armendáriz & Morduch (2010: Chapter 9) report several examples com-
plicating the evaluation of development projects: It is e.g. found that microfinance borrowers 
are wealthier than their neighbors in the vicinity. This must not, but is very likely to cause 
bias in a comparison of the outcomes of borrowers to non-borrowers. Bias occurs if the fact of 
higher wealth is related to the outcome measured, as then an estimation of the ATE could be 
related to either the intervention itself, the pre-intervention wealth differentials or, most likely, 
both.21 These biases can be very substantial, as McKernan (2002: 109) finds: In his estimation 
of profits of Grameen Bank customers, not controlling for this selection „may overestimate 
the effect of participation on profits by more than 200 percentage points.” Controlling for this 
selection might not be possible in all circumstances. But even in such a case, sensible conclu-
sions can be derived if the direction of the bias is known: The inference that a project works is 
valid if one finds a significant positive effect despite a negative bias in the data and even the 
magnitude of the effect is then a conservative approach to the true effect. A proper under-
standing of the impact pathway is therefore important – which provides an important link be-
tween the quantitative impact evaluation and qualitative as well as theoretic research. In the 
case of microfinance, the question would be whether the cause of the wealth discrepancy is to 
                                                 
20 In their case, a leading developmental organization suggested microfinance organizations to measure impacts 
by comparing veteran to new borrowers. But this approach is flawed as it is not taking into account, just as in the 
case of IFSUP, that drop-outs are structurally different in both groups which induces bias in estimates.  
21 In mathematical terms, the error term  is then related to the regressor  indicating treatment, and therefore 
 which is violating the crucial assumption for unbiased results (
u iX
0),( ≠uXCov i Angrist & Pischke 2009: 35). 
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be found in microfinance institutions selecting clients with more collateral or in wealthier 
villagers choosing to borrow from the MFIs due to e.g. better management skills or power 
relations (self-selection): In the second case, it can be expected that non-MFI borrowers 
would have fared worse than borrowers even if given the opportunity of taking credit. In the 
first case, an upward bias is not certain, it might even be the opposite sign given the theoreti-
cal expectation of increasing marginal returns to capital (Rudolph 2010: Chapter 1).  
 
The analysis of IFSUP is similarly a good example for self selection problems in two respects: 
on the one hand side because of deliberate project placement by the project officials, on the 
other hand because of self-selected differences in the participation of target and control group.  
Concerning the first, the fact that IFSUP targets the poorest of the poor22 makes the in-
tervention without further assumptions only comparable to other households in the same cir-
cumstances. A comparison with average villagers would e.g. always fail to the concern that 
unaccounted differences between them influence their response to asset transfer or training, 
not only but especially with reference to the respective power status and subsequent access to 
social resources they have (e.g. Bastiaensen et al. 2005: 980f.), and invalidate the estimates. A 
comparison with other ultra-poor is therefore both necessary to obtain unbiased results as well 
as highly instructive given the rarity of studies of the response of the most marginalized sec-
tion of society to poverty alleviation programs.  
Concerning the second, the aspect of self-selection, the target and control groups can 
be supposed to differ by various reasons: A potentially differing probability for migration 
between the project data gathering periods was already addressed. Additionally, the response 
rates of households chosen for target and control groups are likely to be much higher in the 
former given the closer contact to the project officials. It cannot be ruled out that the willing-
ness to respond in the control group is in turn related to personal outcomes and thus that self-
selection of reported outcomes is taking place. This bias could be indicated by a first analysis 
revealing a higher probability for non-minority households to dropping out of the data gather-
ing process (Rudolph 2010: 36). As it can be expected that the local ethnic minorities are dis-
criminated against by the majority of society (Braun 2010, Lehmann 2006) and thus face 
more difficulties on the local markets as well as via government officials, the control group 
altogether could be expected to have fared better than the data suggests. This aspect would 
imply an upward bias for a simple mean difference measurement. 
                                                 
22 As discussed in Appendix 2, IFSUP targets the work-able ‘ultra-poor’, a subgroup of the poor defined as those 
below an average 1800 kcal/day intake but able to physically work. 
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 At the heart of obtaining valid estimates is thus to ensure what is called the assumption 
of ‘(conditional) exogeneity of program placement’ (Haughton & Haughton 2011: 243). Exo-
geneity per se would be implied if one could be certain of structural similarity between both 
groups. Conditional exogeneity is “the assumption that adjusting treatment and control groups 
for differences in observed covariates, or pre-treatment variables, remove all biases in com-
parisons between treated and control units” (Imbens & Wooldridge 2009: 7). This framing of 
the selection bias problem for impact evaluation is as well called ‘conditional exogeneity of 
placement’ as well as “‘selection on observables,’ ‘unconfounded assignment’ or ‘ignorable 
assignment,’ although the latter two terms usually refer to the stronger assumption that TY  
and CY  [counterfactual outcomes] are independent of T  [group status] given X  [observ-
ables]“ (Ravallion 2008: 3792). 
2.2.2 The Comparison of Potential Outcomes 
To separate issues of endogenous placement on the measured project impact, the evaluation 
problem is classically formulated following a comparison of potential outcomes – a model 
developed among others by Rubin (1974). He thereby popularized a common “mathematical 
and conceptual language” (Sekhon 2009: 489) for the most popular techniques used in the 
social sciences for program evaluation:23  
Following the standard illustration (drawing primarily on Duflo et al. 2008: Chapter 2, 
Imbens & Wooldridge 2009: Chapter 2 , Khandker et al. 2010b: 25-27, Sekhon 2009: 490-
494) of the Rubin Causal Model , the potential outcome iY Y  of individual
24 , , is 
compared if it received treatment, , as well as if it remained untreated, . Translated to 
the case of IFSUP, the causal effect of the intervention on the variable of interest, e.g. meals 
per day, for each individual  would be the difference in meal intakes for the same person, 
under treatment and if left to itself, thus the difference in its potential outcomes . The 
overall causal effect of the project as measured by changes in the population mean
i Ni ,...,1=
T
iY
C
iY
i
C
i
T
i YY −
25, the 
                                                 
23 Sekhon (2009: 489) stresses that the different techniques of causal inference do not necessarily need to be tied 
to the, as he calls it, Neyman-Rubin-Model. They can be used in the sense of a nonparametric estimator, although 
then “what exactly has been estimated is unclear”. He similarly makes the important point that alternatives to 
this specification exist and should not be forgotten, such as the approach of Pearl (2009) to causality – “an alter-
native whose prominence has been growing in recent years” (Sekhon 2009: 489).  
24 Throughout the text, in generally discussing inference frameworks unit , individual or household i are used 
synonymously to refer to the object of treatment of the intervention. Where a distinction would be relevant, this 
is indicated. 
i i
25 Todd (2008: 3851f.) summarizes other parameters of interest: Amongst others direct vs. indirect effects of the 
program, quantiles of the distribution of impacts, if relevant conditional on specific characteristics, the effect of 
treatment on the treated as well as on the untreated that are important for project evaluation besides the ATE . 
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ATE26, could then be displayed by the expected value over all individuals, 
. This approach is obviously counterfactual. In practice, only actual meal 
intakes are observable, although of course counterfactual outcomes are “a quantity that […] is 
logically well defined” (
)( Ci
T
i YYEATE −=
Duflo et al. 2008: 3900).  
Still, an empirical comparison would only be possible for two distinct groups, one re-
ceiving treatment ( 1=G ), one serving as control group ( 0=G ). This approach leads to an 
observed project effect , referred to as single difference (SD), of  D
)0|()1|( =−== GYEGYED CiTi . 
To clarify the difference between observed project effect and actual project effect, the coun-
terfactual outcome  of an IFSUP member, thus CiY 1=G , had it not received this treatment is 
added and subtracted to the equation. The last two terms cancel out and then just simplify to 
the equation above:  
)1|()1|()0|()1|( =−=+=−== GYEGYEGYEGYED CiCiCiTi . 
Reformulation leads to27  
 . )]0|()1|([)1|( =−=+=−= GYEGYEGYYED CiCiCiTi
The first argument, , gives the average causal effect of treatment for the 
group of treated (“average treatment effect on the treated [TOT]” (
)1|( =− GYYE CiTi
Ravallion 2008: 3790, 
e.i.o.)). If the project has no effect (e.g. no spill-overs) on the untreated, TOT is equal to ATE 
(Todd 2008: 3852f.). The second argument of the above equation indicates the bias of , 
, if it were used as measurement for TOT. The bias in TOT or 
ATE is the difference in mean outcomes of the two groups 
D
)]0|()1|([ =−= GYEGYE CiCi
1=G  and  in the case none 
of them were treated: Thus, for IFSUP, it would be the expected difference in IFSUP mem-
bers and control group villagers had IFSUP never been implemented.  
0=G
The crucial question for using  as an estimate of the causal effect is whether this dif-
ference can be supposed to be close to zero – or in other words: If one can be certain that the 
members chosen for the project were not structurally stronger (as e.g. working with them 
would be more easy) or structurally weaker (as e.g. only the poorest were chosen for project 
participation while the rest serves as control group) compared to the counterparts in the con-
trol group. This, of course, is nothing but a mere reformulation of the initially mentioned con-
dition, namely that the assumption of (conditional) exogeneity of program placement holds.  
D
                                                 
26 Different Names are used for the average treatment effect: Imbens & Wooldridge (2009: 15) e.g. refer to the 
“Population Average Treatment Effect (PATE)” to give credit to the fact that the observations N are usually one 
of many subpopulations within an existing superpopulation (subsequently they refer to the later to be introduced 
treatment effect on the treated (TOT) as “Population Average Treatment effect on the Treated (PATT)” .  
27 That, as Deaton (2010a: 439) puts it, the difference of averages is the average of differences is due to the fact 
that the expectation is a linear operator. 
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2.2.3 Approaches to the Counterfactual 
In the literature, several designs have been proposed that allow for a good case to uphold the 
case for similarity between beneficiaries and control group members in expectation. These 
designs are separated by their central design features, as depicted in Figure 3 below. The clas-
sification is based on Imbens & Lemieux (2009: 7f.) and Ravallion (2008: 3792).28
Figure 3: A differentiation of quantitative estimation strategies 
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One set of methods is based on a randomized allocation of units to control and target group 
status. These are ex ante and by their design ensuring exogeneity in expectation, be it through 
intentional design, potentially conditional on further observable factors, or as found in nature. 
The randomized approach can create a clear-cut inference on a causal ATE with a minimum 
of assumptions (discussed in Chapter 2.3).  
                                                 
28 Note that Ravallion (2008) and Imbens (2009) classify RDD and higher order differences differently. I follow 
Ravallion (2008) in these cases. Additionally, Todd (2008: 3855f.) mentions “before-after comparisons” as sepa-
rate strategy. This kind of evaluation would just assume an ignorability of time for the counterfactual which is an 
assumption difficult to uphold in social systems and therefore not considered separately. 
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Another set of methods are observational methods, where endogeneity in placement is ex ante 
present in the data (discussed in Chapter 2.4). Solutions of observational (or non-
experimental) methods are on the one hand provided through the introduction of further re-
strictions on the sample, by this generating exogeneity – as is the case with higher-order-
differences, matching and regression discontinuity designs. On the other hand, methods have 
been developed that allow for a discarding of the bias by circumventing it altogether – as with 
instrumental variables, bounds, sensitivity analysis or control function methods.29
2.3 The Randomization Approach to Impact Evaluation 
2.3.1 Methodology 
The most comprehensive solution to the endogeneity problem is the case of a randomization 
of the intervention, intentionally or by natural hazard. For a truly random assignment, the 
whole population, or a sub-sample of it, would be randomly, e.g. via a lottery30, separated into 
treatment and control groups. The case of true randomization makes, in expectation, the aver-
age response to treatment or non-treatment by definition equivalent in both groups given a 
large enough  (N Stock & Watson 2007: Chapter 2): Thus, with 
, the selection bias cancels out, consequently the observed effect, 
, constitutes the actual causal effect of treatment: 
)0|()1|( =≡= GYEGYE CiCi
)0|()1|( =−== GYEGYED CiTi
ATED = . As Deaton (2010a: 439) observes:  
 
“The difference in means between the treatments and controls is an estimate of the average treatment ef-
fect among the treated, which, since the treatment and controls differ only by randomization, is an esti-
mate of the average treatment effect for all. This standard but remarkable result depends both on ran-
domization and on the linearity of expectations.” 
Still, it is important to keep in mind that this result hinges on the assumption of the non-
occurrence of spill-overs. Otherwise biases could be present in both directions (Duflo et al. 
2008: 3941f.). This is a potential problem for all methods, picked up in Chapter 2.5.1. 
 
Oftentimes, clear-cut randomization is difficult to implement. Pure randomization may not be 
feasible for the objectives of the implementing organization or even a social scientists’ re-
                                                 
29 Overall, this discussion focuses on the most important non-experimental methods in both categories. Given the 
quickly expanding literature it can by no means claim to be exhaustive. Treatment is e.g. assumed to be binary in 
almost all cases, only the bounding approach touching continuous treatment in passing. See Imbens & 
Wooldridge (2009: Chapter 7) for further methods for the case of continuous treatment and generally for further 
interest in program evaluation. 
30 Duflo et al. (2008: 3915-3918) discuss various additional methods of randomizing interventions, as lotteries 
might not be feasible in all cases: A randomized phase-in would for example compare results between those, 
who were randomly chosen to receive the treatment later than the first treatment group. Popular are as well “en-
couragement designs”, where the evaluator does not randomize the treatment itself but incentives to take up the 
treatment that are then used as proxy (comp. as well Khandker et al. 2010b: 38).  
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search question. In case of IFSUP, it is the explicit aim of targeting certain strata of the ultra-
poor, amongst others 40% ultra-poor of aboriginal ethnicity. Randomization would thus be 
conducted conditional on these observable factors. This approach does not lead to less consis-
tent estimates as these observables can be segregated to arrive at an overall causal effect. In 
case of randomization conditional on a set of observables X , the expected outcome condi-
tional on the same set X  is equal in both groups: . This 
allows for comparing the effect of the project within the respective strata, e.g. the effect of the 
project within the subgroup of aboriginal ethnicity against the effect within the subgroup of 
non-aboriginal ethnicity. The overall effect is deducted by weighting the outcomes with the 
share of the treated against non-treated in the strata it was conditioned on (
)0,|()1,|( =≡= GXYEGXYE CiCi
Duflo et al. 2008: 
3934f.)31, ensuring conditional exogeneity of placement.  
 
The approach of (conditional) randomization has the great advantage of, in theory, being a 
fool-proof strategy for internal validity: Internal validity refers to questions, “whether we can 
conclude that the measured impact is indeed caused by the intervention in the sample” (Duflo 
et al. 2008: 3950). Thus, evaluators can make clear statements on the mean project effect.  
2.3.2 Notes of Caution for Randomization 
This case for clear inference has to be mitigated in practice, however – not only for the case of 
natural or quasi-experiments, where randomization oftentimes is only warranted by assump-
tion as discussed below, but also for randomized experiments, which just like other evaluation 
methods suffer from confounding with spill-over effects, as addressed, or attrition. Attrition 
refers to the problem that information cannot be gathered on some of the units receiving 
treatment or control status (comp. for one of the first popular discussions of the problem 
Hausman & Wise 1979: 445f.). If these individuals were structurally different from the rest of 
the population in their outcomes bias is introduced.32
Even if these problems are circumvented, enabling clear policy advice requires exter-
nal validity of experiments (comp. Chapter 4): This is the question of a generalizability of 
results. Deaton (2010b: 445) refers to the issue that usually participants in an experiment are, 
                                                 
31 As Duflo et al. (2008: 3935) put it, from  and if)0,|()1,|( =≡= GXYEGXYE CiCi X takes discrete values, 
ATED =  follows from 
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32 Compare Foster & Bickman (1996) for a practical guide on detecting attrition problems.  
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deliberately or not, not randomly drawn from the parent population. Results in this case may 
not be a reliable guide to policy, since 
 
“even if the experiment itself is perfectly executed, […] the selection or omitted variable bias that is a 
potential problem in nonexperimental studies comes back in a different form and, without an analysis of 
the two biases, it is impossible to conclude which estimate is better – a biased nonexperimental analysis 
might do better than a randomized controlled trial if enrollment into the trial is nonrepresentative.” 
But drawing on its high internal validity, the method of randomization is called for wide-
spread adoption by leading scholars in the field. Yet the view of these “[r]andomistas”33 
(Ravallion 2009) is not unchallenged, as the method has different limits in its application. As 
discussed in the subsequent section, these concern especially hard constraints to the questions 
addressable, ethical concerns and cost efficiency arguments.34 Additionally, natural experi-
ments can be a borderline case to observational studies. 
2.3.2.1 Hard Constraints to the Method 
First of all, randomized control trials (RCTs) are not a useful design for all types of projects: 
Humphreys & Weinstein (2009: 373f.) summarize these cases as “hard constraints” to the 
method. This is the case if real time experiments take too long, such as studies examining the 
influences of cultural change or intergenerational questions. Other instances include the influ-
ence of historical events. Important are additionally cases in which the variable of interest is 
inherently linked to the subject of interest. Humphreys and Weinstein (2009: 373f.) cite the 
case of gender or religion where the history of belonging to this category assumably matters. 
Additionally, treatment assignment itself might change behavior.35 Questions which involve 
serious political interests might be added to this list, especially issues such as large-scale in-
frastructure interventions or broad political reform – be it the height of tariffs and tax rates, 
the design of political institutions such as reforms on government accountancy. It will not 
only be political will that deters randomization in these cases but as well the mere scale of the 
intervention: This is a problem for both the introduction of control groups as well as the num-
                                                 
33 It has to be noted that these ‘randomistas’ are aware of these concerns: Duflo & Kremer (2005: 206) therefore 
emphasize that “[i]t is important to note that we are not proposing that all projects be subject to randomized 
evaluations. We are arguing that there is currently a tremendous imbalance in evaluation methodology, and that 
increasing the share of projects subject to randomized evaluation from near-zero to even a small fraction could 
have a tremendous impact.” 
34 The question of a comparison between different evaluation designs will be addressed in detail in Chapter 2.6. 
35 This is an inherent problem to all treatment evaluations. Known as Hawthorn (for beneficiaries) or John Henry 
(for control group members) effect (Duflo et al. 2008: 3951). The mere fact of being surveyed changes incen-
tives of the units under observation (comp. for an interesting experiment on the matter, where filling out 
questionnaires raised awareness to e.g. hygiene and subsequent health outcomes, Zwane et al. 2011). These ef-
fects can be especially problematic for the method of randomization if changes in the attitude of subjects towards 
the treatment differ with randomization compared to other evaluation methods. This effect was revealed in other 
circumstances: Own laboratory experiments with dictator and ultimatum games give evidence on a significant 
effect of the institutional design on later game behaviour – in this case the allocation of decision/proposal power 
via randomization, merit or bargain (Behnke et al. 2010: 174f.). 
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ber of cases necessary for the statistical power of the experiment. White (2006: 16) therefore 
summarizes:  
 
“When […] can randomized impact evaluations be used? Banerjee [2006b] compares aid programs to 
drugs; the analogy is a good one. Randomized approaches can be used to evaluate discrete, homogenous 
interventions, much like a pill in a drug trial. But most of the projects of large official agencies – which 
constitute the bulk of aid – do not resemble the conditions of medical testing.” 
This argument has to be softened to some degree: Field experiments can find very ingenious 
ways of introducing variation in complicated cases. Humphreys & Weinstein (2009: 371f.) 
highlight various works concerning e.g. participation on political responsiveness, designs of 
anti-corruption institutions, or the role of media on interethnic relations. 
2.3.2.2 Ethical Concerns 
Ethical concerns for the application of randomized designs are twofold: First, a common con-
cern is whether it is feasible to withhold benefits from potentially needy individuals, espe-
cially as they are carefully included in the data gathering process. The second objection con-
cerns the acceptance of a randomized design as viable allocation method on the ground.  
 
Concerning the first, a priori reasoning usually leads to first hypotheses about the benefits of a 
policy or program that then should not be withheld from the control group. On the one hand, 
Duflo et al. (2008: 3915) argue comprehensibly that randomization in these cases is only un-
ethical as such if full coverage were physically possible: In most cases, social interventions 
are only designed to cover a section of the population, due to financial constraints or ques-
tions of organizational capacity. In these cases, randomization, via e.g. a public and transpar-
ent lottery, could be a very just mechanism of allocation. On the other hand, even in cases 
where only a part of society is addressed, a hierarchy of needs even amongst the poorest is 
usually discernable. Many organizations are dedicated to serving the beneficiaries they per-
ceive as having the greatest need or, after their subjective assessment, the highest chance of 
success (Armendáriz & Morduch 2010: 307).36 This approach to DC would deter fully ran-
domized designs and other methods for evaluation have to be found. 
 
Concerning the second, a randomized design might be neither acceptable from the perspective 
of the local population nor from the perspective of a just project design on the ground.  
                                                 
36 This being Armendáriz & Morduch (2010: 307) caution that a “selection bias in the choice of field partner[s]” 
could be introduced if organizations willing to perform randomized evaluations are structurally different from 
other organizations.  
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Problems with non-acceptance are e.g. already evident in IFSUP: Program managers 
report difficulties for gathering data on control group subjects. As they put it, these subjects 
saw how the program transformed the live of their neighbors while they still live in despair. 
They even reported the fear that elites without interest in project success could capture the 
opinion of control-group ultra-poor and instigate them against the project and its beneficiaries. 
This indicates how a target versus control group approach even without randomization can 
raise substantial tensions. NETZ out of these reasons has for example abandoned the practice 
of gathering control group data for impact measurement in the same geographical areas, al-
though this hampers the evaluation of their projects to a great deal.  
But non-acceptance of a RCT might as well be the consequence of a needs-based pro-
ject development process. Ownership of the processes by the affected is a central aspect of 
DC, acknowledged by all major donors (OECD 2005). Out of this, Chambers (1995) makes a 
strong point for equitable and emancipated DC, arguing that it requires  
 
“[a]nalysis and action by local people, and putting first the priorities of the poor: central to the paradigm 
is the basic human right of poor people to conduct their own analysis. People centered development 
starts not with analysis by the powerful and dominant outsiders - the ‘North’, uppers and professionals, 
but with enabling local people, especially the poor, to conduct theirs. 
But such a ‘people centered development’ may run counter the intention of a RCT, as it would 
not be chosen by the involved. The positive value of increased knowledge is of no direct con-
cern for the affected population. When confronted with the proposal of a RCT granting a ma-
jor asset transfers to some, whereas others would only ‘receive’ questionnaires, program man-
agers hold it more likely that the potential target group would rather suggest splitting the as-
sets in half for everybody – what seems a reasonable solution for ultra-poor households.37  
 
This is not to say that rigorous program evaluation should not take place. But in some cases 
flipping coins might not be feasible. Deviations from the ‘perfect’ randomizations or observa-
tional methods are then necessary. Randomized phase-ins of programs could be one possible 
solution, where different subsections receive the treatment at different times and thereby pro-
viding information on the counterfactual while waiting for the program to start (Khandker et 
al. 2010b: 38), although one has to weigh the higher costs involved. Additionally, with every 
deviation from an optimal RCT, causal inference is complicated by definition and the clear-
cut case for internal validity diminished – which reduces the benefits of non-optimal RCTs 
against observational methods.  
                                                 
37 Segers et al. (2010: 533) provide additional examples on the ingenuity of the poor in this respect: For the con-
text of Ethiopia, they describe how households appropriate microcredit programs to fit their need if allowed to, 
bypassing NGO intentions (e.g. loans as solution to seasonal food/grain shortages not intended asset building). 
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2.3.2.3 Cost efficiency 
A more practical argument is, third, the question of cost efficiency: Alternative randomization 
designs such as randomized phase-ins require the management of a far more complex project. 
This requires better-skilled development workers and raises costs substantially – an argument 
why this design is e.g. not feasible for the IFSUP follow-up. Observational studies are espe-
cially efficient if reality by itself provides the exogeneity necessary for evaluation, as in the 
evaluation of disaster preparedness programs (Goldin et al. 2006: 11).  
2.3.3 Natural experiments 
An additional note of caution concerns the question of natural or quasi-experiments. These 
terms “denote a situation where real randomization was employed, without the intent of pro-
viding a randomized experiment” (DiNardo 2008). Humphreys & Weinstein (2009: 369) out-
line that experiments always have an element of control. The investigator seeks to maintain 
control over treatment assignment and where applicable, especially in case of lab experi-
ments, control over the treatment itself. “[I]n natural experiments, the researcher controls nei-
ther but seeks to find assignment processes that create comparable treatment and control 
groups ‘naturally’ [ – ] in this sense, natural experiments are not experiments at all”. This is 
the reason why the treatment of natural experiments has to be approached with great caution: 
What might seem randomized on paper is in many instances affected by unobservable vari-
ables. Deaton (2010a: 446) cites the example of Miguel & Kremer (2004), a study which is 
both policy relevant and methodologically central. The authors assess the impact of large-
scale deworming on the school level on absenteeism. But assignment of phase-in status was in 
these cases actually ascertained through the alphabet: Schools were “listed alphabetically and 
every third school was assigned to a given project group” (Miguel & Kremer 2004: 365). As 
Deaton (2010a: 446f.) argues, this method of alphabetization is just very different from a true 
random assignment. Whether or not the method of alphabetization is justified in this case, it 
has to be applied cautiously: It is e.g. possible that the alphabet might serve as, even if only 
unconscious, basis for the allocation of scarce resources as well. Still, natural experiments can 
be an ingenious way to the counterfactual, given a good case for their exogeneity. 
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2.4 Non-experimental methods 
While randomization is theoretically the most comprehensive solution for evaluation, the out-
lined arguments indicate that experimental data is not feasible in many circumstances. Non-
experimental38 methods will be equally important, as already summarized in Figure 3 above. 
In the following, approaches for successfully assuming conditional exogeneity, at least 
in changes over time, will be addressed with three popular methods: Matching directly ex-
ploits covariates ensuring conditional exogeneity. Similarly, in regression discontinuity de-
signs (RDDs) exogeneity is established by looking at units identical in pre-treatment variables 
through features of the selection design. Higher-order difference approaches argue that 
changes in outcomes of nonparticipants reveal counterfactual changes in outcomes of partici-
pants, thus ensuring exogeneity. 
The next three approaches circumvent the endogeneity in the data altogether: With in-
strumental variable (IV) approaches, the researcher aims at finding a variable uncorrelated 
with the outcome, but associated with participation, thus bypassing the endogeneity in place-
ment. Bounds aim at dropping the exogeneity assumption by establishing an upper and lower 
estimation for the bias. Finally, sensitivity analysis and control function methods will be very 
shortly addressed. Sensitivity analysis assesses whether results change if the exogeneity as-
sumption is slightly relaxed. Control function methods aim at modeling the unobservable 
variables causing endogeneity.  
Combinations of these approaches provide as well important possibilities. 
2.4.1 Matching 
The central question for comparing different groups at a point in time is the degree of their 
comparability. This is the starting point for the long used (comp. e.g. Rubin 1974: 691, 
Thistlethwaite & Campbell 1960: 315) technique of matching, recently undergoing a revival 
(Sekhon 2009): Through matching, the researcher aims at comparing the outcomes of a 
unit receiving treatment with the outcomes  of a unit as similar as possible to the treat-
ment-receiving unit. Matching thus follows the idea to “mimic the effects of randomization, 
even though the treatments were not applied randomly” (
T
iY
C
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Haughton & Haughton 2011: 247).  
 The most clear-cut matching approach would imply exact matching on a vector X of 
covariates – which is usually impossible in practice due to samples being too small or con-
tinuous covariates necessary for comparison. Subsequently, two broad approaches can be dis-
                                                 
38 Also termed methods for “data from observational studies” (Imbens & Wooldridge 2009: 7) or, as far as they 
mimic RCTs, “quasi-experimental evaluation” (Ravallion 2008: 3792) – confoundable with natural experiments. 
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tinguished that are commonly adopted: Propensity score matching39 (PSM) as well as multi-
variate matching techniques. PSM uses the covariate information to ascertain the probability 
of project participation and matches outcomes on this information. Multivariate matching 
directly measures the distance between the covariate vectors for relating the closest target 
units with controls (Sekhon 2009: 497). Although straightforward in theory, the core problem 
with these methods is that “there is no consensus on how exactly matching ought to be done, 
how to measure the success of the matching procedure, and whether or not matching estima-
tors are sufficiently robust to misspecification so as to be useful in practice” (Sekhon 2009: 
489). The crucial question is whether all factors relevant for participation as well as outcomes 
are included in the covariates for matching, X . As Ravallion (2008: 3806f.) stresses, detailed 
knowledge on the program and the local structure is necessary. Qualitative work and theory 
thus are back in the picture, as “[n]o mechanical algorithm exists that automatically chooses 
sets of variables X  that satisfies the identification conditions” (Smith & Todd 2005: 333).  
 
To illustrate the point of the method, propensity scores will be used as example in the follow-
ing. As outlined by Khandker et al. (2010b: 55-60) the propensity score is given by 
 with )|1Pr()( XTXP == 1)(0 << XP , measurable through a logit or probit model (Todd 
2008: 3863). X  is a vector of pre-treatment indicators40 that affect both treatment status and 
outcome. Importantly, “[t]he values taken by [ X ] are assumed to be unaffected by whether 
unit  actually receives the program” (i Ravallion 2008: 3806). Thus, feedback mechanisms 
would lead to biases. The vector X  affects participation and outcome, although participation 
may not affect X .41 After all units  are ascertained a propensity score, in a second step a 
balancing test should be conducted on whether the distribution in target and control group of 
the propensity score as well as of the covariates is similar for different strata of estimated 
,  – this avoids misspecifications that can be very relevant in prac-
tice.
i
gGXP =|)(ˆ }2,1{=g
42 If the case for a plausible propensity score construction can be established, a second 
condition is necessary: The “region of common support” (Khandker et al. 2010b: 56f.), where 
the propensity scores of participating and control units overlap, has to be sufficiently large.  
                                                 
39 Introduced by Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983). 
40 Glynn & Quinn (2011) even argue for the cautioned usage of post-treatment variables if they can provide 
evidence on the selection bias. 
41 To exemplify this assumption, in the case of IFSUP distance to the village center is an important determinant 
of participation and should therefore be included in X , but results will be biased if in response to treatment 
assignments households move closer to the village center, thus participation would have been affecting X . 
42 Smith & Todd (2005: 333) summarize examples for implications of choosing different specifications for X .  
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For this, the sample of control units is preferably much larger than the sample of tar-
geted units – one of the reasons why matching is a difficult approach for establishing causal 
inference in the IFSUP case. Observations that fall out of the common support need to be 
dropped. If these belong to the treatment group, a source of bias is reintroduced (Ravallion 
2008: 3794). As Todd (2008: 3863) notes, “[t]he estimated treatment effect must then be de-
fined conditionally on the region of overlap.”43  
Given the exogeneity assumption (and sufficient common support), Rosenbaum & 
Rubin (1983: 43) proved that “[a]t any value of a [propensity] score, the difference between 
the treatment and control means is an unbiased estimate of the [ ATE ]“. For this, in the last 
step participants and non-participants are matched and their mean outcomes over the overlap-
region compared: Khandker et al. (2010b: 59-63) as well as Todd (2008: 3864-3869) provide 
an overview of the most commonly used methods of matching participants and controls with 
propensity scores. These methods differ by the number of control units used to match partici-
pants (1:1 vs. 1:n), by the closeness of propensity scores that is accepted for ‘good’ matches, 
and concerning the use of weights for fitting, e.g. weighted means in case of (1:n) matching. 
 
For the application of matching, the quality of data on project uptake and outcomes is crucial, 
as Smith & Todd (2005: 347) argue from their comparison of different estimators. If there is a 
plausible case that the observables used really drive project take-up and that they are meas-
ured comparably within the control and target group, the quality of causal inference of match-
ing techniques is no worse compared to RCTs.  
2.4.2 Regression-discontinuity designs 
A similar approach is used by regression discontinuity designs (RDDs). Comparability be-
tween target and control group is ascertained by assuming their similarity in expectation 
through features in the selection design: RDDs try to exploit the fact that an intervention is 
taken up only after a certain eligibility threshold is reached, with this eligibility threshold not 
affected by the treatment.44 As formally presented by Ravallion (2008: 3812), with  rep-
resenting the value of the eligibility variable for individual i  and  being the threshold value 
of the eligibility criteria, this implies an assignment to the target group,  for  
iM
m
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43 One then has to weigh whether other methods, such as regression discontinuity discussed below, might be 
preferable in addressing selection bias. 
44 As outlined in Khandker et al. (2010b: 110) a similar argumentation holds in the case of the exploitation of 
time as cut-off value: These designs, “pipeline comparisons”, use the fact that a program is intervening in multi-
ple phases. Thus the eligible participants that have just not yet received treatment can serve as an approximation 
to the counterfactual. 
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and  for . Based on the assumption that individuals barely above and barely 
below this threshold can ex-ante be expected to have had very similar results if exposed or not 
exposed to treatment, this discontinuity in treatment assignment allows for the construction of 
a credible control group and a causal effect of  
for a small 
0=iG mM i <
)|()|( εε −=−+== mMYEmMYED CT
0>ε 45. Thus, simply the means of a small range of both control and target group 
members just around the threshold value are compared and by their difference, a local average 
treatment effect of the intervention for the range ε±m  is established.46  
 
First developed by Thistlethwaite & Campbell (1960) already in the 1960s, this approach 
seeks to overcome critiques of matching methods:  
 
“[R]egression discontinuity analysis does not rely upon matching to equate experimental and control 
groups, hence it avoids the difficulties of […] incomplete matching due to failure to identify and include 
all relevant antecedent characteristics in the matching process” (Thistlethwaite & Campbell 1960: 315).  
The popularity of regression discontinuity has increased only since the 1990s in the social 
sciences as one of a number advances in econometrics (examples include Green et al. 2009, 
Lee 2008, Lemieux & Milligan 2008). As Imbens & Lemieux (2008: 618f.) summarize, espe-
cially one feature of the method is useful:  does not have to be a deterministic function of 
one or more covariates, but it suffices that the probability of being included as project benefi-
ciary rises in order to estimate a causal effect.
iM
47
 
Regression discontinuity has the great advantage of allowing the evaluator to establish an in-
ternally valid estimation of the local average treatment effect around the cutoff-value. This, 
however, is also the greatest weakness of the method: The results of a regression discontinuity 
design are not simply transferable to other regions of the function. To plausibly deduce the 
project effectiveness of a project over the whole scale of , the assumption of a constant 
treatment effect is necessary, which requires good arguments and some theory. Still, in many 
instances, only the marginal effect of increasing eligibility might be of interest. For example, 
when faced with the question of expanding a program, a regression discontinuity design may 
be exactly analyzing the population of interest, those just above the current threshold of par-
ticipation (
iM
Hahn et al. 2001: 207).    
                                                 
45 That 0>ε  cannot be too large as then the regression discontinuity might not become apparent implies as 
well that the regression discontinuity design is only feasible for large N studies where enough observations just 
around the threshold value can be analysed. 
46 The method is based on just a few assumptions, especially that the expected value of the outcome variable 
without treatment is continuous at the cutoff-value (“continuity restriction”) (Hahn et al. 2001: 202). Assump-
tions such as the mentioned absence of spill-overs additionally have to be taken into consideration.  
47 This is then called “fuzzy” instead of “sharp” regression discontinuity design. 
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 In the case of IFSUP, a RD approach is not feasible due to missing data. The project was de-
signed for all ultra-poor but eligibility was additionally determined by geographical proximity 
to group centers (conditional on covariates48) to be formed for project implementation. In 
principle, the usage of this geographical proximity as cutoff value (e.g. walking distance in 
minutes) for inclusion would allow for a valid regression discontinuity design. One would 
compare the difference in outcomes of households just above and below this threshold, with 
one large advantage: Other non-experimental methods for estimating a causal effect would 
rest on the assumption that walking distance to the group meeting place does not induce bias – 
or at least that this influence is negligible. But this assumption does not necessarily have to 
hold: A short walking distance implies a housing within a cluster of other ultra-poor.49  
 A regression discontinuity approach could invalidate concerns for this bias. Further-
more, a comparison to impact estimates by other methods could be interpreted as a test for its 
presence. But as data on the proximity to the group meeting place was neither recorded in the 
baseline nor in the impact questionnaire, this approach is impossible to implement.  
2.4.3 Higher-order difference methods 
The above mentioned methods aimed at establishing the case for causal interference through a 
look at the difference in outcomes at one point in time , referred to as single cross-
sectional analysis. In contrast, higher-order differences validate the assumption of exogeneity 
through exploiting changes in outcomes. Thus, they rely on longitudinal data. Though panel 
data is not necessary, it allows for additional slackening of assumptions, as outlined below.
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 Higher-order difference methods assume that “unobserved heterogeneity in participa-
tion is present – but that such factors are time invariant” (Khandker et al. 2010b: 71). This 
assumption of time invariance is the crucial point in limiting this method, as will be discussed 
below, but their main advantage over single-difference methods as well. In practice, the ap-
proach is oftentimes used to assess the impact of policy changes in so-called natural- or quasi-
experiments, where policy changes affecting the outcomes in one group can then be compared 
to the development in other groups (Wooldridge 2009: 453f.). 
                                                 
48 Preference was given to minorities, poorer poverty stratum and the female headed of eligible households. 
49 Therefore, it is certainly possible that housing distance is correlated with outcomes depending on the predomi-
nant effects in either direction. Positive influences include e.g. short distance households with a higher likelihood 
of informal cooperation among ultra-poor household through some kind of risk-sharing arrangements, whereas 
longer distances indicate isolated ultra-poor livelihoods. Negative influences are equally possible. Longer walk-
ing distances could indicate a housing in a better-off neighborhood that provides quicker knowledge of employ-
ment opportunities or better access to financial capital. 
50 Comp. for a detailed discussion of the method Wooldridge (2010). 
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2.4.3.1 Pooling Cross-Sectional Data 
The simplest case of higher-order difference methods is the comparison of changes between 
cross-section data-sets for control and target group in two time periods, the so called double-
difference or difference-in-differences (DD) methodology: It gives, 
,   indicating the post- and )()( 11
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t YYEYYEATE −− −−−= t 1−t  the pre-treatment period. 
Thus, not the control group outcome as such but the change in their outcome before and after 
project implementation is used as counterfactual. The condition  
of Chapter 
)0|()1|( === GYEGYE CiCi
2.2.2 for unbiasedness is thus relaxed to  
(
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Ravallion 2008: 3815). Figure 4 (on the basis of Khandker et al. 2010b: 75) exemplifies the 
set-up of a DD analysis: Between the pre- and post-intervention time period, observed mean 
outcomes changed from one to three for the control group, whilst the observed mean outcome 
for the target group changed from two to six. The different intersects of target and control 
group at the baseline period reveal that endogeneity in program placement is a problem. 
Therefore, a simple comparison between groups is not feasible. Yet, under the parallel trend 
assumption of counterfactual outcomes, the observed impact change for the target group (B) 
can be adjusted for the impact change observed in the control group (A). The impact as meas-
ured through DD is then given by the outcome change C, which is internally valid as far as the 
parallelism of counterfactual trends holds.   
Figure 4: The principle set-up of difference-in-differences analysis 
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In practice, and as will be applied later for the IFSUP data in Chapter 3.2, a regression analy-
sis is usually applied for estimating the DD estimator. This leads to an OLS estimation of 
, with εββββ +++++= i3210 covariates)*( iiiii GTGTY 1=iT  for the post-treatment period, 
 otherwise and  for project beneficiaries, 0=iT 1=iG 0=iG  otherwise.51 The coefficient 3β  
on the interaction of time period and treatment status will then give the DD estimator52, even-
tually conditional on additional controls (Wooldridge 2009: 453). As Khandker et al. (2010b: 
73) highlight, DD will only be unbiased if both the regression model is specified correctly53 
and the correlations of the error term iε  with all other variables in the equation are zero. 
Khandker et al. (2010b: 73, e.i.o.) especially emphasize the assumption 0))*(,( , =iiti GTCov ε , 
as this implies “the parallel-trend assumption [which] means that unobserved characteristics 
affecting program participation do not vary over time with treatment status”.54
 
This parallel-trend assumption is the main obstacle to applying difference-in-differences in 
practice, which also applies to the IFSUP data. In data where e.g. attrition between the base-
line and impact data occurred and the drop-outs cannot be expected to be randomly distrib-
uted, it is well possible to find arguments for different time trends in control and counterfac-
tual target group outcomes. This is the case if the “changes over time are a function of initial 
conditions [of the surveyed population] that also influence program placement [or in this case 
the drop out process]” (Khandker et al. 2010b: 77). The DD impact estimator will conse-
quently be biased. It is then important to figure out whether a mixture of approaches, such as 
the combination with matching methods (Todd 2008: 3869) provides a solution, or if it at 
least is possible to identify the direction of the bias.  
                                                 
51 This equation can include unlimited time periods, see Imbens & Wooldridge (2009: 68f.) for details. 
52 It reveals the effect of the combined occurrence of a unit being in the post treatment period as well as in the 
target group compared to being in the baseline period as well as being in the control group. Thus, it indicates the 
effect of being in the target group on the outcome variable of interest over the time period change (Kam & 
Franzese 2007: 26).  
53 A linear-additive model is unproblematic for T=2 and no covariates. As soon as additional time periods are 
introduced or impacts of additional covariates analysed a linear model does not necessarily have the best fit. 
Potential problems of the functional form have to be kept in mind in every case, although as highlighted by An-
grist & Pischke (2010: 11f.), good approximations to ATEs through linear models can be assumed in most cases. 
54 Additional assumptions concern the absence of serial correlation (or autocorrelation) of standard errors. A 
word of caution for interpreting DD results is voiced by Bertrand et al. (2004: 273f.): They argue that serial 
correlation is widespread in DD analysis and usually uncontrolled for, leading to overstated significance levels. 
They therefore caution the acceptance of DD estimates without tests for correlation and argue that the applica-
tion of serial-correlation robust standard errors “should become standard practice in applied work”. 
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2.4.3.2 Panel Data Analysis 
Additional attention deserves the presence of panel data: Panel data implies that data of all 
periods can be related to one single individual. This leads to additional possibilities in analyz-
ing differences in outcomes, namely first differencing (FD), additionally with controls for 
lagged outcomes, as well as fixed effects (FE) models. 
 
First differencing (Wooldridge 2009: Chapter 13.14) amounts to a regression linking individ-
ual and time specific data: . But for the case 
without covariates, this can be reduced to a simple OLS regression of group status on the out-
come changes, with 
TiiTi GTTY ,Ti,310, covariates)*( εβββ ++++=
iii GY εββ ++=Δ 21  as Imbens & Wooldridge (2009: 70) point out. 
Analogous to the pooled cross-sectional DD estimator, this leads to an estimate of the treat-
ment effect . The core difference is that due to the panel 
structure, the impact of the exact same individuals in these groups is subtracted before taking 
the mean. In these models, first differences are implicitly included for all fixed characteristics 
of the observed individuals as well. Oftentimes, concerns for unobservable biases inherent to 
the units of observation are a core limitation of an evaluation. These include motivation, 
skills, social networks, or other factors that can be assumed to influence both outcomes and 
selection but are not observable – and thus not controllable for mitigating selection bias. 
While both methods give similar estimates for data unaffected by e.g. attrition, in case bias 
through unobservables is a concern, first differencing allows to disregard this bias at least for 
the observed units. Concerning IFSUP, a reduced panel was constructed: Unobserved charac-
teristics not changing over time are therefore no longer a source of bias in this panel. The 
question of course remains whether the results from the panel analysis are a valid approxima-
tion to the treatment effect for the overall group. One drawback of the method is that it may 
increase bias compared to cross-sectional DD if facing measurement if control variables are 
subject to measurement error: In this case “[d]ifferencing a poorly measured regressor reduces 
its variation relative to its correlation with the differenced error caused by classical measure-
ment error, resulting in a potentially sizable bias” (
)0|()1|(ˆ =Δ−=Δ= GYEGYE CTβ
Wooldridge 2009: 470). 
Imbens & Wooldridge (2009: 70) describe how on top of the standard approach as out-
lined above, the researcher has the possibility to exploit the panel structure of the data by as-
suming exogeneity in program placement for lagged outcomes: This focus on lagged out-
comes leads to an estimation of the change in outcomes between periods, 
εβββ +++=Δ =0,321 Tiii YGY , with 2β  giving the causal effect of the intervention, whilst con-
trolling for the baseline outcome level. As Imbens & Wooldridge (2009: 70) note,  
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  “[w]hile it appears that the analysis based on unconfoundedness [exogeneity] is necessarily less restric-
tive because it allows a free coefficient in 0,iY , this is not the case. The DID assumption implies that ad-
justing for lagged outcomes actually compromises the comparison because 0,iY  may in fact be corre-
lated with i . In the end, the two approaches make fundamentally different assumptions. One needs to 
choose between them based on substantive knowledge … [But] [a]s a practical matter, the DID ap-
proach appears less attractive than the unconfoundedness-based approach in the context of panel data. It 
is difficult to see how making treated and control units comparable on lagged outcomes will make the 
causal interpretation of their difference less credible, as suggested by the DID assumptions“. 
ε
 
This approach has the main advantage of having included a major time variant component 
that may have confounded standard difference-in-difference estimations.55 On top, panel 
analysis allows to attach additional information about the unit of observation at baseline level 
and its changes to this estimation. In case more than two time periods are present, an expan-
sion is possible through the inclusion of additional time period dummies (Wooldridge 2009: 
Chapter 13.15). 
 
An alternative approach of utilizing the panel structure of the data would be a fixed effects 
model, which controls for unit-level unobservables as well. This fixed effects regression is as 
well called “within estimator” (Wooldridge 2009: 482) and can intuitively be interpreted as an 
inclusion of dummies for each observed unit. By this, it allows for a different intercept for 
each of the individuals. The regression thereby draws only on the variation of variables over 
time within each unit, by this circumventing any bias that could arise from unobservable but 
fixed characteristics. Fixed effects regressions are identical to first differencing for the simple 
case of two time periods. For more than two time periods, both are still similar with large N 
and T. But for “large N and small T, the choice between FE and FD hinges on the relative 
efficiency of the estimators and this is determined by the serial correlation of the idiosyncratic 
errors” (Wooldridge 2009: 487).56  
 
In the later application to the IFSUP case, both a cross-section and a panel difference-in-
differences approach will be utilized; concerning the latter, a choice between FD and FE does 
not have to be taken due to the numer of time periods T=2. 
                                                 
55 As a panel approach by definition excludes the influence of time-constant variables, it prohibits the measure-
ment of the effect of time-constant variables on the outcome of interest: “Even if we can obtain panel data, it 
does us little good if we are interested in the effect of a variable that does not change over time: first differencing 
or fixed effects estimation eliminates time-constant explanatory variables” (Wooldridge 2009: 506). 
56 See for a further comparison e.g. Angrist & Pischke (2009: Chapter 5.3). A lot of additional econometric lit-
erature is evolving around program evaluation with panel data and panel data analysis in general, Imbens & 
Wooldridge (2009: 72) discuss e.g. new ways of constructing artificial control groups in cases data on more than 
two groups is present, whilst Semykina & Wooldridge (2010: 380) develop further methods to correct for en-
dogeneity arising from “time-specific variances and arbitrary serial dependence in idiosyncratic errors”. 
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2.4.4 Instrumental variables 
While higher-order-differences allowed through focusing on changes a cancelling out of time 
and/or unit constant bias, the instrumental variable (IV) method is one of the methods that 
accept that unobserved heterogeneity is present, but bypasses the bias arising from it. 
As exemplified in Figure 5, endogeneity in program placement leads to outcomes not 
only indirectly affected by selection variables through the individuals selected for the inter-
vention but also directly. This would e.g. happen if target and control group differed by entre-
preneurial ability in a microcredit intervention and field workers (unconsciously) chose, next 
to other criteria, ultra-poor they deemed more able for success. Measurement is then upwardly 
biased, as the target group higher counterfactual outcomes compared to the population they 
were drawn from. A proper instrument now has the attribute of excluding the direct relation-
ship between selection variables and outcome. Then, only the direct effect of program place-
ment on outcomes can be measured. But not all selection is based on this ‘ability’-factor. An 
instrument therefore has to be found that is correlated with selection but not with ability 
and/or outcomes.57  
Figure 5: The logical framework of the instrumental variable method 
Program Placement Outcome
Selection Variables
Instrument
Own Graph  
In a regression framework, these two attributes of an instrument Z  are formally summarized 
by the exogeneity assumption demanding no relationship between the instrument and the error 
                                                 
57 For the above example, this could be the variable ‘proximity to NGO headquarters’, if it can be plausibly ar-
gued that this proximity is positively influencing program placement but is neither correlated with ability nor 
outcomes; for this assumption, headquarter location more or less must have been selected at random. The case 
for this correlation to ability/outcomes not being present has to be plausibly established through argumentation, 
which might be problematic, e.g. as soon as headquarter location is related to infrastructure and proximity to 
infrastructure to better counterfactual outcomes in expectation. The instrument would then be endogenous in 
itself and possibly even aggravated the problem.  
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term 0),( =εZCov , as well as the relevance assumption demanding that variation in place-
ment is related to Z , 580),( ≠ZGCov  (Wooldridge 2009: 508). The evaluation of the influ-
ence of group status  on outcomes  is therefore conducted by regressing in two stages.  iG iY
The first regression keeps hold of the exogenous part of the selection variables, the 
second one then estimates the impact of selection on the outcome variable of interest.59 The 
validity of results rests on the credibility of these assumptions. The relevance assumption 
 is in principle testable, and thus is not only able to help detect misspecifica-
tions of instruments but as well caution the use of so-called ‘weak instruments’, referring to 
an insufficient relationship between instrument and placement that leads to imprecise results 
even in large samples (
0),( ≠ZGCov
Khandker et al. 2010b: 91, Wooldridge 2009: 516). On the other hand, 
the exogeneity assumption 0),( =εZCov  is generally not testable (Wooldridge 2009: 508)60: 
Its plausibility therefore has to be assessed in every single case. The relevance of qualitative 
data and of a proper understanding of the project context, possibly in combination with theo-
retical framework of the intervention pathway, comes back into the picture again. 
 
Instrumental variables are an appealing approach to solving endogeneity. But several notes of 
caution are important:  
First of all, as pointed out by Ravallion (2008: 3823f.) the IV approach implicitly in-
cludes the crucial assumption  
 
“that impacts are homogeneous, in that outcomes respond identically across all units at given [levels of 
covariates] X  [… Thus] the validity of causal inferences typically rests on ad hoc assumptions about 
the outcome regression, including its functional form. [E.g. propensity score matching], by contrast, is 
non-parametric in the outcome space.” 
Secondly, Khandker et al. (2010b: 92f.) summarize that instruments usually do not capture all 
variation that leads to program participation. Thus, IV is in many cases only measuring local 
average treatment effects (LATE) that are valid for a subset of the population – similar to 
RDD. The LATE “is the average effect of treatment for the subset of persons induced by a 
change in the value of the instrument from  to  to receive the treatment” (1Z 2Z Todd 2008: 
3879). Latest developments initiated by Heckman & Vytlacil (2005), as summarized by 
Khandker et al. (2010b: 94), allow for an estimation of Marginal Treatment Effects. This es-
                                                 
58 Z can include multiple instruments. It can as well serve as instrument for more than one endogenous variable, 
as long as the regression contains “at least as many excluded exogenous variables as there are included endoge-
nous explanatory variables” (Wooldridge 2009: 524). 
59 Hence, the IV approach is commonly referred to as the two-stages-least-squares approach (2SLS or TSLS) 
(Khandker et al. 2010b: 90), as two OLS models are fitted one after the other. 
60 Comp. Wooldridge (2009: 527-531) for the test of overidentifying restrictions that can in the case of multiple 
instruments aid in establishing a case for exogeneity.  
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timation tries to construct the overall impact function. Depending on the data available, it is 
possible to deduce ATE, LATE or TOT. Heckman & Vytlacil (2005: 669) by this aim to rec-
oncile the structural and treatment effect approach to policy evaluation; they try to estimate 
and verify parts of a predefined structural equation. 
 Deaton (2010a: 429) raises a more fundamental concern about IV methods that is con-
nected to the theory linkage in the marginal treatment effects approach: He argues that IV 
methods are oftentimes used to create analogies to experiments when the focus should rather 
lie on “the variation in [the impact estimator] that encapsulates the poverty reduction mecha-
nisms that ought to be the main objects of our inquiry”61. He therefore insists that only a full 
understanding of the poverty reduction mechanisms at work, and therefore of the heterogene-
ity in place, allows for a credible adoption of IV methods – otherwise it is possible that nu-
merous biases are contained in the instrument but not thought of. “The general lesson is once 
again the ultimate futility of trying to avoid thinking about how and why things work – if we 
do not do so we are left with undifferentiated heterogeneity that is likely to prevent consistent 
estimation of any parameter of interest” (Deaton 2010a: 432). 
 
Two practical examples shed light on the question whether IV methodology could be a useful 
approach for the IFSUP case once the impact pathways are understood.  
Khandker (1998: 205-207) uses program eligibility rules as instrument to solve en-
dogeneity in program placement: In his evaluation, only households below a certain landhold-
ing-threshold were eligible for participation in a microcredit program. A dummy indicating 
landholdings below the threshold instrumented participation. To capture the unobserved effect 
of landholdings on outcomes, the quantity of land owned was additionally included in the 
impact regression. In principle, a similar approach could be used for assessing the IFSUP im-
pact if the data were available: As discussed in the case of RDD, project participation was 
determined by distance from the group meeting points. If this data were present, a dummy 
indicating walking distance below a threshold could serve as instrument for inclusion. To con-
trol for differences in economic opportunities based on walking distance, the absolute walking 
distance could be included to the regression, analogous to the Khandker-evaluation.62
                                                 
61 He exemplifies his case by the (artificial) impact of railways on poverty reduction “Good candidates for [the 
instrument] might be indicators of whether the city has been designated by the Government of China as belong-
ing to a special ‘infrastructure development area,’ or perhaps an earthquake that conveniently destroyed a selec-
tion of railway stations, or even the existence of river confluence near the city, since rivers were an early source 
of power, and railways served the power-based industries. I am making fun, but not much” (Deaton 2010a: 482). 
62 Unfortunately, this data was not collected, which shows the importance of planning evaluations in detail. But 
even this approach would not be clear-cut: Meeting points are not only geographically defined e.g. by village 
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In the context of microcredit impact in India, Garikipati (2008: 2628) uses the vari-
ables “size of the respondent’s neighbourhood cluster [and belonging to the] dominant caste 
within the cluster” to instrument inclusion of households, exploiting that like in IFSUP 15 
members are required to form a self-help group and similar cast-membership can be expected 
to enhance cooperation probability. Garikipati (2008: 2631) later uses these instruments to 
estimate the impact of group membership on vulnerability. But this approach has to be ques-
tioned as the direct relationship between the instruments and vulnerability cannot be expected 
to be zero: She assumes similar caste membership to enhance trust and thus establishes the 
case for her instrument. At the same time, however, it seems likely that similar caste member-
ship influences directly one of her outcome variables, drought-related vulnerability, defined 
among others as “during the last drought, the household met all its food needs” (Garikipati 
2008: 2626). This is certainly less probable if the household is not well connected in the vil-
lage, as could be indicated by her instrument caste membership. In the IFSUP case, cluster-
size, ethnicity, and religion could similarly serve as instruments for participation probability. 
But the model determining selection is not clear enough to exclude endogeneity issues.  
2.4.5 Bounding the Endogenous Placement 
In cases such as these, there may be no direct solution to the endogeneity present. However, it 
is possible to frame the problem as a problem of missing information. Ensuring a balance in 
the data would require adding data that is not available. Manski (comp. amongst others 1990, 
1997, 2007) was among the first to propose an ingenious solution for this problem. It is often 
possible to narrow down the endogeneity problem by constructing bounds on the maximum 
bias present based on minimal assumptions. These bounds can lead to an interval that is in-
formative to the overall treatment effect.63 Manski (2007: 7) argues that this approach is much 
more reliable than a thrive for point estimates:  
 
“Conventional practice has been to invoke assumptions strong enough to identify the exact value of this 
parameter. Even if these assumptions are implausible, they are defended as necessary for inference to 
proceed. In fact, identification [the possibility of inference if one had an infinitely large sample] is not 
an all-or-nothing proposition. We will see that weaker and more plausible assumptions often partially 
identify parameters, bounding them in informative ways.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
centres but as well depending on group members’ houses. It is unclear and cannot be confirmed due to missing 
data if participation was established by minimizing village distance or if other unobservables played a role. 
63 This bounding approach is taken up by various other researchers (comp. e.g. Balke & Pearl 1997, Lee 2002, 
2009, Pearl 2009: Chapter 8.2). Comp. for one of the rare applications of bound applications (in this case Lee-
bounds) to explaining income changes in South Africa Leibbrandt et al. (2010: esp. pp. 39-44) with an unbal-
anced panel. 
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Manski (2007: 183, e.i.o.) bases his results on minimal assumptions. Informative bounds can 
for example be derived under the assumption of monotonicity in treatment: The assumption of 
“monotone treatment response (MTR) […] permits each unit of treatment to have a distinct 
response function [but] requires that all response functions be monotone.” It can be formal-
ized for a dichotome setting by )0|()1|(0|1| =≥=⇒=≥= iiiiii GTyGTyGTGT : This is 
to say that a more (less) intense level of treatment T  is related to a higher (lower) level of 
outcomes for a given individual . As only one outcome is observable, this assumption cannot 
be tested; still it allows the potential of treatment invoking zero-results. Manski (
i
2007: 186-
189) describes how this allows a construction of bounds on the treatment effect 
, where outcomes are bounded by a nil-effect and the 
maximum difference in possible responses. Although a very simple assumption, MTR can 
still be difficult to uphold in practice: On an a priori basis, an in-kind capital transfer cannot 
be expected to increase outcomes. It is plausible that investment in livestock is related to a 
risk of zero or negative outcomes in case the livestock dies. If additionally the household 
chooses to substitute outside labour, the monotonicity assumption could be violated in all 
cases where livestock generates zero or negative returns and counterfactual outcomes would 
be positive (e.g. due to work on the wage labour market). In the case of IFSUP, monotonicity 
can therefore not plausibly be upheld.  
)()()0( min,max, CTCT YYEYYEE −≤−≤
 But other bounding approaches exist: As outlined in Manski (2007: 36-45), bounds for 
longitudinal data where some outcomes are missing can be constructed on the basis of three 
vectors of interest: The outcome variable, the relevant covariate vector including foremost 
treatment status as well as “a binary variable [ z ] indicating when outcomes are observed” 
(Manski 2007: 37). Although the author uses his setting for a general framework, it can easily 
be applied to the impact evaluation problem: Assume the problem that a random population 
subset is treated but non-random attrition occurs. Object of interest might be the probability 
 that the outcome of interest Y falls into a specified set B conditional on treat-
ment status. As Manski (
)|( GBYP ∈
2007: 38) argues, from the Law of Total Probability follows that 
)|0(*)0,|()|1(*)1,|()|( GzPzGBYPGzPzGBYPGBYP ==∈+==∈=∈ . Through 
randomization, information is not only provided on the equation parts  that 
can be observed, but also on the probabilities 
)1,|( =∈ zGBYP
)|1( GzP =  and )|0( GzP =  that are revealed 
in comparison with the baseline information, about which full data is available. Unobservable 
is , the outcomes of the attritors in both groups. Given it is a probability, 
however, it must lie on the interval . Sharp bounds for the worst-case scenario, in the 
)0,|( =∈ zGBYP
]1,0[
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sense that they cannot be over- or underrun, thus can consequently be constructed by assum-
ing either 0 or 1 for all missing outcomes:  
)|0()|1(*)1,|()|()|1(*)1,|( GzPGzPzGBYPGBYPGzPzGBYP =+==∈≤∈≤==∈ . 
This approach is useful in other settings as well: Manski (2007: 36-45) subsequently 
applies it e.g. to quantiles of , Imbens & Wooldridge ()|( GBYP ∈ 2009: 51-53) to the case 
where outcomes of interest lie within the interval . Application is even possible when 
outcomes are normalized to the interval  as long as the assumption is plausible that the 
highest (lowest) observed outcomes provide a feasible mean upper (lower) bound for missing 
outcomes – the latter two estimations will be used in Chapter 
]1,0[
]1,0[
3.2. Importantly, however, the 
information contained in the bounds depends on the width of the interval thus constructed, 
which in turn is depending on the amount of information missing.  
Despite requiring no assumptions on the selection bias, Manski bounds have their 
great limitation in the information they contain: Their application is oftentimes not informa-
tive, as in the assessment of their usefulness by DiNardo et al. (2006: 26): “We do not display 
the Manski–Horowitz64 bounds for our two bounded outcomes since these bounds are sub-
stantially larger than the Lee bounds we present and we can not rule out very large negative or 
positive treatment effects”. Analogously Lechner (1999: 23) notes in one of the few other 
applications that “without good knowledge of the relationship between potential outcomes 
and the selection/assignment process, it is very difficult to bound the treatment effects strictly 
away from zero.” Imbens & Wooldridge (2009: 51-53) and Duflo et al. (2008: 3944) conse-
quently emphasize the applicability of Manski’s framework especially to a case with covariate 
information and knowledge on the direction of the bias to further sharpen the bounds above. 
 
Overall, however, Manski (2007: 6-8) makes a strong case for constructively dealing with 
ambiguity: Researchers must accept that the social sciences seldom allow direct causal infer-
ence. Accepting ambiguous outcomes deriving from concurring hypothesis is certainly prefer-
able to arbitrary choices based on e.g. the complexity of the hypothesis behind the results. In 
the case of bounding the effect, even if only loose bounds can be obtained with unrestrictive 
assumptions, this cannot be a case for not reporting them: One must “[focus] on the fact that 
[even a wide bound] establishes a domain of consensus about the value of [interest, regard-
less] of assumptions about the attrition process […] Wide bounds reflect real uncertainties 
that cannot be washed away by assumptions lacking credibility.“ (Manski 2007: 42).  
                                                 
64 Referring to Horowitz & Manski (2000). 
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2.4.6 Sensitivity analysis 
While the presented methods above were either assuming a solution for the bias, a circumven-
tion or bounds for it, sensitivity analysis deals with uncertainty on endogeneity by a stepwise 
relaxation of the endogeneity assumption – “violations of unconfoundedness are interpreted as 
evidence of the presence of unobserved covariates that are correlated, both with the potential 
outcomes and with the treatment indicator” (Imbens & Wooldridge 2009: 53). As Imbens & 
Wooldridge (2009: 53-56) outline, the degree of bias in outcomes (developed in Rosenbaum 
& Rubin 1983) or in the endogeneity of placement (developed in Rosenbaum 1995) is as-
sessed that still allows a effect in the direction of interest. To arrive at sensible conclusions, 
the researcher has to choose hard limits to the size of a possible unobserved effect or the in-
fluence of unobservable on selection relative to the effect of observed variables – without 
these limits, no information can be extracted. DiPrete & Gangl (2004: 302) assess the useful-
ness of the method for bias in matching estimators and call for a routine application to in-
crease confidence on estimates.  
2.4.7 Control function methods 
Lastly, if endogeneity is recognized as a (potential) problem, the researcher can aim at model-
ing the selection process through a control function. The approach goes back at least to 
Heckman (1979), who in viewing the omitted variables problem as a specification problem 
addressed omitted variables through their estimation: Then, “estimated values of the omitted 
variables can be used as regressors so that it is possible to estimate the behavioral functions of 
interest by simple methods” (Heckman 1979: 153). Estimation of these unobservables is 
based on variation in observed units. In the application to program evaluation, this “allow[s] 
selection into the program to be based on time varying unobservable variables at the expense 
of stronger functional form assumptions needed to secure identification” (Todd 2008: 2874). 
Todd (2008: 2874-2877) outlines further that an estimation of control functions is related to 
matching but constructs scores based on observables as well as estimated unobservables.  
2.4.8 Combination of approaches 
The above discussion treated one method after another: In practice, however, these methods 
must not be seen as substitutes but rather as complements. In his famous critique of observa-
tional studies on the effects of employment and training programs, LaLonde (1986: 617) 
compared the faring of experimental and non-experimental measurements and warned of non-
experimental techniques that possibly “contain large and unknown biases resulting from 
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specification errors”; the consequence was an advice to make use of randomization. Even 
careful matching is no general solution to this problem, as Smith & Todd (2005) are able to 
show; but the reliance of observational methods can be increased through their combination. 
Smith & Todd (2005: 347) call for a case-by-case application of methods and a combination 
of approaches if necessary: Difference-in-differences matching is e.g. one promising solution 
to biases from data with different sources, as changes are looked upon. As Todd (2008) fur-
ther notes, “difference-in-difference matching methods are more reliable than [single] cross-
sectional matching methods, particularly when treatments and controls are mismatching geo-
graphically or in terms of the survey instrument.” Even the applicability of randomization 
may be increased through a combination of approaches: Attenuation bias65 might be a con-
cern where only the intention to project take-up can be randomized but not actual take-up. 
Random assignment can still be used as instrumental variable for measuring “intention-to-
treat” effects (Khandker et al. 2010b: 42f., 89). Last but not least, bounds are not only a sensi-
ble approach if faced with biased randomized studies, but just as much in combination with 
observational studies, such as the bounds on a biased IV estimator by Hotz et al. (1997) con-
cerning the effect of teenage childbearing on educational outcomes. 
2.5 General Drawbacks of the Outlined Approaches 
2.5.1 Spill-Overs as Confounding Factor 
The discussion so far assumed a separable treatment for the intervention group and excluded 
the possibility of reciprocal interference between treatment and control group. Due to the em-
beddedness of quantitative research in complex social systems, however, feedback mecha-
nisms between both groups are a major obstacle for measuring the causal effect of interven-
tions, since they are potentially confounding results. Even with random assignment, the argu-
ment of thus deriving the ATE rests on the assumption of the independence of treatment 
group and non-treatment group, called “stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) […] 
SUTVA is a complicated assumption that is all too often ignored” (Sekhon 2009: 472). Even 
Manski (2007: 129) with his cautious approach to inference only in passing mentions how  
 
“[t]he notation  also supposes that treatment response is individualistic. That is, the outcome ex-
perienced by person  depends only on the treatment that this person receives, not on the treatments re-
ceived by other members of the population. This assumption will be maintained throughout our analy-
sis.” 
) (iy
j
                                                 
65 Attenuation bias is induced by a measurement error where e.g. “program participation varies more than it 
actually does. This overestimation in the variance of [treatment status] leads naturally to an underestimation of 
its coefficient b. This is called attenuation bias because this bias attenuates the estimated regression coefficient” 
(Baker 2000: 57). 
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For development interventions, SUTVA is difficult to uphold in many instances, as spill-overs 
are, intentionally or not, built in side effects of interventions: Concerning IFSUP, the project 
aims e.g. explicitly at changing the socio-political context the target group as well as control 
group ultra-poor are living in. Under these conditions,  is certainly influenced 
by the project. Ravallion (
)0|( =GYE Ci
2008: 3796-3798) highlights an additional source of spill-over bias: 
the displacement of other project plans through external interventions. External interventions, 
e.g. a social protection initiative such as IFSUP, can replace government efforts that would 
have been undertaken counterfactually. If government resources for ‘target group ultra-poor’ 
are subsequently redirected towards ‘control group ultra-poor’, a downward bias is introduced 
in the estimates. Analysis must take this into account and try to construct arguments for the 
severity of the bias (e.g. whether it could be neglected or whether spill-overs could cancel out) 
or the direction to obtain at least an idea of over- or underestimation of the project effect.  
But spill-overs can as well be introduced very subtly to a program e.g. by autonomous 
decisions of the project staff, as is the case for the Mexican government’s conditional cash 
transfer program PROGRESA, much hailed for its randomization approach and its carefully 
planned impact assessment strategy (comp. for a short overview Khandker et al. 2010b: 10). 
Yet, a mere impact analysis based on the assumption of random treatment assignment re-
turned a zero impact. Only after taking into consideration that resources were redirected to 
malnourished children not covered by the program and redistributed among intended benefi-
ciaries by local staff based on their own assessment of need, the project impact could be ade-
quately estimated (Behrman & Hoddinott 2005: 554f.). This case emphasizes the need for 
detailed knowledge of the operational procedures of the actual project implementation for the 
ability to take these factors into account.66 Ravallion (2008: 3790) for this explicitly intro-
duces the concept of an “average treatment effect on the untreated” (TOU).  
Sometimes, ingenious ways of program design provide solutions: Miguel & Kremer’s 
(2004: 208f.) approach to the confounding influence of spill-overs with treatments and meas-
urements at the individual level (leading to positive TOU and a negative bias in measured 
ATE) was the introduction of target and control areas. Geographical distance thus allowed 
them to rule out spill-over effects and a comparison of the estimates even made the argument 
possible that spill-overs alone are so substantial that they justify the program. Methodically 
                                                 
66 Additionally, in case these disruptions of the project routines are noted, the researcher needs some luck so that 
the unobserved heterogeneity can be controlled for in the data. In the PROGRESA case, Behrman & Hoddinott 
(2005: 547) found a way out through “child fixed-effects estimates that control for unobserved heterogeneity that 
is correlated with access to the supplement”. 
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speaking, in this context spill-overs would bias the results significantly towards zero. But 
even a group-level approach cannot be an overall solution, as the authors note:  
 
“While group-level randomization can be used in other settings with externalities localized, either geo-
graphically or along some other dimension, such as the analysis of school vouchers or information 
transmission and technology diffusion, it cannot be used to estimate more global spillovers, such as 
those arising through general equilibrium price effects.” 
They therefore argue for randomization at various levels, which is of course an approach not 
feasible in many instances and potentially largely inflating the costs of the intervention.  
2.5.2 Issues of Heterogeneity 
2.5.2.1 Heterogeneity in Impact Pathways 
Connected with the spill-over theme is the question of heterogeneity in impact pathways. The 
intervention pathway is not revealed by a conventional ATE analysis, and thus neither the 
effect of various project components nor the effect of potential spill-overs within the control 
or target group through the program. As Rubin (1974: 700, FN 713) notes,  
 
“[e]ven assuming a good estimate of the causal effect of E versus C, there remains the problem of de-
termining which aspects of the treatments are responsible for the effect. Consider, for example, ‘expec-
tancy’ effects in education […] and the associated problems of deciding the relative causal effects of the 
content of programs and the implementation of programs.” 
For IFSUP, this is a highly relevant question as the intervention used a threefold social protec-
tion approach intervening with the capital base of households, their vulnerability as well as 
the socio-political context, a set-up which in other contexts may only be replicable in part. 
Duflo et al. (2008: 3902f., e.i.o.) stress for randomized experiments (but the point ap-
plies more general) that the ATE reveals the total project effect including the impact of all 
project effects on the variable of interest as opposed to partial derivates  
 
“keeping everything else equal […] But the total derivative may not provide a measure of overall wel-
fare effects. Again consider a policy of providing textbooks to students where parents may respond to 
the policy by reducing home purchases of textbooks in favor of some consumer good that is not in the 
educational production function. The total derivative of test scores or other educational outcome vari-
ables will not capture the benefits of this re-optimization. Under some assumptions, however, the partial 
derivative will provide an appropriate guide to the welfare impact of the input.” 
An obvious solution to this problem would be a differentiation in treatments, by which sub-
populations of the overall population receive subsets of the treatment – Chowdhury et al. 
(2009) provide an interesting example of this: They are concerned with the causes of migra-
tion constraints despite the presence of seasonal hunger periods amongst the poor in northern 
Bangladesh. They subsequently provide a differentiated treatment of information packages 
and cash-incentives to randomized subsets of the target population. Their results reveal sav-
ings- and borrowing constraints as prime limiting factors of migration, compared to other pos-
sible sources such as information asymmetries. But equally important is a focus on under-
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standing the mechanisms by which programs work (Deaton 2010b). For this, methods beyond 
econometric impact evaluation are important: White (2006: 17) e.g. refers to the case of a 
qualitative evaluation, where the qualitative study  
 
“identified the mistargeting of potential beneficiaries and the failure of mothers to put into practice the 
nutritional knowledge they acquired through counseling. A randomized approach might have only 
shown that the project didn’t work, and would not have helped explain the causal factors.” 
2.5.2.2 Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects 
The impact evaluation literature is traditionally focused on ATEs. Sophisticated methods are 
applied that allow for heterogeneity in treatment effects and are nevertheless able to extract a 
meaningful average treatment effect under minimal assumptions, such as in the RCT case. 
This approach, however, tends to suppress a concern that is often essential: Heterogeneity in 
treatment effects and its causes might just be what the object of interest is. It might be that “it 
is precisely the variation in [the impact estimator] that encapsulates the poverty reduction 
mechanisms that ought to be the main objects of our inquiry” (Deaton 2010a: 429). Thus, in-
terest in treatment effects in many cases needs to go beyond mean analysis. Policy decision 
must e.g. additionally be based on distributional results on which ATE analysis says nothing. 
ATE analysis might thus lead to misinterpretation of effectiveness as the variability of the 
outcome and its reasons are not assessed: Although having the same ATE, a project where all 
participants gain slightly is radically different from a project where the status of half the par-
ticipants worsened although the other half overcompensated this loss through their gains.  
Kanbur (2001: 1086) asks how it is possible that in the development discourse “people 
[are continually] talking past each other, each side equally convinced that it has the truth, even 
when confronted with seemingly the same objective reality.“ Just like in the above case, the 
problem rests on the level of aggregation. It is in this respect important to keep in mind that 
the method of impact analysis should not determine the levels of analysis possible. If the op-
timal method for clear-cut analysis of mean developments reveals nothing beyond the mean, 
this should not imply that beyond-mean evaluations are not to be undertaken – a switch in 
methods might be needed. Median effects or the fraction of the population positively affected 
are similarly important for policy decisions (Deaton 2010a: 439). This was as well highlighted 
by Rubin (1974: 690) in the original formulation of the counterfactual problem: He chose the 
mean not for its analytical strength (though this might be in many cases), but only because 
other estimators such as the median or midmean “lead to more complications when discussing 
properties of estimates under randomization”. Kanbur (2001: 1093) in this light calls for a 
look beyond these methodical limitations: “[T]he message is that explicitly taking into ac-
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count these complications is more likely to shift the intellectual frontier than falling back yet 
again on conventional analysis.”  
Additionally, even if analysis of the mean effect of a specific intervention convinc-
ingly reveals zero-results, “there is no implication about any specific dam [(the average ef-
fects of dam construction on poverty is used as example)], even one of the dams included in 
the study, yet it is always a specific dam that a policymaker has to approve” (Deaton 2010a: 
441). If heterogeneity in responses is large, the mean analysis cannot produce a general guide-
line for the single-case examination.  
 The effort of learning about heterogeneity leads directly to subgroup analysis: The 
question then is whether based on different observable characteristics, failure or success of the 
intervention is upheld. Khandker et al. (2010b) argue for the application of graphical and de-
scriptive analysis for a first understanding of potential heterogeneity. Besides descriptive 
analysis, two approaches are commonly used: Quintile analysis and interaction terms. For a 
quintile analysis, the data on the intervention of interest is separated into different distinct 
subpopulations defined through their levels of observational variables (comp. for an overview 
Imbens & Wooldridge 2009: 17f., Khandker et al. 2010b: 118-124). Carter (2008) for exam-
ple uses information on pre-intervention asset levels to determine heterogeneous responses of 
the effect of natural disasters on asset growth.  
For the interaction term approach, the characteristics by which treatment is supposed 
to be heterogeneous are entering a regression analysis via interaction effects, estimating the 
effect of the characteristics themselves on the outcome of interest as well as their interaction 
with treatment status. This therefore leads to estimations of regressions as in Deaton (2010a: 
440): 
jj
iijjii GGY εγδββ +++++= ∑∑ covariatesfurther *X*X* ji,ji,10  (comp. for a 
detailed overview on the method Kam & Franzese 2007).  
These approaches to heterogeneity are potentially very informative on the impact 
pathways and can lead to a better understanding of the intervention as well as improved policy 
in the future. Banerjee & Duflo (2010c: 26) for example estimate the differing impacts of mi-
crocredit on households with pre-existing business: They thereby can conclude that owning 
businesses changes the use of the loan but not the probability of taking it in the first place. 
Their analysis is inspired by theory on credit constraints according to which efficient markets 
should direct money to places with higher returns on investment – as these can be supposed to 
be higher in existing businesses without fixed costs, their results are intriguing.  
Overall, it should be clear that at least tests for heterogeneous impacts should be con-
ducted. Crump et al. (2008) develop for example tests to analyse whether, defined for a set of 
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covariates, treatment has zero or constant effects in all subgroups. Important is the call of 
Khandker et al. (2010a: 124) in this respect: To be able to sensibly measure heterogeneous 
impacts, one needs to carefully choose which data to gather on the individual as well as 
household and community level.67 For these considerations alone, the link back to theory is 
crucial. But, as White (2009: 282) summarizes: 
 
“Criticisms of reporting an average treatment effect should not be overstated. Heterogeneity matters, as 
does understanding the context in which a particular impact has occurred. But it will rarely be the case 
that the average treatment effect (usually both the treatment of the treated and the intention to treat) is 
not of interest. Indeed it is very likely to be the main parameter of interest. It would be misleading to re-
port significance, or not, a particular subgroup if the average treatment effect had the opposite sign. 
Moreover the average treatment effect is the basis for cost effectiveness calculations.” 
2.5.3 Data Mining Risks 
The danger of using approaches such as interaction terms or non-linear specifications cer-
tainly rests in data mining, by which researchers can be tempted to specify their analysis just 
until they can report significant effects, as Rubin (1974: 700) notes:  
 
“With or without random sampling or randomization, if an important prior variable is found that sys-
tematically differs in E and C trials or in the sample and target population, we are faced with either ad-
justing for it or not putting much faith in our estimate. However, we cannot adjust for any variable pre-
sented, because if we do, any estimate can be obtained.” 
Brambor et al. (2006: 78) report for the context of general multiplicative interaction models 
that an incorrect application of interaction terms is flawing the reliability of articles in top 
journals of the political science: They find for example that  
 
“[o]f the 101 articles that actually interpreted one or more of the constitutive terms, 63 interpreted them 
as unconditional or average effects. […W]e can say with absolute certainty that interpreting constitutive 
terms as unconditional or average effects is wrong. It is simply not appropriate to interpret the results of 
interaction models as if they came from a linear-additive model.”  
The more general point of this analysis is that the case for causal inference is getting more 
complicated with additional regressors.68 As Ravallion (2008: 3793) notes usually the “X’s 
enter in a linear-in-parameters form. This is commonly assumed in applied work, but it is an 
ad hoc assumption, which is rarely justified by anything more than computational conven-
ience (which is rather lame these days).” Sims (2010: 66f.) backs this argumentation. He ar-
gues that standard errors, functional forms and the significance of results are intrinsically re-
lated: “Observing that robust standard errors are quite different from conventional ones, 
which do not cluster or account for heteroskedasticity69, should be a signal to us that there is a 
                                                 
67 The latter aspect of careful data gathering is related to the decision of the size of the sample as well: There 
exists an inherent trade-off between the costs of the intervention or at least its measurement and the effects that 
can be measured: The larger the sample size, the smaller the “minimum detectable effect size” and vice versa 
(Armendáriz & Morduch 2010: 302f., Duflo et al. 2008: 3918). Subgroup analysis inflates this trade-off. 
68 Besides, adding too many interaction terms can, besides reducing the degrees of freedom, lead to problems of 
multicollinearity (Khandker et al. 2010b: 117). 
69 Heteroskedasticity refers to the fact that variation in the error terms of an OLS regression is correlated 
amongst different strata of the population (Wooldridge 2010: 59-62). 
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great deal going on in the data that our linear model is missing” (2010: 66). As he outlines, a 
lot can be learned on the heterogeneity in-between the subjects of the observation from more 
careful approaches that are not too complicated to implement.70 Other authors argue for a 
focus on more important aspects than linearity, such as Angrist & Pischke (2010: 11f.): “The 
linear models that constitute the workhorse of contemporary empirical practice usually turn 
out to be remarkably robust, a feature many applied researchers have long sensed and that 
econometric theory now does a better job of explaining”. 
 Some methods are especially sensitive to data mining risks: In RDD, the evaluator has 
the possibility to choose the bandwidth of ε±m , model specifications other than linear ap-
proximation around the cutoff-value as well as the inclusion of covariates which can strongly 
change the results of the analysis. The great effect of these modifications is reported by Green 
et al. (2009), who try to establish general rules especially for bandwidth selection. Further 
work in their line is required, testing the accuracy of RDDs in cases that are comparable to 
estimates from a classical randomized evaluation. This would bear the possibility to establish 
more knowledge on the rules of applying the designs, especially the bandwidth selection 
question. The “data mining” Deaton (2010a: 440f.) fears in respect to subpopulation analysis 
thus comes back into the picture: “In large-scale, expensive trials, a zero or very small result 
is unlikely to be welcomed, and there is likely to be considerable pressure to search for some 
subpopulation or some outcome that shows a more palatable result, if only to help justify the 
cost of the trial.” Bendavid (2011: 20) therefore makes an analogy to medical trials: “Generat-
ing significant findings through small tweaks of the research design and subtle changes to 
inclusion and exclusion criteria are unsavory practices, but the motivation behind them is un-
surprising.“ He therefore argues for the set-up of ex-ante-trial registration for experiments, 
just as in the medical field: In this, he has a strong point. Only the up-front declaration of re-
search designs, including especially sub-group analysis, can prevent data-mining concerns. 
These data mining concerns must not prevent ex-post analysis of intriguing questions that 
originate from later research but can be added with a note of caution to results from the pre-
declared research design. Glennerster & Kremer (2011a: 29) warn in this context that 
“[s]afeguards are important, but we don’t want the perfect to be the enemy of the good”. 
                                                 
70 Sims (2010: 66) emphasizes the “use of generalized least squares [or] what statisticians call ‘mixed models’, in 
which conditional heteroskedasticity is modelled as arising from random variation in coefficients.” See 
Wooldridge (2010: Chapter 20.23.22, Chapter 22.23.24) for further details. 
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2.6 A Hierarchy of Methods? 
The discussion of methods implicitly involved a hierarchy on the theoretical level: As pre-
sented, the most straightforward approach to the counterfactual and thus to internally valid 
estimates is achieved through RCTs. The other methods presented try to mimic this randomi-
zation or must accept that bias exists. But does this hierarchy hold in the applied work and 
beyond internal validity? Roodman & Morduch (2009: 41) in revisiting evidence on microfi-
nance argue for a cautious approach:  
 
“[E]xclusive reliance on one type of study is not optimal. But the present analysis suggests that for non-
randomized studies to contribute to the study of causation in social systems where endogeneity is perva-
sive, the quality of the natural experiments must be very high. And it must be demonstrated.” 
In the 1970s, however, Rubin (1974: 688) already saw a position of “extensive criticism of the 
use of nonrandomized studies to estimate causal effects of treatments […] untenable [for the 
social sciences]”. Still, this debate is lively and ongoing: Especially authors centered around 
the influential MIT Poverty Action Lab (Ravallion 2009: 1) focus on the need of hard 
evidence to justify and improve development aid.71 This approach of methodological primacy 
is thus said to be more than another “’big think’ fad [… especially as it forces] to engage 
development problems where they play out” (Glennerster & Kremer 2011b: 13). At the same 
time, the ‘gold standard’ is extended beyond program evaluation to questions of behavioral 
research (Glennerster & Kremer 2011b) or even macro-level phenomena (Angrist & Pischke 
2010: 16-20). While proving the working of development programs as well as their guiding 
theory on the ground is certainly a turn to be welcomed, it is left open by Glennerster & 
Kremer (2011a, 2011b) why RCTs should be best suited for this. Deaton (2006: 13f.) warns 
accordingly with the same metaphor for “the latest in a long string of development fads.”  
2.6.1 Clear-Cut Research Designs 
Angrist & Pischke (2010: 4) use RCTs as prime examples of what they call a credibility revo-
lution in empirical work through clear-cut research designs – easily attainable through perfect 
randomization: “Such studies offer a powerful method for deriving results that are defensible 
both in the seminar room and in a legislative hearing.” The role of observational methods is in 
this light reduced to cases where time, money or practical reasons deter the implementation of 
RCTs.72 Various studies, popularized at least since LaLonde (1986), support the claim that 
                                                 
71 “Randomized trials […] are the simplest and best way of assessing the impact of a program” (Banerjee 2006a: 
8), comp. as well Banerjee (Banerjee 2006b). 
72 Although the authors acknowledge that “the difference between a randomized trial and an observational study 
is one of degree. Indeed, we would be the first to admit that a well-done observational study can be more credi-
ble and persuasive than a poorly executed randomized trial.” (Angrist & Pischke 2010: 9) 
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RCTs are the way forward by providing evidence where for the same subjects and interven-
tions RCT evaluations surpass observational methods in credibility.  
It has to be acknowledged that the spread of RCTs has raised the standard for all re-
search designs: Whatever method is used, the internal validity of the approach to the counter-
factual has to be defended with RCT designs as benchmark. Angrist & Pischke (2010: 11) 
highlight this shift to the core of the evaluation problem – the question “whether the sources 
of variation in execution used by […] statistical models justify a causal interpretation of […] 
estimates”. They argue that the debate on causal inference was too often confounded by dis-
cussions on secondary methodological issues73. In this understanding, a focus on research 
designs leads to a focus on internal validity.  
In a second step, however, the danger of such an approach is a one-sided focus on set-
tings in which RCTs are adoptable and straightforward internal validity is achievable. As out-
lined in Chapter 2.3.2, this is by far not everywhere. An over-focussing on randomization 
evidence and comparable research designs could go to the expense of knowledge-gathering on 
the effects of macro-level determinants for successful micro-level interventions (Goldin et al. 
2006: 11), as e.g. tremendous problems of aid in fragile states where sustainable interventions 
on the ground rely on long term capacity building at the state level (comp. for a discussion of 
the task Schneckener 2004). Thus, for finding credible solutions to most empirical questions, 
Sims (2010: 61f.) argues that the complexity of reality requires to at least try “modeling the 
dynamic interactions […] – something for which there is no push-button in Stata.”74  
2.6.2 RCTs Solving Second Tier Problems 
Beyond internal validity arguments, the method is claimed to solve problems of a second tier. 
Duflo et al. (2008: 3908f.) e.g. assess the supremacy of RCTs in face of publication biases:  
 
“[If] the true treatment effect is zero, but each nonexperimental technique yields an estimated treatment 
effect equal to the true effect plus an omitted variable bias term that is itself a normally distributed ran-
dom variable with mean zero. Unfortunately, what appears in the published literature may not reflect 
typical results from plausible specifications, which would be centered on zero, but may instead be sys-
tematically biased.” 
Nevertheless, preferring RCTs over non-randomized evaluations for this reason would only 
provide a superficial solution: The way forward must be the recognition that the publication 
of insignificant findings and replication studies alike is relevant – not to disqualify observa-
tional evidence for this reason.  
                                                 
73 Such as the functional form of the impact regression or heteroskedasticity. 
74 He explicitly counters the logic of Angrist & Pischke (2010: 18-20) who call for shifting the focus from “the-
ory-centric” to experimental evidence on the macro-level as well: Sims (2010: 64) emphasizes multivariate time 
series models and other complex evaluation methods. 
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Related to the previous chapter, their following argument is more convincing: “Some 
researchers may inappropriately mine various regression specifications for one that produces 
statistically significant results [even if] inadvertently”75 (Duflo et al. 2008: 3909.); but here 
again, changing the method is going one step ahead of the straightforward solution: A specifi-
cation guided by theory as well as rich on-the-ground-knowledge is less likely to be subject to 
data-mining-concerns, which brings the discussion back to the hypothetico-deductive method 
argued for by Cartwright (2007) and the call by Deaton (2010b: 3, e.i.o.) “to investigate 
mechanisms and to discover why projects work rather than whether they work”.76  
The debate is as well obscured by the overlap to other debates on aid effectiveness: 
Moore (2006) and Vásquez (2006) observe an aid industry centred around itself and unwilling 
to prove its effectiveness and thus call for RCTs as solution. However, their argument is only 
one for the evaluation of programs as such, not for randomization – even if RCTs force the 
project implementing agency clearly into an up-front consideration of the later-on evaluation.  
2.6.3 Weakest Link Principle 
As soon as estimates have proven to be internally valid, the question is how to apply results. 
Cartwright (2007: 18) subsequently lines out how there exists a real “trade-off between inter-
nal and external validity […]. The RCT, with its vaunted rigor, takes us only a very small part 
of the way we need to go for practical knowledge.”77 Banerjee et al. (2010a: 28f.) e.g. strug-
gle to explain contradictory generalized results of their randomized intervention in India in 
comparison to results from Uganda (Björkman & Svensson 2009) on the success of programs 
initiating community participation for improved public good provision.78  
Concerning external validity, a RCT has to prove just as much as any other study how 
its effects are transferrable (comp. Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion). Similarly, as soon as 
one considers interest in heterogeneity of the impact or of certain impact pathways, interest in 
                                                 
75 Inadvertence may occur if under uncertainty about the correct specification of the relationship between causes 
and outcome the researcher is unconsciously guided to accepting the specification providing the most robust 
results. 
76 Angrist & Pischke (2010: 12-16) would provide a perfect example for Deaton’s call: Citing “the best of to-
day’s design based studies”, they explain how returns to schooling depend on state resources, how class size is 
negatively related to student achievements or how homicide rates are unrelated to the death penalty – what is the 
case is lined out, but not so much why. The danger of this approach is the mere focus on finding exogenous 
variation, not the understanding of the most pressing themes in development economics and beyond. 
77 This is not to say that this trade-off is not there with other methods, but just that RCTs are in no way method-
ologically superior in comparison: Duflo et al. (2008: 3953, FN 3926) as well argue, how RDD and IV methods 
are similarly focusing on parts of the evidence where generalization from can be a difficult case.  
78 They have to resort to general observations on differing context – “[t]here could be many reasons why it was 
possible to increase the involvement of citizens with the public sector in the Uganda case and not in UP, and it is 
difficult to tease them out” (Banerjee, et al. 2010a: 28) – and are left with the conclusion that participation is no 
panacea and context dependent. 
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the program at a larger scale, the transfer of results to other contexts, or factors that are not 
possible to randomize, randomization is one amongst many other methods. Cartwright’s 
(2007: 14) weakest link principle comes back into the picture. 
2.6.4 A Hierarchy beyond the Quantitative Approach? 
Bamberger (2010: 617) goes even one step further and criticizes not only a supremacy of 
RCTs via other methods, but also an implicitly applied hierarchy of quantitative versus quali-
tative insights. He calls for a look beyond the econometric approach:  
 
“None of the quantitatively oriented development participants in this debate [on the supremacy of 
RCTs], however, question the singularity of the econometric analysis of survey-based data as the core 
method of relevance for impact evaluations. […] However, given that a central challenge in interna-
tional development is that the decision makers (development economists included) are in the business of 
studying people separated from themselves by vast distances – social, economic, political and geo-
graphic – there is a strong case for using mixed methods both to help close this distance and to more ac-
curately discern how outcomes (positive, negative, or indifferent) are obtained, and how any such out-
comes vary over time and space (context).” 
One should as well not forget that the understanding of development as such is a discipline 
that draws importantly on “historical and structural explanations for why poverty persists in 
some contexts more than in others, and many of these explanations can’t be found through 
random evaluation or general experimental methods” (Bradhan 2011: 21). As Kanbur (2010: 
xvii) argues, detailed knowledge on what works has to be generated “using the full range of 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies from the social sciences.”  
This does not necessarily imply that the very same researchers have to address their 
evaluation problem with multiple methods.79 However, given the predominance of certain 
methods in different disciplines, an open dialogue is just as necessary as the recognition that 
different methods can contribute to different parts of the same picture. Intersections between 
disciplines, such as the field of development studies, play a pivotal role in this. Mutual stimu-
lation can contribute to an increased variety of the usage of methods within the same disci-
pline and thus to a richer understanding of the social processes surrounding questions of pov-
erty and beyond. 
 
                                                 
79 Though this is certainly possible as Lawson (2010) proves by assessing reasons for chronic poverty through 
combined econometric data evaluation and life history analysis. But as Deaton (2010b: 13) summarizes, “we 
make most progress when theory and empirical work are closely articulated, not necessarily in the same person, 
but at least when different people with different skills read and talk to one another. Good tests require deep un-
derstanding of models and the ability to manipulate them into delivering predictions that are not obvious and that 
are specific enough to the model to be informative about it. At the same time, good theories, or good modifica-
tions of existing theories, require theorists who are familiar with and pay attention to historical and empirical 
evidence.” 
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3 Evaluating a Pro-Ultra Poor Intervention: The Impact of 
IFSUP 
“What determines poverty reduction? If we knew the answer to 
that, the poor would be millionaires.” (Kanbur 2010: xv) 
 
Questions of poverty, poverty persistence and eradication are a central field of study for the 
social sciences, each field bringing in its own perspectives – be it discourses based on risks in 
neo-classical economics, rights-centered approaches in international law or needs-based ar-
guments stemming from political philosophy (Munro 2008: 28-37). Poverty is a question to 
be addressed on all levels: Questions on the structures enabling and maintaining poverty on 
the macro level – such as discussions on economic liberalization or the social consequences of 
conflicts – have their say as does the generation of practical knowledge on what works in 
poverty reduction (Hulme & Lawson 2010: 2f.). The following second part of this thesis is 
concerned with linking impact evaluation to the latter: What works on the ground in poverty 
alleviation, in particular for ultra-poverty80 alleviation?  
In many developing countries, the reduction of the depth and severity of poverty re-
mains a major challenge. Hulme & Lawson (2010: 2) highlight that “chronic and extreme 
poverty has spatial and social relational dimensions”: Regional pockets of ultra-poverty per-
sist even in countries on track for MDG 1; ultra-poverty is additionally concentrated on spe-
cial strata of the population such as ethnic minorities or refugees. Innovative mechanisms 
need to tackle these populations, as conventional strategies fall short of reaching these poorest 
sections of society or even use mechanisms that shut them out – as is the case with the ‘micro-
credit revolution’81 (Amin et al. 2003, Dietzel 2006). Its regularly used group collateral, while 
it may serve its purpose in circumventing moral hazard and adverse selection problems wide-
spread on financial markets for the poor (Amin et al. 2003, Armendáriz & Morduch 2010, 
Banerjee et al. 2003), implicitly excludes the ultra-poor: On group or village level, the group 
collateral system prevents their inclusion individually or in groups, as actual or perceived de-
fault rates inhibit their acceptance by other participants (Rudolph 2010: Chapter 5). This leads 
not only to an inefficient but also inequitable distribution of investment opportunities and in 
                                                 
80 Many names are used to describe the bottom section of society in Bangladesh: the ultra-poor, the hardcore 
poor, extreme poor, poorest of the poor, the destitute, etc. The term ultra-poor in the present paper is related to 
the working definition of the NGO NETZ, focusing especially on calorie intake: Ultra poverty is defined by a 
threshold of 1800 kcal/day/person and (functional) landlessness, as described in detail in Appendix 2. 
81 While the identification of capital market failures, widespread in developing countries (comp. for direct 
evidence e.g. Banerjee et al. 2003), as core obstacle for poverty reduction microcredit has been called for as win-
win solution as discussed by Morduch (2000).  
 52
particular of the potential income gains thereof. The ability of the ultra-poor to increase their 
standard of living on their own is thus seriously constrained. Nonetheless it can be expected 
that the ultra-poor have worthwhile investment projects if given the capital base needed to get 
them underway.82  
As of today, only few projects focus on these long-term needs of the bottom section of 
society. Too often they are only addressed by food or emergency aid, if not left alone. But it is 
crucial that their vulnerability – “the likelihood of being in poverty in the future” (Barrientos 
& Hulme 2008: 4) – is addressed. While food aid is nonetheless necessary in many circum-
stances, a change in policy is needed, and could be emerging at present (see for an overview 
Barrientos & Hulme 2008), that would shift the focus beyond their current deprivation to their 
long-term prospects of freeing themselves of poverty. Organizations of larger, such as the 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (Halder & Mosley 2004, Matin & Hulme 2003), 
and smaller scale, such as NETZ (Dietzel 2003), are since decades at the forefront of develop-
ing related strategies in Bangladesh. Recent approaches focus on directly enhancing the pro-
ductive potential of the poorest and “graduate” (Hashemi & De Montesquiou 2011: 1) them 
out of poverty by a combination of asset transfers, training and context intervention. In Bang-
ladesh and beyond, several preliminary evaluations of pilot projects with such a framework 
are and have been undertaken (amongst others Banerjee et al. 2010b, Emran et al. 2009, 
Haseen 2006, Huda 2009, 2010, Mallick 2009, Matin et al. 2008, Sulaiman & Matin 2006). 
First lessons have been published (e.g. Hulme & Moore 2008, 2010), though partly without a 
counterfactual approach to evaluation (e.g. Ellis et al. 2009: 269-275).  
 
The evaluation of the case of IFSUP can contribute to the understanding of this approach to 
ultra-poverty reduction.83 The intervention classes in the broader field of social protection as a 
revived strategy for reaching the poorest households in developing countries84, taking note of 
their especially deprived situation,  
In the following Chapter 3.1, the IFSUP project will be classified as multidimensional 
poverty reduction scheme with a combination of promotional, preventive and transformative 
                                                 
82 Some innovative micro-credit projects address these issues by explicitly targeting the ultra-poor through inno-
vative design features such as flexible pay-back options (see for a recent evaluation of this approach e.g. 
Khandker et al. 2010a). 
83 First limited knowledge on IFSUP was gathered by Rudolph (2010, 2011). As noted, this point of departure in 
analysis is described in Appendix 1. Additionally, Appendix 2 provides a general overview on the ideas behind 
the IFSUP approach and Appendix 3 an overview of the context of Bangladesh and its northern regions. 
Appendix 4 provides a map of the selected working areas for IFSUP. 
84 For a first overview to the field see Barrientos et al. (2010). 
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project elements. In this context, the concrete mechanisms are described that IFSUP applies 
for poverty alleviation. Chapter 3.2 will be concerned with the strategy for an internally valid 
estimation of the project impact. For this, Chapter 3.2.1 will describe the selection process of 
IFSUP beneficiary and control group members to assess the implications for a counterfactual 
approach to impact evaluation. Chapter 3.2.2 is concerned with, first, a description of the data 
present and second, the assessment of the quality of control group data as counterfactual. 
Chapter 3.2.3 to 3.2.5 will outline the description of the evaluation approach: Manski bounds 
will be used to control for attrition problems, difference-in-differences estimation as well as 
fixed-effect-estimation to assess the plausibility of as-if-randomization. Chapter 3.3 will de-
scribe the estimated impact85 of IFSUP on three variable sets: A significantly positive influ-
ence is found for food security, expenditure data and socio-economic status of beneficiary 
households, as well as increased asset levels and reduced vulnerability (although outcomes for 
health-related variables are unclear). Chapter 3.3.4 summarizes findings for correlates and 
Chapter 3.4 concludes that an internal validity of results could plausibly be established. The 
discussion of the external validity of results and the link back to theory is kept for Chapter 4.  
3.1 Theoretical Classification and Description of the IFSUP 
Approach: Promotion, Prevention and Transformation 
The ultra-poor need special targeting for successfully supporting their livelihoods – new 
forms of social protection are emerging as means to achieve this. Following the conceptuali-
zation of Ellis (2009: 8), social protection includes all initiatives aiming at the poorest and 
pursuing the aim of reducing economic and social vulnerability by a protection of livelihoods, 
transfers with the goal of improved consumption and a reduction of social marginalization.86  
Adopting the typology of Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2008: 70, e.i.o.),  
 
“social protection includes four categories of instruments: ‘provision’ measures, which provide relief 
from deprivation; preventive measures which attempt to prevent deprivation; promotive measures, 
which aim to enhance incomes and capabilities; and transformative measures, which seek to address 
concerns of social justice and exclusion.” 
                                                 
85 Estimation, table and most figure creation was done using STATA 11 (StataCorp. 2009. Stata Statistical Soft-
ware: Release 11. College Station, TX, USA: StataCorp LP). Reference for Stata usage goes, beyond the useful 
Stata help files, to Kohler & Kreuter (2008), Cameron & Krivedi (2009) and Khandker et al. (2010b: Part II) 
additional to countless helpful comments especially on the ‘Statalist’ (available through 
http://www.stata.com/statalist/) and the ‘UCLA Stata FAQ’ (available through 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/faq/). Data analysis beyond the code implemented in Stata 11 was conducted 
using mdesc (Medeiros & Blanchette 2011), the bounds-package (Beresteanu & Manski 2000), matselrc (Cox 
2000) and polychoricpca (Kolenikov & Angeles 2004), table creation was aided by the estout-package (Jann 
2005, 2007), figure creation by grc1leg (user written STATA program by Wiggins (without year)). 
86 Social protection can be this widely defined, although this somehow “straddles the conceptual divide between 
welfare payments and development policy” (Ellis et al. 2009). 
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The IFSUP project uses a threefold approach combining prevention, promotion and transfor-
mation, by this establishing a “springboard” for the poor with a “safety net” beneath (Sabates-
Wheeler & Devereux 2008: 73). This combination of approaches is not uncontested: While 
major developing institutions acknowledge a focus on vulnerability and its ex ante reduction 
(ESCAP 2002: 37f.), a wide range of donors see no promotive elements in social protection 
interventions (World Bank 2000), even if some linkages are recognized (e.g. BMZ 2009: 13). 
A combination of approaches is necessary, though, to do the multidimensionality of poverty 
justice: Just as even emergency cash transfers can be shown to induce the building of asset 
stocks and contribute to livelihood protection and promotion at the same time (Devereux 
2007: 56), productive asset transfers can be used as means to protect livelihoods by promoting 
income generation – with the advantage of explicitly raising the long term productive poten-
tial of households. Opposed to moderately poor households, where temporary safety-net 
measures allow them to mitigate a temporary crisis and bounce back to their original devel-
opment trajectories, the chronically poor need protection against imminent deprivation simul-
taneous to support for their productive capacity (Farrington et al. 2004). It is in this light that 
Farrington et al. (2004) call for an incorporation of protection mechanisms in promotive ac-
tion and vice versa, and that Sulaiman (2006: 1) concludes that an “intervention design for the 
poorest will have to be far more comprehensive including promotional, protective and trans-
formative strategies to make a real dent on extreme poverty.” 
 Figure 6 conceptualizes the project approach and its envisioned impact trajectories. 
The project’s main component, the promotion of the respective household’s asset base, is 
combined with mechanisms aimed at preventing asset loss and building up liquid assets as 
well as a transformative intervention into the socio-political context the ultra-poor are living 
in. The overarching aim is to substantially improve the livelihoods of the ultra-poor house-
holds, especially by lifting their year round DCI above 2,122 kcal pc pd and migrating them 
to mainstream development schemes. This is addressed through the three interwoven pillars of 
the project with their respective subgoals of directly raising the productive potential of the 
poor, reducing their vulnerability to future shocks87 and socially empowering them. 
                                                 
87 The term ‘shock’ as used in this thesis refers to unexpected or with a low probability predictable events influ-
encing the livelihoods of the poor positively (‘positive shock’ such as inclusion in an unexpected NGO scheme) 
or negatively (‘negative shock’ such as illness/accidents or environment related disasters) . See for more details 
and a critique of the term Sinha (2002: 187). In this thesis, the mention of mere ‘shocks’ is generally related to 
‘negative shocks’, while ‘positive shocks’ are explicitly noted.  
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Figure 6: Conception of strategy and envisioned intervention pathway by the IFSUP project 
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With the first pillar on the left hand side of Figure 6, promotional aspects are included in the 
project. This includes primarily two policies, skill trainings and asset transfer. The skill train-
ings centre on the management of productive assets but additionally cover general livelihood 
aspects (such as disaster preparedness, health or basic literacy).88 Concerning the manage-
ment training, women are offered a range of courses related to Income Generating Activities 
(IGAs) they are interested in. Skill training by this is related to the second policy within the 
promotional pillar, the transfer of working capital to the households. This is the major devel-
opment mean of the IFSUP project, leading to a substantial increase in the asset base of the 
ultra-poor with an overall transfer of about 11500 taka89 per household for the purchase of at 
least two assets, including the subsequent running costs, in several tranches. Following base-
line data, the transfer thus amounts to 75% of the average annual wage income of households 
                                                 
88 These aspects additionally provide links to vulnerability through the aspect of risk coping ability: Functional 
literacy training is supposed to in general increase the confidence and market participation ability of the ultra-
poor households, emergency preparedness includes e.g. strategies for saving livestock over flood periods.  
89 About 120 € at market exchange rates or 675 € at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted exchange rates. PPP 
exchange rate: 1$ = 12.7 BDT (World Bank 2006); interbank rate: 1 € = 93.6919 BDT, 1 € = 1,34187 $ as of 
24.09.2010.  
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(comp. Chapter 3.2.2.1). The women choose from a range of IGAs, in large majority livestock 
related (beef fattening, raising of heifer, poultry, etc.) but as well including small trade, small 
businesses (e.g. tea stalls), land purchase or services (e.g. rickshaw pulling but as well educa-
tion as ‘para-veterinary’90). Through these policies, the human capital and physical capital 
base of households is strengthened. The IGAs shall on the one hand establish a lasting and 
growing base of physical capital for the household and help in diversifying their income 
source, and on the other hand are supposed to quickly generate a steady income stream, con-
tributing to the short term food security of households. 20% of this working capital received is 
supposed to be paid back, increasing the responsibility for the assets transferred and reducing 
incentive problems.91 By this, the repayment scheme familiarizes the households with the 
procedure of regular savings and conventional micro-credit, enhancing their financial compe-
tency. The 20% payback is additionally constituting a revolving credit fund accessible for 
households similar to the procedure in rotating savings and credit associations (Armendáriz & 
Morduch 2010: Chapter 3). Aim of these promotive policies is to improve the productive po-
tential of households, lifting it to a level where they can self-sustain their livelihoods. 
Concerning the second pillar, the preventive project elements, the project worked pri-
marily with two policies (middle section of the figure above): A security fund of 1% of the 
working capital was established that serves as basic insurance against asset loss through natu-
ral disasters and diseases of livestock.92 A major second policy is the fostering of savings in 
small but regular installments. For this, the selected women form self-help groups of 10-20 
women opening a collective bank account and generating a save storage place for their liquid 
capital. Outcome of this policy is hoped to be an increased coping ability with regard to-
shocks: A small stock of liquid assets enables households to cope with minor shocks without 
drawing on their productive potential. Additionally, the IGAs as such diversify household 
incomes and increase independence from previous occupations. Aim of these methods is a 
reduction in both dimensions of vulnerability: The security fund reduces the exposition of 
households to risks, the savings component their coping ability. The sustainability of the in-
tervention and the potential for long term food security is by this hoped to be strengthened.  
                                                 
90 ‘Para-veterinary’-training (the Bangla word ‘para’ standing for ‘village’) is one innovative design feature of 
IFSUP. Recognizing the problem of lacking access to veterinary service, some ultra-poor women were offered 
basic training as veterinaries, especially concerning livestock vaccinations. By this it was not only an innovative 
IGA introduced but access to veterinary services for all ultra-poor in the vicinity guaranteed.  
91 But exceptions apply: To prevent the material destruction of families in case of failure of the respective IGA, 
women are not to repay their 20% share in case of asset loss and only parts of it in case of low productivity of 
the asset. 
92 Loss of livestock is additionally prevented through the advancement of livestock vaccination e.g. through the 
mentioned ‘para-veterinaries’.  
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Lastly, the third project pillar introduces transformative project elements (right section 
of the figure above) to the intervention. Two policies are especially relevant: First of all, the 
project creates links to government offices, amongst others government veterinary services, 
and the PNGOs are lobbying for the inclusion of ultra-poor in existing social protection 
schemes of the GOB.93 Secondly, the self-help groups form94 an institutionalized special in-
terest group of the ultra-poor95, as they are combined in ultra-poor ‘federations’ on upazila96 
and even district level. These elements link the transformative pillar to vulnerability reduction 
through access to government resources. But foremost, they give the ultra-poor a voice and 
increase their political space. Outcomes of these transformative elements are subsequently 
hoped to be manifold: As empowerment device the group formation raises the awareness of 
the participating women through training, generating room for discussions and networking. 
Additionally, they increase the ability of ultra-poor for political lobbying. In this respect, the 
PNGOs together with the ultra-poor federations run public awareness raising campaigns and 
demonstration against their deprivation. This aims at transforming the socio-political context 
the IFSUP project is embedded in, to not only give the ultra-poor the means for sustaining 
their livelihoods but as well tackle the dependency relations that lock them in their depriva-
tion in the first place. This is an aspect oftentimes neglected (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux 
2008) but important for project success: As Bastiaensen et al. (2005: 990) outline the political 
processes around poverty and capital markets have to be taken into consideration in poverty 
alleviation programs: The poor are deprived of opportunities for shaping the institutional 
landscape and thus cannot (co)determine the rules of the game they have to play. Neglecting 
these political forces can lead to “[poverty] interventions that converge with local elite net-
works with the effect that the […] flow of funds destined to the poor ultimately reproduce[s] 
the local structures of poverty.” Thus, the third pillar supports the overall purpose of sustain-
able livelihoods for the ultra-poor. 
 
Overall purpose of the program is the stabilization of ultra-poor livelihoods, their long term 
food security and the migration to mainstream development schemes such as microcredit in 
                                                 
93 These include especially the GOB cash or food transfer social protection schemes ‘vulnerable group develop-
ment (VGD)’ (with WFP as donor) and ‘vulnerable group feeding (VGF)’ that have been established to target 
ultra-poor but where corruption is regularly impeding their inclusion (comp. e.g. findings by TIB 2008: 44f.) 
94 Additionally, they serve as coordinative device between women and PNGOs and to facilitate savings. 
95 On top of the general marginalization of the poorest in Bangladeshi society, a majority of the target group 
belongs to especially excluded sections without political representation: female headed and Adibasi households. 
96 Administration in Bangladesh follows the levels national – division – district – upazila – union – mouza. The 
six upazilas where the project is implemented are Durgapur, Gangachara, Kalmakanda, Kaunia, Joypurhat and 
Panchibi (see Appendix 4 for an overview).  
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order to lift households permanently above the poverty line. The intervention can thus be clas-
sified as integrated poverty reduction program following a multidimensional understanding of 
poverty (Barrientos et al. 2010: 7).  
3.2 Estimation Strategy of the Project Impact 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the measurement of the project impacts hinges on the construction 
of a credible counterfactual. The degree and assumptions under which the control group in the 
IFSUP case constitutes such a counterfactual will be outlined in the following. For this, the 
selection process and similarities as well as dissimilarities of the two groups at baseline will 
be outlined in detail before describing a threefold impact measurement strategy, combining 
single difference with Manski bounds, difference-in-differences as well as within-estimation.  
3.2.1 The Selection Process 
Selection of beneficiaries was based on four steps: Analysis of statistical data, participatory 
collection of local knowledge, household level surveys and practical concerns.  
As described by program managers, NETZ and the respective PNGOs chose three dis-
tricts of the deprived northern part of Bangladesh as working areas and, based on data pro-
vided by the WFP and the BBS, subsequently selected the two poorest upazilas each, and 
within these the four poorest unions each. Based on their local knowledge and consultations 
with the respective local council (Union Parishad, UP), the poorest villages were singled out. 
Secondly, the 6000 poorest households (1000 per upazila, 250 per union) were selected for 
inclusion in the baseline survey.  
For this step, the NETZ PNGOs used Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)97, in par-
ticular transect walks, social mapping and wealth ranking: By physically traversing the tran-
sect of a village accompanied by local inhabitants, transect walks allow for a comprehensive 
understanding of the local characteristics of the village, the distribution of housing by differ-
ent sub-groups of interest (in this case especially concerning religion, ethnicity and well-
being), the usage of land and other resources, and possible constraints and opportunities of the 
locality. Following this first understanding of the local context, the PRA tool of so-
cial mapping is enriching the gathered information by facilitating the local community to 
draw maps of their community including all households: These allow to map e.g. the demo-
graphic structure, the distribution of household characteristics, the relative distribution of 
                                                 
97 See for a call for a widespread adoption of these methods beyond the selection process to as well impact 
evaluation e.g. Chambers (2009, 1995). For an overview on PRA techniques see Rietbergen-McCracken 
& Narayan-Parker (1998: Section 2). 
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poverty and access to physical and social resources in the community. Last, the tools of 
wealth ranking is used to get a detailed statement on the relative wealth level of each house-
hold, based on a poverty concept self-constructed through the community – through the tool, 
local community members are asked to sort households on different piles based on perceived 
socio-economic status. The facilitator by this not only learns about the relative wealth level 
but as well about the aspects of poverty relevant for the community. In the case of IFSUP, 
wealth ranking was used to sort out the poorest 250 households98 in the respective union that 
were to be included in the baseline survey. All tools are conducted with open and encouraged 
participation of all village members, in part by subgroups of community members based on 
e.g. interest in gender-differing information on access to village resources. The validity of 
results can be cross-checked by repeating the tools with different focus groups or by compar-
ing PRA results with the later gathered baseline data. 
All participants had at the time of the baseline survey a chance of being chosen for in-
clusion in the beneficiary group, determined by the PNGOs following targeting criteria as 
well as practical aspects such as group formation. After the collection of baseline data99, se-
lection of households into target and control group was conducted following envisaged 
amounts of at least 50% belonging to group II of ultra-poverty100 and 40% to Adibasi101 eth-
nicity. Preference in selection was as well given to female headed households102, households 
with disabled member(s) and beggars. Group II poverty status was operationalized by land-
lessness, a monthly income below 400 taka, and a maximum of average two meals during at 
least nine months of the year. NGO involvement, especially coverage by microcredit was con-
sidered an exclusion criterion. Double-checks on the information in the baseline survey were 
conducted to verify rightful inclusion in the beneficiary group.  
However, the selection process was, last but not least, strongly influenced by practical 
but in retrospect unobservable concerns as well: As the project implementation is based on the 
organization of households in groups, beyond these concerns preference was given to house-
holds with a walking distance below approximately 15 minutes to the group meeting points. 
                                                 
98 As long as they were physically able to work as this is a core criterion for successful project implementation. 
99 Information was collected on the location of households, household members including sex, marital status and 
education, health information, house, land and asset ownership and value, savings and credit, NGO support, 
nutritional status, social awareness/status as well as in 2009 information on trainings and assets received. 
100 Ultra-poor are disaggregated by their DCI and capacity to work through the program. Group I ultra are inca-
pable for physical work (e.g. disabled, elderly, orphans) and not targeted by the program. Group II and III differ 
by their degree of poverty with DCIs of below 1600 kcal/day for group II and below 1800 kcal/day for group III 
(comp. Appendix 2 for more detail).  
101 Adibasi is used as umbrella term for the different indigenous minorities of especially India and Bangladesh. 
102 These are households without primary male earner, mainly divorced, widowed or deserted women. 
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Preference was as well given to the comprehensive inclusion of ultra-poor neighbourhoods to 
minimize social tensions caused through side-by-side difference in program in- or exclusion 
of households with similar social status. Last but not least, with regard to efficiency-concerns 
for the travel time of project-fieldworkers, a tendency was built into the selection process that 
prefers villages clumped together and well-connected by a in tendency better infrastructure.103  
Overall, through this process four fifths of the 6000 interviewed were assigned to the 
beneficiary group, one fifth to the control group – stratification was done on union level, as-
signing 200 and respectively 50 households to beneficiary and control group.  
3.2.2 Data on the Project Population104 and Its Comparability over 
Groups and Time 
The data gathered for the baseline survey allows a detailed description of the ultra-poor popu-
lation in the selected unions105, already hinting at constraints the households face. Given the 
selection process, the summary statistics are representative for the poorest strata of house-
holds106 in each of the selected unions. As the question of endogenous program placement is 
pressing, divergences in patterns between target and control group are noted in the last col-
umns. Data was gathered in two phases. In 2007, a baseline was conducted in six upazilas of 
the three districts in question; in 2009 a follow up study was conducted.107 The survey was set 
up by NETZ in cooperation with the PNGOs as well as an external consultant and conducted 
by field workers of the respective PNGO.  
 Table 1 summarizes key characteristics of the sampled population. In its first three 
columns, it displays the mean, standard deviation and number of non-missing observations for 
the beneficiary group in 2007. These summary statistics will be discussed in Chapter 3.2.2.1. 
For the subsequent discussion of control-group deviations in Chapter 3.2.2.2, the following 
two columns depict the deviation of control group means as well as their significance as 
measured by a simple t-test of mean-equality, the following six columns the deviation of con-
trol group means on upazila level from respective beneficiary group means. 
                                                 
103 Further hidden aspects of selection are of course possible: The data revealed for example that 140 households 
were already affiliated with a saving program of one of the implementing NGOs, Ashroi, in the district Joypur-
hat. These households constitute 7.7% of the beneficiary but only 4.3% of the control group which must not, but 
could hint to a bias in the selection – whether this bias would be correlated with outcomes is of course a priori as 
well unclear.  
104 This chapter draws in part on Rudolph (2010: Chapter 3) but was updated and extended.  
105 An analysis at union-level is complicated by erroneous and missing coding for the impact survey, therefore a 
view on upazila-level is taken where geographical subsamples are addressed.  
106 Households of group II and group III poverty status (comp. FN 98). 
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3.2.2.1 Descriptives of the Project Population at Baseline 
Table 1 contains information on variables that were chosen for measurement of a causal pro-
ject impact or as control variables in the impact regressions (comp. Chapter 3.3). The latter 
include the baseline distribution of key fixed household characteristics as well as the distribu-
tion of wealth, assets and overall well-being indicators. Detailed information on the definition 
of these variables and, if applicable, their construction can be found in Appendix 7: Variable 
Definitions and Construction     Procedure.  
Some of these variables are summarized indices based on principal component analy-
sis. These indices serve as proxies for the underlying wealth structure determining the distri-
bution of socio-economic status, housing quality and asset ownership in the sample (see 
Appendix 5:  for a detailed description of the PCA methodology and the index construction in 
the case at hand). The absolute value of these indices is not informative as such, but it is in 
comparison between subjects and/or over time. 
 
As presented in the first column of Table 1, the IFSUP intervention intervenes with a sampled 
population of 63% belonging to group II of ultra-poverty, the rest to group III; 50% are of 
Adibasi ethnicity, 22% of households are female headed. The sampled population of the six 
upazilas thus shows the characteristics of the selection process, as these figures are much dif-
ferent from their distribution in the basic population ( BBS 2009a). The average household 
size amounts to 3.9 family members108, which can be translated to 3.12 adult equivalents109 
and thus a support-gap of about 0.8 in an average family. 
The severe poverty the families are living in is represented by the hunger they face 
with an average amount of 1.95 meals per day110 over the year. This is mirrored by expendi-
ture figures with a yearly mean consumption of 17961 taka, translating into a yearly mean per 
                                                 
108 This size seems at first sight surprisingly small compared to the 2005 national average of 5.0108(BBS 2009a) 
but with female headed households (22% of the sample) being overrepresented in the sample (national average: 
11 %, BBS 2009a), they draw the average household size down: Female headed families oftentimes are nuclear 
families108, with the female household head being deserted or widowed. This is in line with findings of the Bang-
ladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS 2009a), reporting much smaller average household sizes for female (3.48) 
compared to male headed households (4.98) in Bangladesh. 
109 Adult equivalents figure calculation follows Townsend (1994: 554, FN 512) and are “for adult males, 1.0; for 
adult females, 0.9. For males and females aged 13-18, 0.94, and 0.83, respectively; for children aged 7-12, 0.67 
regardless of gender; for children 4-6, 0.52; for toddlers 1-3, 0.32; and for infants 0.05.” 
110 Households reported the amount of months with average meals intake of one, two or three for the year. 
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capita consumption of 4808 taka.111 Mean pc consumption is thereby well below conserva-
tive112 lower poverty line estimates for the region of around 5500 to 6000 taka.113
Additional to their direct poverty, households are highly vulnerable to shocks: Savings 
amount to a mean of 33 taka, mean credit to 315 taka. But these low figures are due to many 
families neither taking credit (n=3078) nor saving (n=3991), as indicated by the high standard 
deviations. Among the households who do save, mean savings amount to 409 taka, while 
among households taking credit, mean credit amounts to 637 taka.114 Vulnerability indicators 
for health outcomes stand at one average sick day per month. 50% of mothers receive medical 
checkups before and after birth, 70% of children basic immunization by the age of 1.5 years. 
While the first figure seems surprisingly large in comparison, immunization coverage is low 
given the widespread immunization schemes in Bangladesh.115  
Concerning physical assets, households own mean tropical livestock units116 (TLU) of 
0.27, as would be e.g. two goats and seven chickens, with a mean value of 1327 taka. Again, 
the high standard deviations point to the uneven distribution even among the ultra-poor. The 
same finding holds for the average reported values of productive (744 taka) and durable assets 
(243 taka). Last but not least, households are landless or functionally landless, as indicated by 
the mean size of productive land of 0.01 acres.  
Finally, as reported in Rudolph (2010: Table 1) the maximum education of household 
head or its spouse is used as an indicator for the (formal) education level of the household. 
The marginalization of the ultra-poor concerning education is indicated by 22% of household 
heads without any formal education, 52% being only able to sign their name, 8% having 
dropped out of school after class one or two, 9% having dropped out after class 3-5 and only 
 
111 192 € and respectively 51 € at market exchange rates or about 1053 €, respectively 282 € Euro at PPP ad-
justed exchange rates, see FN 89 for calculating figures. 
112 Conservative is meant in the sense that these figures are based on readjustments based on a “Törnqvist price 
index [which tends to] underestimate the increase in price level” (Murgai & Zaidi 2004: 12, e.i.o.). As figures 
are derived from the 2000 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, taking inflation between 2000 and 2006 
into consideration the lower poverty line since then should have further shifted upward. 
113 The lower per capita income poverty line in 2000 is calculated to yearly 5456 taka for rural Rangpur division 
districts (in particular for rural Bogra, Rangpur and Dinajpur districts; Rangpur Division contains the project 
areas in Joypurhat district and Rangpur district) as well as 6012 taka for rural Dhaka division districts (in par-
ticular for Tural Faridpur, Tangail and Jamalpur districts; Dhaka Division includes the project areas of Netra-
kona district) (Murgai & Zaidi 2004: Table A7, recalculated). 
114 Figures are for the overall sample. 
115 Indicative for comparison are findings by the BBS & UNICEF (2007: 160, 178, 187) for the same year: For 
under-5 children, 89% in Rangpur, 94% in Joypurhat and 75% in Netrakona received full immunization. For 
pregnant women, 66% in Rangpur, 55% in Joypurhat and 48% in Netrakona received antenatal care. 
116 TLUs are computed based on the proposal of Jahnke (1982: 9f.), standardizing one TLU to 250 kg liveweight. 
As suggested by Jahnke (1982: 9f.), weights of 0.7 for cattle, horse and buffaloes, 0.2 for pigs, 0.1 for sheep and 
goats and 0.01 for chicken, hens and ducks and were used. 
10% having started or completed secondary education. Only 2% of households report being 
covered by any sort of GO/NGO intervention.117
 
 
                                                 
117 Examples of assistance include old age allowance or food aid from the GOB/UN WFP, or health education 
through NGOs like World Vision or CARE Bangladesh 
 64
65 
Table 1: Description of beneficiaries’ baseline characteristics and control group differences 
    deviation of control to beneficiary group means on upazila-level 
 
mean 
BG sd N 
deviation 
CG N Durgapur Gangachara Kalmakanda Kaunia Joypurhat Panchibi 
fixed household characteristics 
group II poverty status 0.63 0.48 4800 -0.07*** 1200 -0.03 -0.04 -0.11*** -0.15*** -0.04 -0.06 
Adibasi ethnicity 0.50 0.50 4800 -0.01 1200 -0.10** 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
female headed HH 0.22 0.41 4800 0.04*** 1200 0.00 0.07** 0.10*** -0.01 0.08*** 0.02 
family size 3.95 1.49 4800 -0.23*** 1200 -0.07 -0.23* -0.59*** -0.18 -0.26** -0.04 
adult equival. HH size 3.12 1.11 4800 -0.12*** 1200 -0.04 -0.09 -0.36*** -0.11 -0.18** 0.03 
overall outcome variables 
average meals pd pc 1.95 0.26 4723 0.01 1193 0.03* -0.02 0.01 0.03* 0.00 0.02 
SES (PCA) -1.46 1.18 4778 0.01 1190 -0.11 -0.01 -0.37*** 0.16* 0.12 0.26***
sec. outcomes (PCA) -1.00 1.09 4778 -0.04 1190 0.02 -0.03 -0.34*** 0.11 -0.11 0.10 
yearly expenditure 17961 6130 4799 -590.28*** 1200 -512.06 -257.67 -2098*** 184.49 -84.53 -771.06 
yearly expenditure pc 4808 1458 4799 450.54*** 1200 -42.69 258.16*** 126.14 204.70 1403*** 755.04***
vulnerability outcome variables 
households' savings 32.88 138.47 3479 -0.04 861 1.13 1.38 0.00 -0.33 171.75** -55.98 
households' credit 314.58 731.90 4800 -21.67 1200 -35.31 -75.94 -71.88 55.00 7.49 -9.36 
housing quality (PCA) -0.44 0.94 4778 0.05* 1190 0.10 0.04 -0.12* 0.20*** -0.03 0.11*
sick days per capita 0.96 1.99 4799 -0.26*** 1200 -0.87*** -0.40*** -0.15 -0.18 0.18 -0.14 
pregnant mothers’ age 29.88 7.97 4111 -0.63* 589 0.08*** 0.28*** -0.13*** -0.05 0.06 -0.15***
mothers checkup status  0.52 0.50 2040 0.17*** 879 -0.18*** 0.16*** 0.00 -0.10 0.03 -0.07 
children’s vaccination 0.70 0.46 1834 -0.03 394 . . 0.62 -0.83 0.15 -0.17 
asset outcome variables 
tropical livestock units 0.27 0.44 4799 0.05*** 1200 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.12*** 0.19***
livestock value 1327 2248 4799 -76.65 1200 -828.14*** -1113*** -95.64 157.04 385.19* 1036***
product. assets (PCA) -0.63 0.82 4799 0.04 1200 -0.10* 0.06 -0.12* 0.16** 0.12* 0.11 
productive asset value 743.55 1197 4799 -122.34*** 1200 -369.97*** -674.11*** -91.54 181.77*** 77.88 142.17 
durable assets (PCA) -0.58 0.94 4799 -0.03 1200 -0.04 -0.06 -0.23*** 0.09 -0.03 0.08 
durable assets value 243.32 342.63 4799 -1.68 1200 -19.94 6.96 -40.06** 49.95** -19.49 12.49 
productive land in acre 0.01 0.07 4799 0.01** 1200 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.04***
Observations 6000 1000 1000 1000 1000 999 1001 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; The deviations of CG means and their significance at overall/upazila level displayed follow a t-test on mean equality assuming equal variance.  
 
3.2.2.2 Differences between Control and Beneficiary Group at Baseline 
Central for the estimation of a causal project impact is the problem of selection bias as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2.2. This problem is potentially very significant, as the logic of the selec-
tion process has not fully conformed to a conditionally randomized selection process. It is 
therefore no surprise that the groups of selected beneficiaries differ statistically significant on 
a couple of the indicators presented in Table 1. This is a serious concern for any impact esti-
mation: Measurement of causal effects is likely to be confounded by pre-existing differences 
between beneficiary group and control group at baseline if these are related to project out-
comes. Recalling from Chapter 2.2.2, a simple difference in mean observed outcomes be-
tween the groups,  would lead to a bias 
, representing expected differences of developments in both 
groups had the project not been implemented. Subsequently, it has to be assessed to what de-
gree this bias is confounding results and/or by which strategies it can be circumvented.  
)0|()1|( =−== GYEGYED CiTi
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3.2.2.2.1 Differences in Means on Overall and Upazila Level 
Table 1 above depicts in columns five to twelve differences of control group means for the 
whole sample and on upazila-level (measured through a t-test of mean equality). As suggested 
by the number of significant differences (indicated by stars) for the overall sample alone (col-
umn four), the selection process is not likely to have approximated strict randomization.  
The question though is, whether endogeneity can be expected to be structurally differ-
ent for both groups. As presented in columns seven to twelve, directions of mean differences 
and their significance are similarly structured across the upazilas for most variables: A con-
clusive picture is on the one hand indicated for the fixed household characteristics section – 
which is self-evident given the partial selection of group status on observables. This differ-
ence will be controlled for in the impact regressions. On the other hand the variables ‘yearly 
expenditure’, ‘yearly expenditure per capita’, ‘sick days per capita’, ‘tropical livestock units’ 
and ‘productive land in acres’ show very similar patterns across the subsamples. Importantly, 
in these cases the bias is pointing in a direction that suggests an underestimation of the coun-
terfactual, as exemplified by the finding that 7% of control group households belong the bet-
ter-off poverty strata III.118 These figures indicate that among the 6000 identified ultra-poor 
households an on average poorer subsample was chosen for inclusion in the project.  
                                                 
118 Subsequently, mean CG expenditure pc is 451 taka higher. Additionally, mean CG households have 0.26 less 
sick days per month, 0.05 more TLU and 0.01 more acres of productive land in economic use. Their by 590 taka 
lower overall household expenditure is a consequence of a significantly lower family size in the CG (mean dif-
ference 0.23 members or 0.12 adult equivalents, indicating a slightly better dependency ratio in mean CG HHs). 
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A note of caution concerns the over upazilas structurally dissimilar, but overall still 
significant differences for the variables ‘housing quality’, ‘pregnant mothers age’ and ‘moth-
ers’ checkup-status’. These indicate further dissimilarities that would counteract the underes-
timation-argument above. Additionally, as the above analysis has only compared means, un-
revealed structural differences could be hidden in the distribution of the above variables as 
analysed in the following chapter.  
3.2.2.2.2 Differences in Distributions on Overall and Upazila Level 
Figure 7 to Figure 11 summarize the density of the distribution of core variables. Figure 7, the 
overall distribution of yearly per capita expenditure of households, is very similarly distrib-
uted in control and target group. But as summarized in Figure 8, this is only the case for four 
of the selected upazilas, while the expenditure distribution for control group members in 
upazilas of Joypurhat District is, despite a similar maximum, broader compared to the target 
population. Still, the density of expenditure levels is for both groups very similarly distrib-
uted, reassuring a comparability of counterfactual outcomes for both groups.  
Figure 7: Density of yearly expenditure per capita 
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The graph shows the distribution of per capita yearly expenditure in BDT for households 
selected ("Target group") and not selected ("Control group") for IFSUP.
Density: Yearly expenditure per capita
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Importantly, the difference in shares of households belonging to group II poverty status does not suffice in ex-
plaining these average mean differences. T-tests on mean difference conditional on belonging to group II or III 
poverty status show significant differences between CG and BG in both cases. Results are available on request. 
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Figure 8: Density of average yearly expenditure per capita by upazila 
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The graph shows the distribution of per capita yearly expenditure in BDT for households 
selected ("Target group") and not selected ("Control group") for IFSUP.
by upazila
Density: Yearly expenditure per capita
 
But the economic potential of households is not only determined by their current income and 
expenditure status. Assets, especially physical and human capital, are important determinants 
in the long-term household production function. The socio-economic status (SES) index tries 
to capture these aspects (as depicted in Figure 9): The SES, based on principal component 
analysis, provides a comparative measurement for the underlying long-term wealth structure 
differentiating households, by this complementing the expenditure figures above119. A more 
direct insight in the distribution of human capital in the two group provides the distribution of 
the maximum education levels120 of household head and, if present, its spouse (as reported in 
Figure 10). A more direct indicator for access to financial-productive capital as well as the 
vulnerability implied by the distribution of access to different sources of livelihood sustain-
ment is provided in Figure 11 through a diversification index of income sources121 (DIS). 
                                                 
119 The SES-index is primarily based on the first principal component of physical assets (productive assets, dura-
ble consumer goods and housing) as well as human capital (maximum education levels). Comp. Appendix 5 for 
a detailed description of its construction.  
120 The maximum of reported education levels of household heads or their spouse is ranging from 1 to 9 (1: illit-
erate; 2: signature only; 3: basic reading/writing skills; 4: class 1-2 passed; 5: class 3-5 passed; 6: class 6-8 
passed; 7: class 9-10 passed; 8: secondary school certificate obtained; 9: higher school certificate obtained). 
121 Index from 0-8 counting the number of income sub-classes of the household (land usage; livestock usage; 
fruit trees, bamboo clumps/vegetable gardens; productive assets of the type rickshaw/van, fishing net, boat, 
husking machine, small business capital; number of household members pursuing wage labour occupations). 
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All three figures confirm that control and target group seem to be selected from a comparable 
population. It has to be noted that the distribution of SES indicates that wealth structure dif-
fers between groups, but even more between upazilas.   
Control group distributions are, besides Gangachara, shifted towards the right, backing 
the case for their structurally better position. Concerning the distribution of education levels 
and diversification of income sources, it is again Gangachara that stands out of a general pic-
ture of a credible counterfactual. This possible negative bias has to be assumed to be negligi-
ble in expectation 
The unequal distribution for both groups in-between upazilas focuses attention to the 
fact that the project intervenes in three similar, but still structurally different regions of the 
country (comp. Appendix 3: Bangladesh and Its Northern Regions for more details). The es-
timation of a causal project effect has to take this into account by allowing for structural dis-
similarities – cluster-robust standard errors on upazila level and upazila-dummies will be in-
cluded in the impact regressions (comp. Chapter 3.2.5).  
Figure 9: Density of socio-economic status by upazila  
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The graph shows the distribution of the socio-economic status index for households selected ("Target group")
and not selected ("Control group") for IFSUP. SES was through principal component analysis.
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Figure 10: Distribution of the size of homestead by upazila 
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The graph depicts the histogram of the density of maximum education levels (1 "illiterate", 9 "higher secondary
school") of household head and its spouse in households selected ("Target group") and not selected
("Control group") for IFSUP.
by upazila
Density: Maximum education level of household heads
 
Figure 11: Distribution of the diversification of income sources 
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The graph depicts the number of income sources available for households (outside wage labor occupations, land,
livestock, home-production potential) of households selected ("Target group") and not selected ("Control group")
for IFSUP, ranging from 0, (begging), to 8, (four household members with wage labor occupation, land and
productive asset ownership, home-production of vegetable and animal products)
by upazila
Density: Diversification of income sources
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3.2.2.3 Single Difference as Conservative Impact Measurement 
The general picture of mean similarities and distributions leads to a general conclusion: For 
many variables, differences between control group and beneficiary group seem negligible. 
The remainder is expected to overall indicate that households were selected for the program 
that had a structurally weaker status at baseline. This fits with the general approach of NETZ, 
aiming at a selection of the in comparison poorest households for their projects. 
Continuing this argument would lead to the expectation that the control group has the 
potential for a better development in mean outcomes without the intervention over time. For 
this, it is assumed that outcome variables in 2009 )1( =t  are positively influenced by lagged 
outcomes in 2007 )0( =t  next to other factors, thus . This could be a 
direct mechanism for some variables: More livestock or productive assets directly influence 
future incomes, thus asset accumulation in the same fields. For other variables, the process 
works intermediary: Better health is indicative of a better coping ability against shocks.  
,...)( 0,1,1,
+
=== = tititi YYY
But this relationship is limited through non-linearities in these processes: As Carter 
(2007: 52-55) outlines, the asset base of households is crucial for movements out of and into 
poverty. Whereas shocks contribute to short term fluctuations in livelihood status, structural 
up- or downward trajectories are determined by the asset122 and skill levels of a household 
and the possibility to move to upward asset accumulation trajectories.123 In this light, Carter 
(2007: 55-59) argues that different classes amongst the poor exist: Based on a choice of the 
poor between present and future consumption he models different livelihood strategies. The 
success of the ‘high potential strategy’ is depending not only on individual skill and the ab-
sence of shocks but, for individuals with intermediary skill level, as well a minimum capital 
base. Only if this capital base is crossed, upward trajectories out of poverty are possible.  
Thus, one subsection of the poor is trapped in poverty for a lack of skill – those “eco-
nomically disabled […] who are inevitably in a poor, low-equilibrium trap” (Carter 2007: 56, 
e.i.o.) – , whereas an intermediate subsection of the poor might be trapped in poverty as their 
                                                 
122 Assets are here understood in a broad sense comprising the five kinds of capital (human, financial, social, 
productive, natural) additional to political resources and other assets (Moser 2007: 1,9). 
123 In this, the socio-political context is implicitly assumed as external to the model and fixed. By this, the socio-
political context of material poverty is reduced to an intermediary factor that might influence the outlined trajec-
tories but is no main determinant in the reasons for up- and downward mobility. But this context is certainly an 
additional factor of differentiation next to Carters skill level. Strategies chosen by the poor would then addition-
ally depend on socio-political constraints by the system that importantly are not external to the system, but are 
influenced by the choices of the actors involved. Exemplarily, Radhakrishna et al. (2006: 148) point to the fact 
that poverty needs to be seen as more than income (or asset) poverty, as “an outcome of multiple deprivations, 
including attributes like powerlessness, alienation and lack of social justice. Income poverty provides only a 
simplified view of poverty and conceptualization of poverty should extend beyond what is captured by the 
money metric.” 
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initial endowments with skill and capital do not suffice to lift them above a threshold needed 
for an upward trajectory – “[t]he multiple equilibrium poor […] will move to the high-
potential strategy if they are not too far away from the needed minimum capital” (Carter 
2007: 56, e.i.o.). Only the “upward mobile […] are expected to always surmount a poor stan-
dard of living given a sufficiently long period of time” (Carter 2007: 56, e.i.o.).124  
This being, it can be expected that at an aggregate level future outcomes are positively 
influenced by initial asset levels, at least as long as the group in question contain a portion of 
“upward-mobile” poor. At worst, initial endowments do not matter and counterfactual out-
comes amongst the ultra-poor are on aggregate identical in every case, as no matter what the 
initial situation is, a poverty trap exists.125  
A simple estimation strategy assuming as-if-randomization under these pretexts would 
assume that the beneficiary group counterfactual, , is underestimating the out-
comes of the IFSUP intervention, given a structurally slightly better situation in the control 
group. With controls for the evident differences in fixed household characteristics 
)1|( =GYE Ci
X , the 
observed project effect  would thus be a conservative 
measure of the real project effect, as the bias would be 
negative. Although the above assumption would allow for a clear-cut estimation strategy
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126, it 
can only be upheld if the data presented for 2009 is covering the same individuals as the data 
for 2007. As mentioned, attrition for unknown reasons is making this assumption unrealistic. 
Additionally the above conclusion rests solely on observable factors. But as argued by Carter 
(2007: 56), the livelihood trajectories of the poor are not only depending on initial asset levels 
or the occurrence of shocks but crucially “individuals are heterogeneous in the sense that they 
have innate skill levels and abilities.” Especially the latter aspect renders doubt on the conser-
vative-estimation argument and calls for difference-in-differences or fixed-effects strategies.  
3.2.3 Estimation Strategies for the Project Impact 
3.2.3.1 Manski-Bounds as Solution to Non-Random Attrition  
Attrition refers to a process by which individuals scheduled for project inclusion or coverage 
by the control group survey dropped out of being surveyed. As long as the mechanism under-
lying attrition is random or unrelated to outcomes, this is of no concern. The only conse-
quence would be a reduction in the statistical power of the estimation, due to the shrinking 
                                                 
124 Comp. as well for empirical evidence on the matter Carter et al. (2008). 
125 Additionally, shocks confound the trajectories but these effects should cancel out on aggregate. 
126 As conducted in Rudolph (2010: Chapter 6). 
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sample size. But bias is introduced if this is not the case – if e.g. the poorest were not ob-
served, migrating out of desperateness, outcomes are measured within a subgroup that is bet-
ter off as the true group of reference; if the best-off households refused respond, e.g. unwill-
ing to display their riches, impact is estimated with a reference group worse off than it truly is. 
Figure 12 displays the distribution of attrition households by group status and region: Attri-
tion was a problem predominantly for the control group. Its size shrank by 21% from 1200 
households in 2007 to 986 households in 2009. Importantly, attrition is very unevenly distrib-
uted across regions: While about 42% of control group members were not requestioned in 
Gangachara, respectively 31% in Kaunia and 22% in Durgapur, attrition is less a concern in 
Kalmakanda (11%) and negligible for Joypurhat and Panchibi (2% and 0% respectively).127  
Project managers give no account for the reasons of these high attrition rates – they 
especially cannot provide estimations for the poverty strata that was most likely not resur-
veyed. The large difference in attrition rates is supposed to have a major reason in the non-
acceptance of the selection procedure by some control group families. Tensions between 
families not included and the implementing PNGOs were reported. Thus, while some attrition 
might be uncorrelated with outcomes, a clear assumption cannot be taken. 
That a cautious approach is not unwarranted is indicated in Figure 13: The distribution 
of fixed household characteristics128 between groups and over time shows that the attrition 
process cannot be assumed to be random across covariates for the upazilas Durgapur, Gan-
gachara and Kaunia. For Joypurhat and Panchibi, as expected by the data base, distributions 
remained similar over time and groups, whereas they are reasonably stable for Kalmakanda 
given the 11% attrition rate for the control group there. 
                                                 
127 Attrition in the beneficiary group is amounting to a total of 74 households: “Among the 4803 women 90 
dropped out from the action. A total of 23 died during the period. The others dropped out due to migration. 16 
women were replaced from the same family. 15 women were replaced from the control group as in their families 
was none to become a group member. During phase out of the action the total number of members was 4744.” 
(NETZ 2010: 6). Additionally, 65 HHs split up, one HHs into three sub-households. All these are present in the 
impact survey, replacements were not separately recoded. They therefore can only be ignored for estimation it 
has to be noted though that they account for a total of 2.33% of the BG.  
128 The interpretation of the distribution of female headedness between groups and years is not clear-cut, as di-
vorces and death of male household heads are not only possibly in-between the years but might as well be differ-
ent between groups, with males in beneficiary group households more unlikely to leave their wives given her 
asset contribution to the household. Still, marriages are relatively stable in Bangladesh and divorce is a social 
stigma, therefore changes within two years are assumed to be negligible.  
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Figure 12: Attrition in control and target groups by upazila 
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Figure 13: Difference in fixed household characteristics between control and target group households by 
upazila and in-between 2007 and 2009 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
CG BG CG BG CG BG
CG BG CG BG CG BG
Durgapur Gangachara Kalmakanda
Kaunia Joypurhat Panchbibi
Full sample 2007
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
CG BG CG BG CG BG
CG BG CG BG CG BG
Durgapur Gangachara Kalmakanda
Kaunia Joypurhat Panchbibi
2009 sample biased by attritors
Own graph
Percentage distribution of fixed household characteristics for households selected ("BG")
and not selected ("CG") for IFSUP.
by upazila
Share of households with outlined characteristics
Adibasi ethnicity Group II poverty status
Female headed HH
 
 74
Impact measurement in this context has to the attrition process into account: Additional to a 
single difference estimator, Manski bounds as outlined in Chapter 2.4.5 will be constructed in 
order to narrow down possible bias in impact estimation. These bounds provide upper and 
lower limits of the treatment effect under the assumption of as-if-randomization at baseline.  
 An estimation of worst case bounds is implemented following a difference of means in 
2009: Target group means of impact variables are straightforward, as target group outcomes 
are measured without attrition. For the control group, upper and lower bounds on the means 
are constructed. Attrition households are indicated by z  ( 0=z  if no outcome measured). 
The lower bound for control group means is given by 
 The upper bound for control group means is given by 
. 
)0|0(*)0,0|()0|1(*)1,0|()0|( min ====+====== GzPzGYEGzPzGYEGYElower
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As outcomes are rescaled to the interval ]1,0[∈Y , 1max =Y  and  and thus 
 and .  
0min =Y
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This leads to the simplified for of the bounds for control group means, with 
 for the lower bound and 
 for the upper bound.  
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 As beneficiary group means are observed without attrition, bounds on the impact are 
given by  and , 
reported following rescaling with the original variation of the variable of interest.  
)0|()1|( =−== GYEGYED upperlower )0|()1|( =−== GYEGYED lowerupper
This bounding strategy is used similarly for naturally bounded as well as (partially) 
unbounded variables. In case a variable is naturally bounded (such as meals per day ranging 
from zero to three or dietary diversity score (DDS), ranging from zero to eight), these bounds 
are true worst case bounds of the treatment effect for the upper as well as lower impact meas-
urement. As soon as these bounds are naturally unbounded129, lower (upper) bounds are con-
structed under the assumption of missing outcome information being on the level of the low-
est (highest) observable outcome variable.  
If bounds lead to informative impacts on the treatment, which is the case when both 
 and  point in the same direction, 95% confidence intervals (CIs) are constructed 
using bootstrapping (
lowerD upperD
comp. for an overview on the method Wooldridge 2010: 438-442). Due 
to external constraints, 50 bootstrap replications were used for the construction of CIs.130  
                                                 
129 Be it in one direction, such as expenditure or TLU, theoretically ranging from zero to infinity, or in both di-
rections, such as PCA indices, covering negative as well as positive values. 
130 This in comparison small number (current standard are e.g. 100-500 replications in the medical sciences 
Pattengale et al. 2010: 337) could lead to a power loss of up to up to 2-10% depending on the sample size as 
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3.2.3.2 Difference-in-Differences as Solution to Time-Invariant Bias  
Additional to the Manski bounds as a conservative approach for attrition with potential struc-
tural bias, a DD strategy can alleviate further doubts concerning endogeneity in placement. As 
a bounding approach is complex with longitudinal data, the DD estimation will exclude data 
from the high attrition upazilas: Although this reduces the overall number of observations and 
thus the statistical power of the estimation131 as well as the case for an external validity of 
results132, attrition can be excluded as a concern biasing results133. This DD impact measure-
ment using the two cross-sectional data-sets is implemented through an OLS regression with 
linear specification134,  
iiii ZXyeartreatmentyeartreatmentY εγαββββ +++×+++= 3210 , 
with  as outcome variable of interest for household , iY i
0β  as constant, 
yeartreatment ×  as interaction term for the actual project impact,  
treatment as a dummy variable indicating the status of project beneficiary or control group,  
year  as a dummy variable indicating the year of the baseline (2007) or impact survey (2009),  
iX  being a vector of geographical controls on upazila level, 
iZ  as a variables-vector introducing the household characteristics ethnicity, group II poverty 
status in 2007, female-headedness (all as dummies) and household size (continuous variable).  
3.2.3.3 Fixed Effects as Solution to Skill-Differences  
The argument for as-if-randomization at baseline level was constructed following observable 
variables. Further difficulties could arise from unobservable factors biasing selection. In the 
asset framework discussed above, the future livelihood trajectories of the poor and poorest are 
distinguishable by three groups: Differences in distributions of those ‘economically disabled’ 
are of little concern, as group I ultra-poor are excluded from inclusion in either control or tar-
get group. But the ‘upward mobile’ as well as ‘multiple-equilibrium poor’ in the terminology 
of Carter (2007: 56) are differentiated by intrinsically unobservable characteristics such as 
                                                                                                                                                        
Monte Carlo studies of Davidson (2000: Figure 2) have shown. Due to computational power and time constraints 
this approach regardless had to be chosen. 
131 Information on 4000 households in Durgapur, Gangachara, Kaunia and Kalmakanda, of which 210 are control 
group attrition households, is dropped. 
132 Impact measurement of the implementation is now only measured on data from three upazilas in two different 
districts and two implementing organizations.  
133 Although by this it is assumed that 2% attrition for CG in Panchibi and 11% attrition for CG in Kaunia is 
negligible. 
134 It remains a question for further research, what insights different model specifications can generate. A first 
test with probit regressions, treating the impact indicator as dummy variable (3 meals per day as “1”, less than 3 
as “0”), provided similarly consistent results. 
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entrepreneurial ability, motivation or social networks. As ability, skill, motivation and the like 
can plausibly be assumed to remain constant over time or at least over the covered two-year 
period, a panel approach can control for biases through these unobservables. 
 Data collection for IFSUP was conducted for the same individuals in the same vicini-
ties for 2007 as well as 2009. In the data collection process, the linkages between 2007 and 
2009 households through IDs was confounded, though, therefore no panel data set is present 
in the original dataset. Still, drawing on information present in the data, a clear link between 
2007 and 2009 households could be established for part of the sample. Using information on 
the names of household head and spouse135 as well as fixed household characteristics136, data 
sets of 2007 were linked to data sets of 2009. However, it is problematic that the panel data 
set constructed with this procedure is significantly reduced in size: Overall 982 households 
can be linked from 2007 to 2009, of which 262 are control group and 720 beneficiary group 
members. As reported in Figure 14, attrition for the panel data-set is ranging for the benefici-
ary group from 79% (169 of 800 households remaining) in Gangachara to 89% (89 of 800) in 
Panchibi and for the control group from 68% (64 of 200) in Panchibi to 92% (16 of 200) in 
Durgapur. Despite this severe attrition, the distribution of fixed household characteristics is 
still comparable between the 2007 cross-section and the 2009 panel data, as reported in Figure 
15, with the best comparability for Durgapur, Panchibi and Joypurhat data.  
Reasons for this reduction are manifold: Most prominently, linkages failed where 
names of household heads and spouse were not recorded. Additionally, attrition households in 
the 2009 data sets subsequently dropped out of the panel data set as well. To be able to inter-
pret the panel data, two assumptions have to be taken: First, the dropping of name information 
has to be randomly distributed concerning outcome variables. Additionally, both concerning 
the identification strategy as outlined in FN 136 and concerning the 2009 attrition rates, it is 
assumed that the households are kept in the sample without negative shocks occurring. This 
                                                 
135 Due to inconsistencies in the transcription of Bangla to Latin spelling, Statas’ soundex command was used.  
136 Core characteristic for attribution were upazila, ethnicity and the soundex code of names for household head 
and spouse. Where these results were ambiguous, as multiple households with identical names and ethnicity in 
the same location were present, step by step the following characteristics were added to identify the links be-
tween these: Variables used were group status, ethnicity, female headedness, upazila of housing, education lev-
els of household heads beyond signature-ability, family size corrected for children born in-between 2007 and 
2009, home as well as homestead ownership corrected for home-construction/homestead-purchase in-between 
2007 and 2009 as well as group II poverty status. Identity between these characteristics for 2007 and 2009 can 
only be assumed for female headed-households not remarrying, households without members dying, without 
household heads acquiring formal education, and households where group II poverty status 2007 was correctly 
reported in 2009. The identification strategy for households with multiple pairs following upazila, ethnicity and 
the soundex codes is thus potentially upward-biased as it prefers households without shocks. The identification 
strategy thus as well had to drop 2007 information on 2009 attrition households. The fact that Panchibi, Joypur-
hat and Kaunia are non-attrition upazilas is left out of consideration for the panel data due to the low number of 
observations that would be remaining in case of this further data reduction. 
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leads to an upward bias introduced in expectation for control group households relative to 
beneficiary households as only for them attrition is observed in 2009 and as they are more 
likely to face negative shocks due to not being included in the program. Impact would under 
these assumptions be measured against a relatively upward-biased control group and is thus a 
conservative approximation to the true causality.  
If this upward bias of control group means does not hold, impact measurement would 
be overstated. If the assumption of random non-collection of names does not hold, uninter-
pretable bias is introduced in estimates. For an assessment of these assumptions, point esti-
mates of the SD, DD and within estimates have to be compared. 
Figure 14: Attrition in control and target groups by upazila for the panel data-set 
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Figure 15: Difference in fixed household characteristics between control and target group households by 
upazila and in-between the 2007 cross-section households and 2009 panel households after attrition. 
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Impact measurement is conducted following the estimation of a fixed-effects regression 
ititititiititi ZZXXyeartreatmentyearYY εγγααββδ +−+−+×++Β=− ====== )()()( 0,1,0,1,320,1, , 
with  as change in the outcome variable of interest for household i  for 2007 
( ) as well as 2009 ( ), 
)( 0,1, == − titi YY
0=t 1=t
iΒ  as vector of individual constants, 
yeartreatment × as interaction term for the actual project impact,  
year  as a dummy variable indicating the year of the baseline (2007) or impact survey (2009),  
iX  being, for each year, vectors of time-invariant household characteristics that cancel out 
due to the within-estimation approach, be they observable (from geographical location to eth-
nicity) or unobservable (from ability to social networks), 
iZ  being, for each year, vectors of time-variant household characteristics such as HH size.
137
                                                 
137 Only included in the within-estimation of Appendix 6. 
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3.2.3.4 Specification Including Additional Controls (Appendix) 
The above regressions include controls for fixed household characteristics influencing the 
selection process (ethnicity, female headedness, group II poverty status), household size (pro-
ject implementation is conducted at household level, though many outcome variables are 
measured at individual level) as well as geographic locality (as as-if-randomization was con-
ducted on union level).  
 Appendix 6: Further Analysis of Internal Validity in this respect reports different 
specifications of the impact estimation tables, introducing additional controls for education 
levels, outside wage labour income, further NGO/GO support. As these variables are likely to 
be, at least in part, a project impact themselves, they are included to the within estimation to 
be able to compare outcomes for the same individuals. Their inclusion serves the important 
purpose to warn against overturning of results or large deviations in point estimates or stan-
dard errors beyond a comparison of the DD, panel, and Manski bounds. Results will be noted 
in the main text where necessary.  
 Additional interest lies in heterogeneity of treatment effects and specific impact path-
ways. Results of Appendix 6: Further Analysis of Internal Validity give a first indication for 
this by including an interaction effect for IFSUP beneficiaries additionally receiving support 
by GOB social protection schemes.  
3.2.4 Spill-Overs as Confounders 
Estimation of treatment effects relies on the SUTVA assumption, implying no spill-overs. 
This assumption is very unlikely, especially given the transformative project pillar that aims 
to influence the socio-political context all ultra-poor in the respective area are living in. But it 
can be expected that spill-overs predominantly have a positive influence for ultra-poor control 
group households: First of all, through IFSUP employment opportunities are introduced that 
should relax pressure on the wage labour market. Secondly, IFSUP aimed at enhanced re-
sponsiveness for local government institutions in the just distribution of access to government 
social protection schemes. Third, IFSUP introduced not only knowledge on animal husbandry 
but as well access to livestock vaccination schemes in the regions that can be expected to 
spread beyond the project population.  
 This being, spill-overs are expected to introduce a downward-bias on estimated im-
pacts.  
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3.2.5 Standard Error Concerns 
Estimation of regressions always implies concerns for heteroscedasticity and, for time series 
data, serial correlation of error terms that would bias the estimation of t-values. Bertrand et al. 
(2004: 274f.) especially criticise the common practice of difference-in-differences estimations 
without taking these considerations into concern:  
 
“because of serial correlation, conventional DD standard errors may grossly understate the standard de-
viation of the estimated treatment effects […] computing standard errors that are robust to serial correla-
tion appears relatively easy to implement in most cases, it should become standard practice in applied 
work” 
Similarly, Stock & Watson (2008) recently brought the aspect to the agenda that usual robust 
standard errors controlling for heteroskedasticity can be inconsistent in case of fixed-effects 
panel analysis, at least if time periods exceed two.  
Potential problems could be present for the IFSUP data, especially as the selection of 
control group and beneficiary group participants was implemented on union level. These po-
tential problems are circumvented using upazila-level fixed effects138 and cluster-robust stan-
dard errors on upazila level139.  
It has to be noted, though, that current discussions in the literature caution against the 
application of cluster-robust standard errors for the case of few groups (G) with a large num-
ber of within-group units. As Wooldridge (2010: 884) comments, “we should not expect good 
properties of the cluster-robust inference with small groups and very large group sizes when 
cluster effects are left in the error term.” For the evaluation in this thesis, cluster effects are 
therefore made explicit in the impact regression. But even if the cluster effects are excluded 
from the error term, “[w]ith small G, inference based on cluster-robust statistics could be very 
conservative when it need not be” (Wooldridge & Imbens 2007: 8).140 Wooldridge & Imbens 
(2007: 9) therefore recommend for this case “whether or not we leave cluster (unobserved) 
effects in the error term, there are good reasons not to rely on cluster-robust inference” and 
propose the introduction of fixed effects together with, eventually, adjusting for heteroscedas-
ticity by a robust regression. 
                                                 
138 Oriented on the methodological approach of Banerjee et al. (2010b) in the estimation of effects of a random-
ized asset transfer project. 
139 Data on unions of housing is missing for part of the sample and cannot be easily linked for other parts due to 
different coding. 
140 A replication of the estimates using robust but unclustered standard errors resulted in more significant results 
(tables available on request). Further analysis concerning the necessity of clustering could draw on a test devel-
oped by Kdezi (2003: 12f.) for its presence.  
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3.3 Impact Estimation 
The impact of IFSUP is measured for several bundles of variables while controlling for fixed 
household characteristics and geographical location.141 These are to give an indication for the 
impact of the various project pillars as well as the overall project effect. Chapter 3.3.1 pro-
vides an overview and discussion of variables indicative for the overall project effect. Chapter 
3.3.2 reports impacts on asset holdings and Chapter 3.3.3 vulnerability related indicators. 
Chapter 3.3.4 will summarize the discussion on internal validity by drawing on findings from 
the covariates. Variables indicative for the transformative project pillar of IFSUP are not re-
portable at present, as clear-cut impact variables are missing142, difficult to compare over 
time143 and weigh, although recently estimation strategies for this problem have been pro-
posed, providing pathways for further analysis.144  
 
Indicators selected for impact measurement include recalls on food consumption, expenditure 
figures, summary indicators and PCA indices (comp. Appendix 5: PCA Analysis for the con-
struction procedure). Impact measurement with the PCA indices is conducted given concerns 
for potential measurement error in the IFSUP data: Meals per day data as well as overall ex-
penditure figures for 2009 were collected with a twelve month recall period. Expenditure fig-
ures for food expenditure and collected food value were unsystematically collected with a 30 
day, seven day or one day recall. These recall periods are rather unusual compared to other 
approaches for expenditure figures and food security estimates145, and problematic especially 
given the already persisting concerns with shorter recall periods: These  
“methods rely heavily upon the memory of respondents leading to substantial measurement error even 
when people are asked to recall what they ate the day before, as in the case of the 24-hour recall 
[…T]these methodological challenges can lead to an unacceptably high measurement error, especially 
when interviewers are not fully trained and standardized against each other and the lead supervisor.” 
(Pérez-Escamilla & Segall-Corrêa 2008: 20).  
 
                                                 
141 Importantly, all impact estimates are robust to the exclusion of these control variables, both concerning sig-
nificance and sign (results available on request). 
142 Offenheiser & Jacobs (2006: 17) add, these might not even be quantitatively discernible, as is the case for 
diffuse measurement or a context specific intervention: Poverty reduction is not a technical issue, but centrally 
about challenging social injustice and addressing power imbalances as argues a rights based approach to poverty 
(Munro 2008: 28-37). “Advocacy projects […] are context-sensitive and do not lend themselves to measurement 
by [RCTs. A]gencies funding advocacy projects therefore must rely on qualitative evaluation techniques and 
satisfy themselves with less tangible – though still meaningful – evidence.“ (Offenheiser & Jacobs 2006: 17). 
143 It can additionally be expected that the effects of the transformative project aspects are, if any were present, 
lagging due to the inertia of changes in social and cultural systems; Fisman & Miguel (2007) e.g. provide evi-
dence concerning the persistence of cultural attitudes to corruption.  
144 Banerjee et al. (2010c) apply an estimation strategy developed by Kling et al. (2007) in a similar context 
where they “test the null hypothesis of no effect […] on ‘social outcomes’ against the alternative that [the inter-
vention] improves social outcomes. [For this, they] construct an equally-weighted average z-score” (comp. as 
well Banerjee et al. 2010c: 7). 
145 For expenditure surveys, reference periods exceeding several months are already unusual (Pérez-Escamilla & 
Segall-Corrêa 2008: 17), for food intake 24-48 hour recall periods are common (Hatløy et al. 1998: 897). 
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Although twelve-month recall periods for food security impact measurement provide the im-
portant advantage of averaging seasonal fluctuations, especially of incorporating the locally 
occurring hunger season monga, their application requires a lot of care, since otherwise they 
are “prone to careless answers or to reporting their current situation as opposed to conditions 
during the prior twelve months” (Coates et al. 2003: 8, FN 5).  
Additional measurement error is induced in the reported value of assets and livestock 
through the measurement and reporting system employed for data collection: Values are ac-
cording to IFSUP project managers reported following the ‘best guess’ of the interviewee and 
interviewer. Furthermore, for the variables related to livestock, productive and non-productive 
asset values, interviewers did not separately code ‘zero’ and ‘missing’ in the impact survey. 
This information thus had to be combined as zero to be able to draw conclusions.146 PCA in-
dices on the other hand rely on assets generally visible to the interviewer, such as the number 
of rooms or the presence of durable goods. A comparison of estimates for indices and value 
figures is thus able to counter concerns for data validity. 
On top of these measurement error problems, where indices based on criteria visible to 
the interviewer provide increased reliability, PCA indices aim at including dimensions of 
poverty “not captured by money metric measures” (Booysen et al. 2008: 1113) – such as edu-
cation levels, the quality of housing construction or ownership status of homestead.147  
Overall, these variable bundles based on different construction and measurement 
mechanisms is beyond being indicative for various project outcomes providing information on 
effectiveness through multiple complementing reference points in the data. 
3.3.1 Overall project impact 
Indicators for the overall project are selected to give an indication for the impact on overall 
food security and wealth of ultra-poor households. Variables include average meals per day 
per capita, the socio-economic status index (PCA), the index of secondary outcomes (PCA), 
yearly expenditure and yearly expenditure per capita, additionally impact on average food 
expenditure per capita per day and the value of collected food per capita per day.148. 
IFSUP seems both over the range of presented variables and for the different specifica-
tions to have a very significant impact on the treated population, as reported in Table 2 (single 
                                                 
146 Exemplarily, the amount of credit for the 982 control group households is reported for 396 households with a 
range of 110 to 30,000 taka, not distinguishing for the rest of the data between zero credit and households not 
willing or able to respond.  
147 Subsequently, PCA is applied to other evaluations of asset-based projects (comp. methodology in Banerjee et 
al. 2010b: 34). 
148 Effects for the latter two variables are not reported for the longitudinal impact estimations as baseline data for 
these variables is missing. 
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difference (SD) estimation with Manski bounds in the last two rows), Table 3 (DD estimation 
for non-attrition upazilas) and Table 4 (within-estimation for the reduced panel data set).  
 The intervention, as displayed in column 1 of the tables, raised the intake of average 
meals per day (mpd) from 0.328 (DD estimate) to 0.411 (within estimate) – results that are 
highly significant on the 1% level and similar to the Manski bounds of the effect 
. These bounds are informative, as both lower and upper bounds have 
the same sign, and worst case bounds, as the outcome variable is naturally bounded (through 
the interval [0,3]). This figure indicates that the major purpose of the project, securing food 
security for ultra-poor households, was achieved. This figure highlights additionally that food 
insecurity can be overcome in a relatively short term of three years by an intervention such as 
IFSUP. The sharpness of bounds on the treatment effect for the overall sample reaffirms this 
finding. As displayed in 
]700.0,350.0[∈mpdD
Figure 16 bounds can be constructed conditional on attrition on 
upazila level as well. As outlined, upper and lower bounds for control group means are al-
ways lower than beneficiary group means for all cases with 95% confidence intervals. As ex-
pected, bounds on control group means are wider for upazilas with higher attrition rates. 
Figure 16: Manski bounds and confidence intervals for average meals per day 
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The single variable analysis of the project effect for meals per day in Rudolph (2010) for sin-
gle difference and Rudolph (2011) for DD estimates could raise concerns that the overall im-
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71][0.025,2.3∈SESD
]1.360 -0.910,[∈SOSD
                                                
Given the concerns for measurement error, it is comforting that the positive average 
project effect is visible not only through the asset-indices but as well in expenditure figures: 
Both yearly expenditure on household and on per capita level increased significantly (on the 
5% and respectively 1% level for the single difference estimator, on the 10% level for the DD 
estimator and the 1% level for the within estimator) through the project, as reported in col-
umns 4 and 5. The impact estimation for household expenditure ranges from 4532 taka (SD 
The positive average effect of the project on the secondary outcomes status index 
(SOS) between 0.606 (DD estimate), though only significant on the 10% level, to 0.852 
(within estimate), significant on the 1% level, is reassuring that the project raised the well-
being of households beyond the direct transfer of assets through the households on education, 
home, homestead and durable asset related variables: An increase in secondary outcomes by 
one would be equivalent to the ownership of a radio (0.60) or the ownership of the house the 
respondent is living in (0.65). Manski bounds in this case are not informative, as the differ-
ence in means is ranging in the negative with . Attrition could thus 
cover an actual zero or negative effect of the project, at least for the upazilas where the DD 
estimation could not be implemented. But the positive and significant effect of the DD estima-
tion reassures a positive impact at least for the upazilas Kalmakanda, Joypurhat and Panchibi.  
pact on food security is a question of the choice of the indicator. This is notably the case as 
meals per day are calculated as average of reported months during the last year with approxi-
mately one, two or three meals per day for family members.  
A comparison of impacts for other variables indicative for the overall project impact is 
therefore necessary. Evidence based on PCA indices as well as expenditure figures as inde-
pendent variables reveal similarly significant results. The intervention is likely to have caused 
an increase in the SES index of 1.442 (DD estimate) to 1.962 (within estimate), again with 
informative, though very wide and on the 5% level insignificant bounds 
.149 This increase of the SES by about 1.4 units can e.g. be represented 
by households owning a vegetable garden (0.73), a husking machine (0.31) and a tubewell 
(0.36) or households getting to own jewellery (0.63), a radio (0.40) and the homestead they 
live on (0.42).150
 
149 It has to be kept in mind though that these bounds are not worst case bounds, but upper (lower) bounds under 
the assumption of missing values having highest (lowest) observed values. It has to be noted additionally that 
factor loadings and subsequent PCA indices could only be calculated in ignoring attrition households. 95% con-
fidence intervals constructed with bootstrapping (50) for the control group mean of SES leads to an upper 
Manski bound CI in-between 1.51-1.69 and 1.86-2.09, thus including the beneficiary group mean of 1.81.  
150 Estimation strategy analogous to Filmer & Pritchett (2001: 117) using the quotient of overall standard devia-
tions and factor loadings as presented in Table 11 of Appendix 5 as weights for a change from zero to one in the 
dummy variables. 
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estimator) to 7143 taka (within estimator). This positive influence on expenditure is not 
driven by the baseline difference in household sizes, as indicated by the positive yearly pc 
expenditure, with estimates ranging from 960.1 (within estimator) to 1918.6 (DD estimator). 
That bounds are uninformative in the sense that they contain the possibility for a positive as 
well as negative impact for both variables is not unexpected, given the large range of expendi-
ture figures.151 These point estimates still indicate that IFSUP households have been able to 
generate income streams that they are able to use: And these are quite significant in absolute 
terms. Using the DD figures and 2009 means as reported in the second last row as reference 
points, 15% of mean household expenditure and 25% of mean pc expenditure can be attrib-
uted to the project. To the extent that this measured expenditure can be interpreted as expres-
sion of permanent income levels (see for a summary of the inference problems involved 
Hsiang-Ke 2003), IFSUP with a one time intervention primarily aimed at the productive po-
tential of ultra-poor households152 increased the well-being of household substantially. But for 
certainty on these conclusions, repeated measures after a longer time-span are necessary.  
Finally, and only relying on data from the impact survey, IFSUP seems to have 
caused, significant on the 5% level, an increase in daily per capita food expenditure of 0.864 
taka, which is not surprising, but as well an increase in the value of collected food by 0.355 
taka. This latter finding was expected to be negative, but as the figure not only includes beg-
ging but as well food self-collected in nature, respondents could have reported the value of 
food consumed from home gardening as well. As home gardening was explicitly supported, a 
positive effect is then plausible.  
Last but not least, the positive estimates of the panel data set allow with certainty the 
conclusion that at least for the individuals of the reduced panel data set the project effect was 
significant and positive in the indicators measured. Additionally, as all point estimates for the 
DD estimation are in fact lower (except per capita expenditure) than their counterparts in the 
SD scenario, this could indicate that attrition is biasing results downward and is indeed a con-
cern for the data. 
 
151 It has to be noted though that upper bounds are worst case bounds assuming zero expenditure for attrition 
households, leading to a maximum project effect of 9936.4 taka for yearly HH expenditure and 2105.3 taka for 
yearly expenditure pc. 
152 The high correlation between current expenditure and expected permanent income can be theoretically ex-
pected given Friedman’s (esp. 1957) permanent income hypothesis (comp. as well the application to SES indices 
in developing countries in Howe et al. 2008: 4). 
Table 2: Difference estimation with Manski bounds for the overall project impact 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 average meals 
per day per 
average family 
member 
socioeconomic 
status index 
(PCA) 
secondary out-
comes index 
(PCA) 
yearly HH ex-
penditure 
yearly expendi-
ture pc 
average food 
expenditure pc 
pd 
value of col-
lected food pc 
pd 
member part of 
beneficiary group 
0.404*** 
(7.33) 
1.450*** 
(10.31) 
0.645*** 
(7.60) 
4532.8** 
(4.02) 
1211.3*** 
(4.76) 
0.864** 
(3.15) 
0.355** 
(3.08) 
        
female headed HH -0.0422* 
(-2.47) 
-0.406*** 
(-6.27) 
-0.241*** 
(-9.54) 
-1774.3* 
(-2.14) 
-146.2 
(-0.57) 
-0.255** 
(-2.87) 
-0.0167 
(-0.15) 
        
Adibasi ethnicity -0.0286 
(-1.09) 
0.447*** 
(9.00) 
0.349*** 
(5.28) 
1274.8*** 
(4.56) 
233.7 
(1.10) 
0.507*** 
(9.89) 
0.301** 
(2.78) 
        
group II poverty 
status 
-0.0222*** 
(-6.20) 
-0.386* 
(-2.55) 
-0.336** 
(-2.97) 
-1042.9 
(-1.16) 
-256.0 
(-1.26) 
-0.146 
(-1.13) 
-0.0946 
(-1.46) 
        
number of HH 
members 
0.0146* 
(2.12) 
0.321*** 
(6.90) 
0.236*** 
(8.33) 
4005.4*** 
(21.17) 
-856.1*** 
(-10.38) 
0.906*** 
(27.01) 
0.182*** 
(7.48) 
        
Constant 2.453*** 
(45.21) 
-1.069*** 
(-5.25) 
-0.218* 
(-2.03) 
13582.6*** 
(13.62) 
10955.8*** 
(29.43) 
1.605*** 
(7.25) 
0.685** 
(3.42) 
        
upazila dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.375 0.339 0.295 0.351 0.234 0.489 0.171 
N 5211 5273 5273 2217 2217 5362 5369 
mean for BG 2.960 1.810 1.190 34374.3 7777.9 6.080 1.680 
upper Manski bound 0.700 2.371 1.360 9936.4 2105.3 2.080 0.700 
lower Manski bound 0.350 0.025 -0.910 -11638.3 -4188.8 -1.280 -2.830 
Single difference estimation of outcome variable in the heading on project participation and the indicated controls. Regression includes upazila-level fixed effects. In parentheses 
t-statistics from upazila-cluster-robust standard errors. The last two rows show upper and lower Manski bounds for the difference of outcome variable means assuming as-if-
randomization at baseline (N=6014 of which for N=213 CG members outcomes are missing due to attrition) for all households in one cluster; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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(2) 
Table 3: Difference-in-Differences estimation for the overall project impact 
( 1) (3) (4) (5) 
 average meals per day per 
average family member 
0
socioeconomic status 
index (PCA) 
secondary outcomes 
index (PCA) 
yearly household 
expenditure 
yearly expenditure 
per capita 
project impact .328** 
(7.02) 
1.442*** 
(10.72) 
0.606* 
(3.76) 
5221.0* 
(4.05) 
1918.6* 
(2.98) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
member part of 
beneficiary group 
-0.00343 
(-0.27) 
-0.165 
(-2.15) 
-0.0174 
(-0.36) 
-159.4 
(-0.34) 
-635.4 
(-2.17) 
     
year 2009 0.673*** 
(13.24) 
1.402*** 
(11.99) 
1.239** 
(8.97) 
7627.2* 
(3.02) 
1128.4 
(1.50) 
     
Adibasi ethnicity -0.0250* 
(-3.42) 
0.546*** 
(16.97) 
0.466*** 
(29.53) 
298.0 
(2.16) 
-226.6 
(-1.82) 
     
female headed HH -0.0280 
(-0.88) 
-0.224 
(-2.13) 
-0.142* 
(-3.07) 
-418.8 
(-1.26) 
440.8 
(1.50) 
     
group II poverty 
status 
-0.00999 
(-0.42) 
-0.345* 
(-3.13) 
-0.238* 
(-4.16) 
-1607.2 
(-2.01) 
-492.5 
(-2.56) 
     
number of HH mem-
bers 
0.00824 
(1.38) 
0.285** 
(7.66) 
0.216** 
(9.81) 
3288.9*** 
(31.42) 
-698.1** 
(-6.55) 
     
Constant 1.999*** 
(77.50) 
-1.832*** 
(-22.38) 
-1.128*** 
(-10.72) 
6764.7*** 
(29.91) 
8666.8*** 
(10.88) 
     
upazila dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.822 0.607 0.573 0.701 0.424 
N 5816 5874 5874 4250 4250 
mean 2009 2.900 1.359 0.852 33762.6 7676.8 
Difference-in-differences estimation of the outcome variable in the heading on project participation and indicated controls. Impact estimation for upazilas Panchibi, Joypurhat 
and Kalmakanda. Regressions include upazila-level fixed effects. In parentheses t-statistics from upazila-cluster-robust standard errors. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4: Within estimation for the overall project impact 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 average meals per day per aver-
age family member 
socioeconomic status 
index (PCA) 
secondary outcomes 
index (PCA) 
yearly household 
expenditure 
yearly expenditure 
per capita 
project im-
pact 
0.411*** 
(7.58) 
1.964*** 
(13.21) 
0.852*** 
(10.57) 
7143.0*** 
(4.13) 
960.1*** 
(4.31) 
      
year 2009 0.622*** 
(14.01) 
1.569*** 
(6.00) 
1.557*** 
(7.48) 
10552.1*** 
(5.26) 
2126.6*** 
(7.38) 
      
Constant 1.926*** 
(68.73) 
-1.597*** 
(-12.75) 
-1.153*** 
(-9.99) 
17395.3*** 
(80.64) 
5124.9*** 
(66.13) 
N 1905 1926 1926 1387 1387 
R² 0.888 0.775 0.731 0.749 0.404 
mean 2009 2.968 1.858 1.250 35698.8 8040.5 
Within estimation on household level of the outcome variable in the heading on project participation for the restricted panel data set. Regressions include upazila-level fixed 
effects. In parentheses t-statistics from upazila-cluster-robust standard errors. The reported constant is an average over the FEs. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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3.3.2 Project Impact on Physical Asset Holdings 
Table 5 reports the single difference with Manski bounds, Table 6 DD estimates and Table 7 
within estimates for the variables tropical livestock units, value of livestock, productive assets 
index (PCA), value of productive assets, durable assets index (PCA), value of non-productive 
durable assets and the size of productive land in acre.  
The selection of variables has two aims: First of all, it shall provide an indication for 
the impacts of the major project component, the distribution of assets. Secondly, it aims at 
answering the question whether IFSUP has been able to generate differences in the holding of 
non-productive assets already in the short time period. This would be an indicator, similar to 
the SOS, of an impact beyond the direct assets transferred.  
 
The results confirm that households were able to better their productive potential due to the 
project:  
As indicated in the first row for columns one and two in the tables below, beneficiary 
households hold significantly (1% for SD and within estimates, 5% for DD estimates) more 
livestock, both in units (ranging from 0.487 TLU for the SD and 0.687 TLU for the within 
estimate) and in value (ranging from 7254.9 taka to 7914.1 taka for the within estimate).  
As indicated in columns three and four, beneficiary households have a significantly 
(on the 1% level for SD and within estimates and on the 5% level for DD estimates) increased 
position in asset holdings as measured by the first component as well as self-reported values. 
Measured impact ranging from 0.780 (SD estimate) to 1.082 (within estimate) for the PCA 
index, which is equivalent to households owning a tubewell (1.00) or a husking machine 
(1.00), and 2651.9 taka (DD estimate) to 3292.3 taka (within estimate) for the reported pro-
ductive asset values.  
As indicated in column five, the project significantly increased mean landholdings of 
households by 0.087 (SD estimation) to 0.101 (within estimation) acres, significant on the 1% 
(SD and within estimation) and 5% (DD estimation) level. This is a substantial increase given 
mean overall landholdings in 2009 of 0.105 acres, using the DD estimates. 
 
Concerning livestock, productive assets as well as land holdings, the project therefore raised 
asset levels substantially throughout the three years. This is not surprising, given the transfers 
involved. The share of livestock related transfers as share of all assets distributed constitutes 
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about 70%153. With a full livestock transfer equivalent to one cow (0.7 TLU), the measured 
SD impact of 0.487 TLU could be equivalent to exactly the transferred amount. With a nega-
tive spin, this could indicate that project beneficiaries did not build up livestock beyond the 
initial transfer154. With a positive spin, beneficiary households’ livestock asset base was main-
tained at least during the project implementation phase. 
That beneficiary households could generate welfare beyond the face-value of the as-
sets transferred could be indicated by the projects impact on durable assets in column 7, both 
in index and value measurement: Impact measurement ranges from 0.620 (SD estimate) to 
0.768 (within estimate) for the PCA index, which would be more than compensated by 
households owning electronics (1.34) or jewellery (1.43), and from 968.3 (SD estimate) to 
1137.9 (within estimate) for respective values. Importantly, though, this impact is only sig-
nificant on the 5% level for the SD estimate and not at all for the DD estimate. On the other 
hand, Manski bounds, significant on the 5% level155, for the durable assets PCA index are 
informative and positive with , although not worst case bounds as the 
index has neither a natural upper nor lower bound.  
The findings on durable assets are therefore inconclusive, especially for the upazilas 
covered by the DD estimates. Positive within estimates allow at least a positive conclusion for 
part of the sample given control group households are an adequate counterfactual.  
 
153 Calculated following the asset distribution numbers in NETZ (2010: 30). 
154 In this respect it has to be kept in mind that 20% (10%) of the transfer had to be paid back if profits exceeded 
7000 taka (lay between 5000 to 7000 taka).  
155 For the beneficiary group, the estimate of the mean of 0.73 has 95% CIs of maximally 0.68 to 0.77. For the 
control group, the estimate of the lower bound for the mean of -0.24 is surrounded by 95% CIs of maximally -
0.33 to -0.15 and the estimate of the upper bound for the mean of 0.55 is surrounded by 95% CIs of maximally 
0.43 to 0.66.  
Table 5: Difference estimation with Manski bounds for physical asset-related variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 tropical live-
stock units 
value of live-
stock 
productive as-
sets index 
(PCA) 
value of pro-
ductive assets 
size of produc-
tive land in 
acre 
durable assets 
index (PCA) 
value of non-
productive du-
rable assets  
member part of 
beneficiary group 
0.487*** 
(5.65) 
7776.9*** 
(6.03) 
0.780*** 
(7.84) 
2998.5*** 
(5.23) 
0.0867*** 
(7.10) 
0.620** 
(3.95) 
968.3** 
(3.79) 
        
female headed HH -0.0341 
(-1.05) 
52.15 
(0.09) 
-0.316*** 
(-4.48) 
-373.7 
(-1.44) 
-0.0281 
(-1.20) 
-0.390*** 
(-14.19) 
-470.7** 
(-3.37) 
        
Adibasi ethnicity 0.211*** 
(4.81) 
2924.8*** 
(8.63) 
0.146** 
(3.77) 
1207.7*** 
(5.13) 
-0.0161 
(-1.82) 
-0.0653 
(-0.96) 
422.3*** 
(6.83) 
        
group II poverty 
status 
-0.102** 
(-2.62) 
-1205.0* 
(-2.30) 
-0.144 
(-1.86) 
-1102.2* 
(-2.51) 
-0.0180 
(-1.57) 
-0.143 
(-1.83) 
-207.2* 
(-2.25) 
        
number of HH 
members 
0.0609*** 
(5.82) 
741.6*** 
(5.73) 
0.121*** 
(4.85) 
445.6*** 
(9.01) 
0.0227** 
(3.81) 
0.0820*** 
(5.53) 
178.2*** 
(13.19) 
        
Constant 0.135** 
(3.34) 
1326.4 
(1.59) 
-0.633** 
(-3.41) 
1022.7** 
(2.70) 
-0.0595** 
(-2.68) 
-0.144 
(-1.18) 
330.0 
(1.90) 
        
upazila dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.116 0.152 0.175 0.123 0.118 0.227 0.118 
N 5373 5373 5373 5373 5373 5373 5373 
mean for BG 0.958 12668.0 0.803 4851.5 0.162 0.731 2143.4 
upper Manski bound 0.590 8712.6 1.110 3403.0 0.120 0.980 1260.0 
lower Manski bound -0.520 -24596.4 -0.520 -12620.8 -0.940 0.180 -5757.1 
Single difference estimation of outcome variable in the heading on project participation and the indicated controls. Regression includes upazila-level fixed effects. In parentheses 
t-statistics from upazila-cluster-robust standard errors. The last two rows show upper and lower Manski bounds for the difference of outcome variable means assuming as-if-
randomization at baseline (N=6014 of which for N=213 CG members outcomes are missing due to attrition) for all households in one cluster. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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(5) (6) 
Table 6: Difference-in-Differences estimation for physical asset-related variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) 
 tropical live-
stock units 
value of 
livestock 
productive assets 
index (PCA) 
value of pro-
ductive assets 
size of produc-
tive land in acre 
durable assets 
index (PCA) 
value of non-
productive durable 
assets  
project impact 0.527** 
(7.71) 
7254.9** 
(5.50) 
0.812** 
(5.28) 
2651.9** 
(4.99) 
0.103** 
(4.59) 
0.659 
(2.80) 
1074.7 
(2.36) 
      
  
  
  
  
(
  
  
  
0.113 0.221 
  
member part of 
beneficiary group 
-0.114 
(-2.10) 
-151.2 
(-0.22) 
-0.110** 
(-4.64) 
118.5 
(0.44) 
-0.0178 
(-1.36) 
-0.0191 
(-0.55) 
-25.65 
(-2.70) 
      
year 2009 0.127 
(1.51) 
4675.0** 
(4.74) 
0.481* 
(3.35) 
1455.3 
(2.56) 
0.00332 
(0.58) 
0.377 
(1.55) 
674.4** 
(8.48) 
      
Adibasi ethnicity 0.190*** 
(22.67) 
1990.8*** 
(12.81) 
0.0683 
(1.67) 
509.0*** 
(12.22) 
-0.0111 
(-2.55) 
0.0857*** 
(10.75) 
315.9*** 
(10.33) 
      
female headed HH -0.0235 
(-0.78) 
131.4 
(0.25) 
-0.133 
(-1.70) 
-241.9* 
(-3.38) 
-0.0153 
(-1.74) 
-0.265* 
(-4.26) 
-263.2 
(-2.67) 
      
group II poverty 
status 
-0.0712* 
(-3.57) 
-603.5* 
(-3.75) 
-0.159 
(-2.07) 
-618.8 
(-1.93) 
-0.0118 
(-1.42) 
-0.132 
-2.00) 
-101.9 
(-2.45) 
      
number of HH 
members 
0.0630* 
(3.81) 
588.5* 
(4.12) 
0.0906** 
(7.51) 
297.0*** 
(24.22) 
0.00826 
(2.03) 
0.0908** 
(8.70) 
102.8*** 
(44.34) 
      
Constant 0.0825 
(1.60) 
-390.7 
(-0.37) 
-0.764*** 
(-15.65) 
670.3 
(1.34) 
0.00582 
(0.84) 
-0.552* 
(-3.54) 
373.6 
(1.97) 
      
upazila dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.227 0.374 0.320 0.249 0.236 
N 5960 5960 5960 5960 5960 5960 5960 
mean 2009 0.932 12536.6 0.478 4427.7 0.105 0.379 1853.6 
Difference-in-differences estimation of the outcome variable in the heading on project participation and the indicated controls. Impact estimation for upazilas Panchibi, Joypurhat 
and Kalmakanda. Regressions include upazila-level fixed effects. In parentheses t-statistics from upazila-cluster-robust standard errors.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7: Within estimation for physical asset-related variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 tropical live-
stock units 
value of 
livestock 
productive assets 
index (PCA) 
value of produc-
tive assets 
size of productive 
land in acre 
durable assets 
index (PCA) 
value of non-
productive durable 
assets  
project 
impact 
0.687*** 
(10.76) 
7914.1*** 
(8.97) 
1.082*** 
(7.54) 
3292.3*** 
(13.74) 
0.110*** 
(5.57) 
0.768*** 
(4.17) 
1137.9*** 
(4.15) 
      
 
  
year 2009 0.0368 
(0.62) 
3203.9*** 
(5.83) 
0.432** 
(2.74) 
853.0** 
(2.90) 
0.0424 
(1.77) 
0.698* 
(2.33) 
960.5*** 
(5.56) 
       
Constant 0.272*** 
(9.13) 
1220.5** 
(2.60) 
-0.625*** 
(-14.74) 
679.8** 
(3.48) 
0.0156 
(0.82) 
-0.588*** 
(-4.72) 
225.1 
(1.60) 
N 1953 1953 1953 1953 1953 1953 1953 
R² 0.428 0.560 0.509 0.418 0.168 0.489 0.431 
mean 2009 0.941 12125.4 0.855 4807.3 0.166 0.865 2314.5 
Within estimation on household level of the outcome variable in the heading on project participation for the restricted panel data set. Regressions include upazila-level fixed 
effects. In parentheses t-statistics from upazila-cluster-robust standard errors. The reported constant is an average over the FE s. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
3.3.3 Project Impact on Vulnerability of Households 
Below, for the variables savings, credit, index of income source diversification, housing qual-
ity index (PCA), dietary diversity score, sickness in days per capita, age of pregnant females, 
mothers’ checkup status around birth and the vaccination status of children (>1.5 years) re-
sults are presented in Table 8 (SD estimates with Manski bounds), Table 9 (DD estimates) 
and Table 10 (within estimates).  
 Beyond the build-up of asset levels presented and the overall improved situation, these 
estimates give an indication for a reduced vulnerability of beneficiary households to shocks 
through the project.  
Important indicator of decreased vulnerability – in its dimension to be able to “deal 
with risky events when they occur”156 (Ellis et al. 2009: 23) – is the access of households to 
capital markets and the ability to build up savings. Savings are a new focal point of develop-
ment practitioners and theorists alike and their potential to decrease vulnerability by providing 
both a buffer for shocks and the means for productive investment is increasingly recognized 
(Armendáriz & Morduch 2010: 147f.). Access to credit on the other hand has long been seen 
as major poverty alleviation mechanism, both by unleashing the productive potential of the 
poor (Yunus 2006) and by enabling the smoothing of consumption patterns throughout sea-
sons and crises. That this might be a viable pathway even for the ultra-poor, who are in many 
contexts shown to be excluded from microcredit access (e.g. for northern Bangladesh Amin et 
al. 2003), has recently been argued for by Khandker et al. (2010a: 39), following the evalua-
tion of a ultra-poor microcredit program as well in northern Bangladesh. 
The impact of IFSUP on savings is positive, as expected by the savings-
encouragement design of the program: Mean savings increased significantly (1% for SD and 
within, 5% level for DD estimates), from 607.3 taka (within estimate) to 723.5 taka (SD esti-
mate). Though Manski bounds are not informative, this indicates an increased coping ability 
of beneficiary households – given the beneficiary group mean in 2009 as reported in the third-
last mean of Table 8, the project was responsible for 87.5% of savings built up by beneficiary 
households. Concerning credit, the impact estimates tell a different story: Impact seems to be 
(for SD and within estimates significantly on the 5% and respectively 10% level, but not for 
DD estimates) negatively related to the IFSUP project. Mean credit levels sank by 771.5 for 
the DD and 917.6 for the SD estimate. Manski bounds are informative, with 
                                                 
156 Opposed to the second dimension of being exposed to risks, unrelated to coping abilities.  
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that impact must lie below -698.8 taka. But given the insignificance of the DD estimates, a 
time-variant or regional bias could be present in this case. Even then, the conclusion holds 
that IFSUP had a negative or negligible impact on credit.  
A priori, it would have been expected that beneficiary group members would through 
their inclusion in the project increase their access to (informal) credit, through increased col-
lateral (Banerjee & Duflo 2010: 62f.). It could additionally have been hypothesized that they 
would use this access to improve their businesses, given the expectation that their productive 
potential is underused. However it has to be kept in mind that credit is utilized for other pur-
poses than productive investment as well: Banerjee et al. (2010c: 12) report from a random-
ized microcredit intervention on moderately urban poor in India that only around 50% of 
loans had a (partially) business related purpose. This indicates, as Banerjee & Duflo (2011: 
Chapter 9) argue, that access to credit is not enough for scaling-up businesses. These might 
just not be profitable enough after they have reached a certain small scale. Further external 
constraints and human psychology additionally play a major role in the decision of the poor to 
borrow. Recently, it has been proposed that the flourishing microcredit movement could be 
the expression of savings, rather than borrowing constraints, e.g. in following self-control 
problems that might even be higher the poorer individuals are (Banerjee & Mullainathan 
2010: 43): As Banerjee & Duflo (2010: 74) put it, from this perspective credit “is not the only 
way (and possibly not the best way) to offer a commitment to saving”.  
The negative to negligible impact of IFSUP on credit behaviour could be an expres-
sion of both these phenomena: On the one hand, it is plausible that IFSUP households have 
reached a certain level of productive asset ownership, from which further scaling up is diffi-
cult. Many of the ultra-poor households’ income generating activities are essentially home-
base production. Scaling these up might require investments beyond the scope of the ultra-
poor. On the other hand, the savings device of IFSUP provides households with means to save 
up large lump sums for the purchase of durable assets and the like, first evidence of which has 
been discussed in the previous chapter. Both reasons support the finding that IFSUP house-
holds, at least in a project phase-out situation, have reduced their borrowing. Given these find-
ings, the question remains open whether IFSUP beneficiaries would have increased access to 
credit had they had wanted to.  
                                                 
157 Mean credit levels of beneficiaries in taka at 183.05 and their CIs of a minimum 142.82 to 231.02 do neither 
overlap control group CIs around the lower bound of the mean (885.54), ranging from 732.3 to 1048.04 nor 
around the upper bound of the mean (6214.98), ranging from 5314.30 to 7193.35. 
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Beyond these questions of access to financial products, the risk coping ability of ultra-poor 
beneficiaries can be expected to have further increased, as indicated by column 3 in the tables 
below. Diversification of income sources is measured as simple index count of the different 
sources a household receives income from. This diversification index can be expected to be 
correlated with risk diversification. Nevertheless, the core aspect of diversification – “a mix-
ture of activities that have net returns with negative correlations” (Rayhan & Grote 2010: 597) 
–cannot be directly captured due to data lacking on these correlations. Concerning the meas-
ured DIS, IFSUP increased the diversification score significantly (1% for SD and within, 5% 
level for DD estimates) from 1.093 (SD estimate) to 1.376 (within estimate). Manski bounds 
are informative and worst-case bounds with , significant on the 5% 
level.158 It is in this respect important to remember that IFSUP members on average received 
more than one IGA. All beneficiary households were e.g. given the means to start a vegetable 
garden additional to their main asset transferred. In this light, a diversification well above one 
would have been ceteris paribus expected. An impact ‘only’ around one seems to indicate that 
substitution effects are taking place for the households: IGA transfers lead to substitution 
away from outside occupations to the management of these IGAs.159 This finding is highly 
relevant in another context as well, as it could be indicative of the argument for positive pro-
ject spill-overs to control group members in Chapter 3.2.4.  
  
Additionally, the increased coping ability of beneficiary households is as well indicated by 
improved housing facilities, measured by a PCA index. Significant on the 5%-level, housing 
quality increased by 0.139 (SD) to 0.340 (within estimate). Manski bounds are not informa-
tive. This increase is relatively small in absolute numbers, as a change in ownership status of 
house (1.26) or homestead (0.90) is related to much higher scores. Still, the accumulation of 
housing is a prime example of an increase in lasting well-being beyond the direct assets trans-
ferred by the project. In this respect, it is especially important that housing is the major pre-
requisite for escaping poverty, as is argued by Moser (2007: 6), drawing on findings from a 
panel study in Latin America: “[W]hile accumulating housing itself as an asset does not pull 
households out of poverty, it is a prerequisite for the assets that do.”  
 
158 CIs for the beneficiary group mean of 4.46 are ranging from minimally 4.40 to a maximum of 4.50, CIs for 
the lower bound of the control group mean of 2.70 range from minimally 2.56 to a maximum of 2.83, while CIs 
for the upper bound of the control group mean range from minimally 3.80 to 4.08. 
159 Investments in education are missing in this index, thus a full-time reduction in child labour would decrease 
the DIS score as well. 
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While the variables mentioned above tried to directly capture vulnerability aspects related to 
risk coping ability, the following discussion aims at finding indirect evidence on the health 
status of households. Health shocks are a prime reason for impoverishment; and poor health is 
a main determinant of being locked in ultra-poverty, as Kabeer (2010: 71) finds for rural 
Bangladesh.  
 In this respect, food variety as measured in the DDS is an important indicator of nutri-
tional adequacy and a predictor of health outcomes, as summarized in Hodgson et al. (1994: 
143-145): Higher food variety is related to height and weight for age measures of children as 
well as to the prevalence of heart and sugar related diseases and even to total mortality, 
though partially drawing on much more detailed measures of diversity. IFSUP achieved a 
significant (on the 1% for SD, 5% for DD and 10% level for within estimates) and positive 
impact of 0.810 (within estimate) to 0.956 (SD estimate) on dietary diversity, with informa-
tive and worst-case Manski bounds of , significant on the 5% level.160 
This increase by at least one food variety could be related to the relatively cost effective pro-
motion of home gardening by trainings and the distribution of seeds, which calls for an inclu-
sion of this project component in related projects as well.  
 The impact of IFSUP on other health indicators, especially per capita sick days, age of 
pregnant mothers, the participation of mothers in ante- and postnatal checkups and vaccina-
tion status of children is inconclusive. SD estimates indicate a positive influence on sick days 
(which might as well be due to household members permitting themselves to stay at home), 
higher vaccination rates for children (with informative Manski bounds significant on the 5% 
level161) and, counter-intuitively, a reduction in the mean age of pregnant females (which 
might indicate that more children are born in the beneficiary group). These results are incon-
sistent with (insignificant) within and DD estimates. This could have various reasons: A first 
might be the severely reduced sample size for the latter three variables; a second difficulty in 
measurement (checkup itself might e.g. not be the variable of interest but checkup by quali-
fied health personnel); a third that effects on health indicators have not played out yet. In this 
respect, follow up studies are necessary to get a clearer picture.  
 
 
160 CIs for beneficiary means of 7.32 range from minimally 7.28 to maximally 7.36; CIs for the lower bound of 
control group means (5.22) range from 5.00 to 5.44, CIs for the upper bound of control group means (6.64) from 
6.54 to 6.75. 
161 CIs for beneficiary means of 0.97 range from minimally 0.95 to maximally 0.98; CIs for the lower bound of 
control group means (0.71) range from 0.65 to 0.77, CIs for the upper bound of control group means (0.89) range 
from 0.82 to 0.93. 
Table 8: Difference estimation with Manski bounds for vulnerability related variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 amount of 
households' 
(in)formal 
savings 
amount of 
households' 
(in)formal 
credit 
index of in-
come source 
diversification
housing 
quality 
index 
(PCA) 
dietary 
diversity 
score 
amount of 
days lost 
due to 
sickness pc 
age of 
pregnant 
females 
mothers’ 
checkup 
around 
birth 
vaccination 
status of 
children 
(>1.5 
years) 
member part of 
BG 
723.5*** 
(19.51) 
-917.6** 
(-3.01) 
1.093*** 
(7.23) 
0.139** 
(3.00) 
0.923*** 
(6.51) 
0.199** 
(2.95) 
-2.773** 
(-2.58) 
0.111 
(1.29) 
0.0973** 
(2.65) 
          
female headed 
HH 
29.80 
(0.98) 
-49.05 
(-1.62) 
-0.239** 
(-2.58) 
-0.0151 
(-0.29) 
0.00203 
(0.02) 
0.105** 
(3.20) 
-0.598 
(-0.60) 
-0.0788 
(-0.87) 
0.0106 
(1.15) 
          
Adibasi ethnic-
ity 
71.90** 
(3.90) 
-15.04 
(-0.54) 
0.365*** 
(10.37) 
0.426*** 
(9.62) 
-0.124 
(-0.72) 
-0.0219 
(-1.06) 
-0.737 
(-1.83) 
0.124 
(0.69) 
-0.00236 
(-0.24) 
          
group II pov-
erty status 
-12.20 
(-0.54) 
-66.32* 
(-2.42) 
-0.113 
(-1.39) 
-0.406*** 
(-4.37) 
0.0768 
(1.17) 
0.00834 
(0.23) 
0.428 
(0.56) 
0.000410 
(0.01) 
-0.0147 
(-1.43) 
          
number of HH 
members 
17.72 
(1.21) 
66.60** 
(3.29) 
0.234*** 
(8.28) 
0.186*** 
(7.74) 
0.0473* 
(2.12) 
-0.0837*** 
(-4.37) 
1.504*** 
(6.09) 
0.00686 
(0.18) 
-0.00179 
(-0.39) 
          
Constant 34.75 
(0.39) 
954.0*** 
(5.36) 
1.973*** 
(11.62) 
-0.326** 
(-2.62) 
6.512*** 
(34.37) 
0.584*** 
(-9.05) 
22.42*** 
(29.34) 
0.212 
(1.10) 
0.900*** 
(22.51) 
          
upazila dum-
mies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.0612 0.0779 0.268 0.157 0.261 0.0504 0.191 0.221 0.0417 
N 5373 5369 5392 5284 5373 5373 435 464 1407 
mean for BG 836.4 183.8 4.460 0.490 7.320 0.540 27.72 0.490 0.970 
upper Manski 748.8 -698.8 1.760 0.870 2.110 0.220 0.140 0.150 0.270 
lower Manski -3024.8 -6028.3 0.520 -2.860 0.690 -4.500 -5.730 -0.0300 0.0900 
Single difference estimation of outcome variable in the heading on project participation and the indicated controls. Regression includes upazila-level fixed effects. In parentheses 
t-statistics from upazila-cluster-robust standard errors. The last two rows show upper and lower Manski bounds for the difference of outcome variable means assuming as-if-
randomization at baseline (N=6014 of which for N=213 CG members outcomes are missing due to attrition) for all households in one cluster. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 9: Difference-in-Differences estimation with for vulnerability related variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 amount of 
households' 
(in)formal 
savings 
amount of 
households' 
(in)formal 
credit 
index of di-
versification 
of income 
sources 
housing 
quality 
index 
(PCA) 
dietary 
diversity 
score 
amount of 
days lost 
due to 
sickness pc 
age of 
pregnant 
females 
mothers’ 
checkup 
around 
birth 
vaccination 
status of 
children 
(>1.5 years) 
project impact 697.5** 
(9.28) 
-771.5 
(-1.55) 
1.013** 
(6.13) 
0.153** 
(5.87) 
0.810** 
(4.61) 
0.0866 
(0.33) 
-3.138 
(-1.47) 
0.163 
(0.81) 
0.0834 
(1.26) 
          
member part of 
BG 
-4.998 
(-0.16) 
20.25 
(1.04) 
-0.106 
(-0.90) 
-0.0486 
(-1.58) 
0.0565 
(1.12) 
0.155 
(1.00) 
0.112 
(0.64) 
-0.156 
(-0.88) 
-0.0350 
(-0.51) 
          
year 2009 -15.14 
(-0.08) 
566.7 
(1.20) 
0.777 
(2.13) 
0.615*** 
(14.74) 
1.673 
(1.50) 
-0.319 
(-0.97) 
1.156 
(0.51) 
-0.328 
(-0.93) 
0.141*** 
(12.00) 
          
Adibasi ethnic-
ity 
28.59* 
(3.80) 
-17.59 
(-2.24) 
0.583*** 
(16.98) 
0.425*** 
(20.22) 
-0.00413 
(-0.09) 
-0.0800* 
(-4.08) 
1.507** 
(4.87) 
0.0398 
(2.90) 
0.0188** 
(5.02) 
          
female headed 
HH 
30.06 
(0.97) 
18.93* 
(3.51) 
-0.211 
(-1.50) 
0.0534 
(1.78) 
-0.162 
(-1.26) 
0.225* 
(3.23) 
1.999 
(2.32) 
-0.0593 
(-2.01) 
0.0384 
(2.01) 
          
group II pov-
erty status 
-13.01 
(-0.79) 
-43.39* 
(-4.02) 
-0.217 
(-2.14) 
-0.258*** 
(-13.30) 
0.0324 
(0.43) 
0.00574 
(0.09) 
-0.718 
(-1.68) 
-0.0494 
(-1.24) 
-0.0131 
(-0.59) 
          
number of HH 
members 
24.76 
(1.11) 
48.75 
(1.35) 
0.239** 
(9.08) 
0.143*** 
(21.39) 
0.0300 
(1.79) 
-0.116 
(-2.64) 
0.399 
(2.54) 
0.000438 
(0.04) 
-0.00961 
(-1.76) 
          
Constant -45.53 
(-0.82) 
183.5 
(0.94) 
1.716*** 
(10.20) 
-0.901*** 
(-12.86) 
6.424** 
(9.14) 
0.814 
(2.41) 
27.86*** 
(33.02) 
0.853** 
(5.43) 
0.793*** 
(34.44) 
          
upazila dum-
mies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.266 0.0719 0.425 0.251 0.618 0.0458 0.0310 0.132 0.0957 
N 4300 5958 5978 5879 5960 5960 2658 1393 1642 
mean 2009 707.7 226.5 4.405 0.237 7.165 0.533 28.70 0.553 0.980 
Difference-in-differences estimation of the outcome variable in the heading on project participation and indicated controls. Impact estimation for upazilas Panchibi, Joypurhat 
and Kalmakanda. Regressions include upazila-level fixed effects. In parentheses t-statistics from upazila-cluster-robust standard errors. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Table 10: Within estimation for vulnerability related variables 
 (1) (2) (9) 
 amount of 
households' 
(in)formal 
savings 
amount of 
households' 
(in)formal 
credit 
index of diver-
sification of 
ncome sources i
h
(
d
d
0 0
(
ousing 
quality 
index 
PCA) 
**
ietary 
iversity 
score 
amount of 
days lost 
due to sick-
ness pc 
-
age of 
pregnant 
females 
mothers’ 
checkup 
around 
birth 
vaccination 
status of chil-
dren (>1.5 
years) 
project 
impact 
607.3*** 
(4.18) 
-774.7* 
(-2.05) 
1.376*** 
(9.62) 
.340  
(3.83) 
.956* 
2.03) 
0.0756 
(-1.01) 
0.232 
(0.11) 
0.0789 
(0.72) 
0.0800 
(0.48) 
         
(
-
     
(
1931 1953 1953 160 
 
year 2009 111.9 
(0.81) 
674.1 
(1.74) 
0.830** 
(3.89) 
0.682*** 
13.26) 
2.349** 
(4.02) 
0.419* 
(-2.56) 
0.800 
(0.40) 
0 
(0.00) 
0.286* 
(2.07) 
     
Constant 31.32 
(0.61) 
306.8*** 
(5.41) 
2.309*** 
(30.74) 
-0.475*** 
-11.02) 
3.954*** 
(9.89) 
0.967*** 
(11.95) 
26.87*** 
(83.52) 
0.431*** 
(5.58) 
0.624*** 
(40.70) 
N 1694 1953 1954 102 697 
R² 0.410 0.0542 0.636 0 0
0 7
.326 .648 0.0394 
0
0.0155 
2
0.0125 0.311 
mean 2009 758.6 199.9 4.409 .525 .297 .539 7.66 0.526 0.981 
Within estimation on household level of the outcome variable in the heading on project participation for the restricted panel data set. Regressions include upazila-level fixed 
effects. In parentheses t-statistics from upazila-cluster-robust standard errors. The reported constant is an average over the FE s. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
3.3.4 Findings for Correlates and Summary Statistics  
The validity of the arguments in the discussion above is supported by the structure of the es-
timates for the correlates of the overall project impact.  
Most importantly, for the DD estimates of Table 3, Table 6 and Table 9, second row, 
includes a measure for the effect of inclusion in the project at baseline (measured by the vari-
able ‘member part of beneficiary group’). This inclusion is not significant for any variable but 
PCA asset index and in this case and most others162 negatively related to the outcomes. This 
reassures the argument that control group outcomes are, conditional on the correlates in-
cluded, identical or even upwardly biased in comparison to the true beneficiary group coun-
terfactual and can thus indeed be interpreted as point of reference for the project impact.  
The plausibility of the data is further strengthened by findings for the vector of covari-
ates included in Table 2-Table 10, leading to a conclusive picture over estimation strategies 
and variables selected:163 Household size is overall significantly and positively linked to the 
variables presented.164 This is in line with theory, suggesting that larger households can better 
diversify and spread risk (Ellis 2000: 14f.) and that economies of scale are relevant on the 
household level (Townsend 1994: 560). Female headedness is negatively associated with out-
comes165, in line with findings that female headedness is a main determinant of being chroni-
cally poor (Rahman et al. 2009: Chapter 1), at least if controlling for additional demographics 
(Meenakshi & Ray 2002: 558). Additionally, the negative correlation of group II poverty 
status in 2007 with the outcome variables166 is indicative for some sort of continuing persis-
tence in the poverty levels perceived, in line with poverty trap arguments (Carter 2007, 
Dasgupta 1997, Wood 2003). Last but not least, ethnicity is positively related to outcomes:167 
This is surprising, given the expectation that these ethnic minorities are especially discrimi-
nated against (comp. findings from India and Bangladesh in this direction by Lehmann 2006, 
Meenakshi & Ray 2002), but in line with findings of Miah (2008: 12f.) reporting no special 
discrimination in marketing (besides pig rearing) for Adibasis amongst the group of ultra-
poor. It is therefore well possible that Adibasi ethnicity is a determinant of ultra-poverty but 
                                                 
162 Besides productive asset value, DDS, credit and mothers’ age; higher sick days are in the expected direction. 
163 Though health related variables show partially inconclusive patterns, in line with the hypothesis that data 
quality may be unclear in their case.  
164 The relation is insignificant for MDP, productive land size, credit, savings and health related variables in the 
DD estimates and savings and health-related variables in the SD estimates. A negative correlation is estimated 
for expenditure per capita, vaccination status and, as expected, sick days. 
165 Besides pc expenditure in the DD estimation, livestock value. Health and financial market indicators are in-
conclusive, which is plausible given the special role women is attributed in family care and foresight 
(Armendáriz & Morduch 2010: 233).  
166 Besides inconclusive findings for health related indicators. 
167 Besides MPD, credit, land size and inconclusive for health related variables. 
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not associated with a lower status amongst the ultra-poor; further research in this direction 
would be necessary to confirm this hypothesis. 
Problematic is the interpretation of the positive year effect: A priori, as ultra-poor 
households are theoretically expected to be in a poverty trap, zero or only slight average gains 
would be expected over the years. Exogenous reasons such as a recovery period following 
natural disasters – in Bangladesh severe inundation in the whole country in 2004 and in its 
northwestern provinces in 2005 (Rayhan & Grote 2010: 597f.) – could explain these results as 
well as data inherent problems, such as measurement error under the assumption that house-
holds had incentives to underreport their wealth for the baseline survey. The continued exis-
tence of measurement error for PCA based indices would be counterintuitive, though. An 
analysis of additional time periods is necessary to find an answer to this puzzle, especially 
whether this upward trend for the control group will hold. Given the data available, it has to 
be assumed that a possible bias is constant over both groups.  
Last but not least, the reported R² measures the explained variation in the data by the 
variables included in the regressions.168 The absolute height of R² is of secondary interest. 
Given a sufficiently large N and under the assumption of as-if-randomization, an already 
small change in variation between households can be attributed to the project (Wooldridge 
2009: 199f.). More interesting are changes in R² with a change in the variables for the model: 
Inclusion and exclusion of the correlate-vectors controlling for fixed household characteristics 
and in a second step regional dummies lead to the general and plausible picture that R² values 
for variables directly related to the program (e.g. TLU, productive assets, savings) change to a 
much lesser degree than secondary outcomes like housing quality or durables assets (results 
available on request).169 For these secondary outcomes, the difference between groups is sig-
nificantly influenced by the program; effects still have to play out, though. 
3.4 Rounding up the Case for Internal Validity 
The estimations above lead to a good case for internally highly valid results. It is of course 
possible, but not likely that additional factors confound the estimates. Appendix 6: Further 
Analysis of Internal Validity provides first insights to two further avenues of making the case 
for validity more robust: Interactions with government social protection schemes as well as 
bias through additional observable characteristics uncontrolled for.  
                                                 
168 Partially, this can be misleading: The partially very high R² values for the within regression (e.g. around 70-
80% in Table 4) are due to the inclusion of fixed effects for all individuals (Wooldridge 2009: 486). 
169 This is as well indicated by the share of point estimate measures in the variable mean: Point estimates for the 
socio-economic status amount to 80%, point estimates for the secondary outcomes index to 54% of the benefici-
ary group mean (measured for SD estimates, comp. Table 2). 
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Interactions of beneficiary group status and support by government social protection 
schemes is included into the impact regression in order to ascertain the finding that impacts 
are due to the asset-transfer, and not to transformative elements leading to inclusion of BG 
members in government programs through political lobbying. For these estimates, the general 
picture is a negative and insignificant relationship of the interaction of government program 
coverage with BG status. At the same time, the positive estimates for the project as such, as 
measured by the inclusion of households in the beneficiary group, is overall positive and re-
mains significant for most variables. 170  
Controls for the additional variables education level of household heads, wage labour 
income, household size and government support to a within estimates adds controls for 
changes in these variables for the same individuals to the impact estimation. The consistency 
of point estimates and significance supports the conclusion that IFSUP beneficiaries profited 
from the program even beyond changes in these covariates.  
  
This additional evidence supports the picture that the IFSUP project had, within three years, a 
significant positive effect on food security, income poverty, asset levels both productive and 
non-productive as well as vulnerability. Health related variables are largely inconclusive.  
IFSUP thus, in the context of northern Bangladesh and with the implementing organi-
zations involved, proves to be a viable strategy in addressing the ultra-poor and improving 
their livelihoods. Three crucial questions are remaining in this respect: 
First, the question concerning the sustainability of results: IFSUP aims at generating 
long-term pathways out of poverty. However, this can only be achieved by follow up studies 
with non-deteriorating data quality for both control and target group.  
Second, the question concerning heterogeneity in impacts: Until now, it was addressed 
that IFSUP works; due to which impact pathways, however, remains unclear. Further analysis 
should differentiate between subgroups of the population in order to differentiate their treat-
ment effects, as was started with the inclusion of interaction terms with coverage by govern-
ment schemes. 
Third, the question concerning the generalizability of effects remains: What would 
happen to IFSUP if the project were transferred to other contexts, in Bangladesh and even 
beyond, or scaled up? The following chapter will conclude the thesis with this question.  
                                                 
170 These estimates are indicative in another aspect: The data is conform to the hypothesis that political lobbying 
led to the inclusion of the poorer strata among the beneficiary ultra-poor in GO schemes. Their lower status as 
such serves to explain the negative sign of estimates. 
 104
4 External Validity 
“[T]o produce ‘useful knowledge’ beyond its local context, [an evalua-
tion] must illustrate some general tendency, some effect that is the re-
sult of mechanism that is likely to apply more broadly” (Deaton 2010a: 
448). 
4.1 Theoretical Perspective 
As long as only direct project evaluation is concerned, issues of external validity – that is 
questions of a transferability of the results obtained in the given context to other settings 
and/or a larger scale (Manski 2007: 26f.) – may not be of interest. The implementing organi-
zation is foremost concerned with generating knowledge about the effectiveness of their spe-
cific project, in order to be able to justify the costs to its stakeholders (be it individual or or-
ganizational donors or the general taxpayer) and to adapt their program if necessary. But be-
yond this scope, it is always the question of an application of the approach to other contexts 
and/or a larger scale – IFSUP was explicitly designed as a pilot project whose findings are to 
be disseminated for an adoption elsewhere. Moreover, the evaluation should always be in-
clined to answer questions of broader interest to society (Humphreys & Weinstein 2009). For 
this, impact evaluation has to solve not only questions of internal but as well questions of ex-
ternal validity – an important aspect too often left aside.171  
 As Cartwright (2007: 18) notes, “[t]he central question for external validity then is, 
‘How do we come to be justified in the assumptions required for exporting a causal claim 
from the experimental to a target population?’.” Deaton (2010a: 450) makes a strong point of 
linking evidence to theory to ensure external validity: 
 
“[R]unning RCTs to find out whether a project works is often defended on the grounds that the experi-
mental project is like the policy that it might support. But the ‘like’ is typically argued by an appeal to 
similar circumstances, or a similar environment, arguments that depend entirely on observable vari-
ables. […] In the end, there is no substitute for careful evaluation of the chain of evidence and reasoning 
by people who have the experience and expertise in the field. The demand that experiments be theory-
driven is, of course, no guarantee of success, though the lack of it is close to a guarantee of failure.”  
The hypothetico-deductive approach would try to falsify a general theory by harder and 
harder ‘acid tests’. Falsification of the theory leads to its adaption and in the process, factors 
relevant for external validity can step by step be adjusted for. This is in line with proponents 
of the experimental approach who argue in favor of a comparison of experiments in various 
                                                 
171 Concerning microcredit, Ault (2009) e.g. makes a strong case that for too long proponents have generalized 
‘best practices’ from single evaluations that actually need to be adopted to local contexts – equivalently, the 
theoretical dependency of microcredit performance on macro context was ignored: “[A]ny comparison of [mi-
cro-finance institutions] that does not take into account the macroeconomic and macro-institutional environment 
[…] is incomplete” (Ahlin et al. 2011: 105). On the other hand, the evaluation of results generated on the field 
has at least an important advantage to evidence generated in laboratories: “[T]reatment occurs without the inter-
vention of the researcher, through some incidental process” (Robinson et al. 2009: 344). 
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contexts.172 This expansion of knowledge is crucial for external validity, as theory alone is of 
no help when data is not available:  
 
“Failures of a theory on the support are detectable; statisticians have developed methods of hypothesis 
testing for this purpose. Failures off the support are inherently not detectable […] There is no objective 
way to distinguish among theories that ‘fit the data’ but imply different extrapolations” (Manski 2007: 
28).  
Without care for external validity, hypotheses from the comparison of projects can otherwise 
be misleading: According to the interpretation of Banerjee (2006a: 8)173 RCTs e.g. revealed 
that school attendance can most cost-efficiently be boosted by deworming programs.174 For 
this argument, he compares different interventions: deworming, conditional cash transfers 
(CCT), handing out school uniforms or free school meals. But each of these projects is 
adapted to a specific context and thus covers multiple dimensions. This invalidates a compari-
son on the single dimension ‘impact on school attendance’, while a comparison on all dimen-
sions is prohibited by the need for local context adaption of programs. 175 And above all, who 
has looked into the question whether worms are obstacles to school attendance in Mexico, 
where evidence from CCTs has been gathered? 
 Duflo et al. (2008: 3952-3954) argue for a twofold distinction for assessing the exter-
nal validity of programs: First, the degree to which a program is depending on the specific 
implementing NGDO is crucial: The effect of pilot programs could especially hinge on the 
fact that the quality of the implementing agency is high, positively influencing compliance 
rates and procedure adherence. Armendáriz & Morduch (2010: 307) argue that especially pi-
lot RCT studies are usually very carefully set up: “Regionwide policies can seldom be imple-
mented with the same level of care”. Added to this question must be concerns that success 
hinges on the relatively small scale of the operation: Beyond management capacity, this ques-
tion relates to general equilibrium effects if projects are implemented on a larger scale. Sec-
ond, they recommend to evaluate to what extent the sample used for obtaining results is spe-
cific,176 and to what degree the implementation is restricted to carefully selected geographical 
                                                 
172 “Of course, even randomized trials are not perfect. Something that works in India may fail in Indonesia. 
Ideally, there should be multiple randomized trials in varying locations” (Banerjee 2006a: 8). 
173 Banerjee (Banerjee 2006a: 8) argues: “How costly is the resistance to knowledge? One way to get at this is to 
compare the cost-effectiveness of plausible alternative ways of achieving the same goal. Primary education, and 
particularly the question of how to get more children to attend primary school, provides a fine test case because a 
number of the standard strategies have been subject to randomized evaluations. The cheapest strategy for getting 
children to spend more time in school, by some distance, turns out to be giving them deworming medicine so 
that they are sick less often.”  
174 Drawing on the evaluation of Miguel & Kremer (2004). 
175 Goldin et al. (2006: 11) e.g. claim that the value of sustainability of an intervention is reduced by RCTs’, or 
more general quantitative methods’, focus on cost-benefit calculations, which comes down to the incomparabil-
ity of one-dimensional impacts if projects necessarily include multiple facets due to context adaption. 
176 IFSUP results would for example a priori only be transferrable to other ultra-poor of group II and III that 
were targeted by the program. These effects can be found on an aggregate level as well: Gulli (1998: 25-29) for 
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sites. Evaluations could therefore try to randomize sites for achieving greater external valid-
ity, something that is “almost never done. Randomized evaluations are typically performed in 
‘convenience’ samples, with specific populations” (Duflo et al. 2008: 3953). The solution can 
therefore only be “a combination of replications and theory that can help generalize the les-
sons from a particular program” (Duflo et al. 2008: 3953f.). Ensuring external validity is cru-
cial, “[o]therwise, we will be gathering evidence, not knowledge” (Deaton 2006: 13).  
4.2 Generalizations beyond IFSUP? 
Through the above mentioned procedure, generalizations beyond IFSUP are possible to some 
extent. In the following, first the general question of a transferability of the approach to other 
NGDOs will be addressed, followed by arguments of scale. It will be concluded that imple-
menting agencies need a high management capacity. Beyond these concerns, the questions is 
whether the approach as such is valid in other contexts. Subsequently, the dependency on spe-
cific context is addressed and, in comparison with similar programs and theory, denied.     
IFSUP supports the case of asset-based approaches to poverty alleviation. 
4.2.1 Transfer of the Approach to Other Implementing Organizations 
A replication of the IFSUP strategy is in principle possible. NETZ and its PNGOs shared their 
approach in local and regional workshops with national and international donor agencies as 
well as the public. However, an online publication of the detailed final report of IFSUP has 
not taken place.177 This is recommended for a further dissemination of the approach.  
Furthermore, the question is crucial whether the positive example of IFSUP is related 
to the agencies involved. NETZ is carefully selecting partners with a long-standing experience 
in working with the poorest and most marginalized section of society. In this respect, it is 
likely that a transfer of the program hinges on finding suitable implementing organizations.178 
Nevertheless, it is reassuring that three different NGDOs of different size179 and experience in 
asset-transfer programs in different local contexts180 succeeded with the implementation of 
                                                                                                                                                        
example reviews the evidence that financial sustainability and depth of outreach are negatively related for devel-
opmental microfinance institutions – she concludes that proponents arguing against this relation falsely general-
ize from too few data-points while proponents arguing for this trade-off have the problem of not being able to 
falsify that financially sustainable institutions could in fact reach the poorest, although the institutions under the 
respective study did not. 
177 Although NETZ (2010: 42) explicitly voiced “no objection to this report being published on [e.g. the] Euro-
peAid Co-operation Office website”. 
178 Differing attrition between upazilas could e.g. indicate the consequences of differing management capacity. 
179 With employees ranging from about 570 to 1800 and turnover from about 400,000 to 1.3 Mio € before project 
implementation (NETZ 2006: Part III). 
180 Compare for further details on differences between IFSUP regions Appendix 3. 
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IFSUP. Still, experienced organizations with high commitment are certainly necessary for a 
replication: As noted for similar programs, the  
 
“approach demands a more compassionate work force compared to microfinance. The real challenge is cre-
ating such a compassionate work force and managing it with a focus on achieving results. This involves sig-
nificant change and innovation in management” (Matin et al. 2008: 29). 
4.2.2 Difficulties to Scaling Up 
However good the reproducibility of the approach by other organizations may be, the question 
of the effectiveness of the approach at a larger scale is crucial, even within the very same con-
text. Three aspects are important in this respect: First of all, management costs, secondly gen-
eral equilibrium effects and third the capacity of implementing organizations.  
Costs per unit of the IFSUP program amount to 245 € per household assisted with 
about 50% of the costs due to the asset transfer. This relates to 4082 households per million € 
invested. These high unit costs as such are an obstacle to large-scale implementation, espe-
cially as evidence on the large scale impact of these programs is missing. Taking the small 
scale of IFSUP into consideration, however, substantial economies of scale can be assumed in 
case of a broader coverage, driving unit costs down. 
Concerning general equilibrium effects, impacts are unclear as well. Relating to the 
promotive project pillar, Udo et al. (1992: 50) e.g. argue that the seasonality in the availability 
of cattle feed is the major limiting factor in an expansion of cattle production for Bangladesh. 
This points to a serious limit in scaling up the project: A sufficient number of IGAs need to be 
found to support the livelihoods of the ultra-poor. This can most likely only be achieved if a 
redistribution of assets is implicitly involved in the project, e.g. by increasing the land pur-
chase component in IFSUP. Additionally, the fact that spill-overs to other (ultra-)poor are in 
tendency positive has to be re-evaluated as soon as large-scale national transfers would e.g. 
influence livestock prices. While this has been termed a positive effect that “supports local 
livestock prices, and expands the sale opportunities” (Ellis et al. 2009: 273), it could well 
have a negative effect on the productivity of livestock investments by other ultra-poor. Con-
cerning the preventive pillar, vulnerability can be addressed more sensible with a larger de-
sign, especially for insurance schemes risk will be spread more broadly.181 For the transfor-
mative pillar, backing by higher level authorities is certainly necessary for successful lobby-
ing and obstacles given patronage elite structures in developing countries could well be ex-
pected in this respect – this links the approach to ‘good governance discourses’ and good gov-
ernance as prerequisite for development (comp. Nanda 2006). 
                                                 
181 Comp. for the emergence of microinsurance schemes in the development discourse e.g. Cohen et al. (2005). 
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Related to the transformative project elements are, third, management problems that  
could provide obstacles to effectively scaling up. As Deaton (2010a: 448) cautions, “devel-
opment projects that help a few villagers or a few villages may not attract the attention of cor-
rupt public officials because it is not worth their while to undermine or exploit them, yet they 
would do so as soon as any attempt were made to scale up.” An additional concern relates to 
the adoptability of the program to local needs of the beneficiaries. Huda (2010: 40), relating to 
first experiences from scaling up for a similar program in India, reports how the importance of 
detail in selecting IGAs or in adopting skills training is crucial for project success but on the 
other hand difficult to achieve with a large scale government bureaucracy. Only by of the 
state, however, a large scale and national impact can be reached. Huda (2010: 41) therefore 
calls for a combined effort of NGDOs and state authorities:  
 
“The state has the ability to effectively scale, while the NGO has a client-driven ethos. Perhaps the 
NGO can implement with resources provided by the state, or the government staff can be trained by the 
NGO on how to keep the varied needs of the extreme poor at the forefront of their strategy?”  
Otherwise, the danger remains that the approach will end as one of the redistributive grant 
schemes criticised in the development discourse and replaced by a microfinance movement 
without the necessary outreach to the poorest (Matin et al. 2008: 29f.). 
4.2.3 Specificity of the Sample and Transfer to Other Contexts 
Crucial for a generalizability in principle, independent of the scale, is especially, whether re-
sults depend on the specifity of sample and context. But as data was gathered exactly under 
these specific circumstances, this question is by definition off the empirical support.  
Still, the specific targeting design of IFSUP contains features that allow a good case 
for a transferability of results. IFSUP chose the poorest poverty strata fit for physical work in 
the on average poorest unions of the working area.182 Additionally, the project was imple-
mented in upazilas with both a high and low percentage of ethnic minority groups (comp. 
Figure 13). As far as ‘average poverty’ of unions and upazilas is correlated to structural dis-
advantages concerning political space, infrastructure and environmental conditions, IFSUP 
estimates provide a bottom line for counterfactual impacts in other contexts of (northern) 
Bangladesh. Still, it has to be kept in mind that an application of the approach is only feasible 
for ultra-poor of group II and III. For those unable to be addressed by self-employment, the 
                                                 
182 Recall that IFSUP was implemented in three districts belonging to the poorest of the country (comp. 
Appendix 3). Within these districts the poorest upazilas, within which the poorest unions were selected. In these, 
an ultra-poor population group still fit for physical work was selected for coverage, of which on average a poorer 
subsection was singled out as project participants (comp. Chapter 3.2.1). 
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elderly, disabled and orphaned ultra-poor, must be targeted by other schemes, e.g. cash trans-
fers (Schubert 2008) 
 As concerns the transferability of the approach beyond Bangladesh to another cultural 
and socio-political context, the case is not as clear-cut. Concerning microcredit, it is e.g. ar-
gued that its apparent success in Bangladesh hinges to a great extent on small travel distances 
due to the high population density in the country.183 Similarly, the asset transfer strategy of 
IFSUP might need to be adopted, especially if group meetings are related to higher (opportu-
nity) costs for both NGDOs and households involved. A rigorous evaluation of the asset trans-
fer approach in these contexts is necessary. First positive results are reported e.g. for Zim-
babwe, though not as hard evidence (Ellis et al. 2009: 269-275). Without an estimation of 
counterfactual impacts, the conclusion that “very little is known more generally about the true 
success rates of livestock [and asset] transfer projects in Africa” (Ellis et al. 2009: 275) can 
only be replicated. Although the case for a transferability of the approach beyond the South 
Asian context is not yet rigorously studied, pilot programs are underway (Huda 2009). 
4.2.4 Comparison with Other Programs 
Preliminary evidence of these pilot programs seems to confirm the overall validity of the as-
set-based approach to ultra-poverty reduction: Ellis (2009: 273f.) concludes that “[t]he multi-
ple roles of livestock in successful rural livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa are well known, 
and have been empirically verified in numerous studies. Livestock can provide the key to the 
successful construction of pathways out of poverty”. As reported in his evaluation of a Zim-
babwean program, failures of the strategy were predominantly related to livestock diseases 
(reported similarly for other contexts by Huda 2009: 28f.). This highlights innovative features 
of IFSUP, such as the retraining of ultra-poor to veterinaries in order to enhance vaccination 
coverage while providing an innovative IGA.  
For Bangladesh, the estimates for IFSUP are backed by findings from similar projects 
a well: Positive effects for BRAC’s TUP project are reported using change rankings from the 
community perspective (Sulaiman & Matin 2006: 23) as well as counterfactual outcomes 
(Hulme & Moore 2008, Matin et al. 2008: Chapter 5), leading to positive estimations for so-
cial, physical, human, financial and natural capital.184 First positive results are as well re-
ported from India (Huda 2010) and beyond for the experience of a pilot scheme testing the 
                                                 
183 In this light, Pedrosa (2011: 298) finds that interest rates and the strictness of screening procedures increase 
with distance in Niger, reducing the feasibility of the approach to capital market constraints. 
184 Especially concerning per capita income, an increase to a DCI above 2100 kcal pc pd, food diversity social 
status, self-perceived health but not concerning investments in education of children. 
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effectiveness of the asset-based approach in various settings185 (Huda 2009). Once rigorous 
evaluations have been concluded for these pilots (on the way e.g. by Banerjee et al. (2010b)), 
further lessons for the external validity of IFSUP can be drawn as well.  
In perspective, the importance of the transformative project element must be high-
lighted: Hulme & Moore (2010: 160f.) emphasize that the inclusion of local elites in the proc-
ess and institutionalization of ultra-poor organizations is highly relevant for improving the 
social position of ultra-poor and for ensuring lasting impacts. As they note, this “component is 
perhaps the most context specific and least transferable of the [design]” (Hulme & Moore 
2010: 161). Given the analysis of mean impacts, IFSUP does not allow conclusions on its 
counterfactual impact without the transformative elements but findings in other contexts are 
highly enlightening in this respect: Chaudry (2010) reports how a one-time cash stipend to 
ultra-poor in Vietnam, similar in size with the IFSUP transfer, was used to a large extent for 
productive purposes and the building up of asset stocks. But the major reported drawback 
were “[a]ttempts to pressure beneficiaries and seize the project funds” (Chaudry 2010: 175), 
as the project lacked a successful transformative project component.  
4.2.5 Relation to Theory  
Overall, the theoretical approach behind IFSUP has to be brought back into the picture: 
Dowling & Chin-Fang (2009: 30) summarize that the “chronically poor [are] subject to multi-
ple poverty traps” – related to education levels, physical capital, high vulnerability, poor natu-
ral environments, insufficient access to financial resources, isolation from markets and dis-
crimination as well as political exclusion. In these circumstances, they cannot be expected to 
free themselves out of poverty. Economically, their productivity is so low that they need to be 
pushed to a level from where self-help is possible again (comp. for an approach to modelling 
these ‘smart subsidies’ Armendáriz & Morduch 2010: Chapter 10.15); socio-politically, their 
exclusion from society and dependence on exploitative patron-client relationships needs to be 
overturned (Ferguson et al. 2007, Wood 2003). These multiple deprivations not only prevent 
the poor from freeing themselves out of poverty, but as well prohibit mainstream development 
schemes in reaching them.186 The “graduation model” (Hashemi & Umaira 2011) assumes 
that a multiple intervention, centred around an asset and skills-transfer to overcome the eco-
nomic trap, and an intervention in the socio-political context to overcome the political and 
social discrimination are a viable solution to these problems.  
                                                 
185 The approach centres on asset transfer but includes next to transformative aspects additionally a health com-
ponent. Pilots are implemented in Peru, Honduras, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Haiti, Yemen, and India. 
186 Dowling & Chin Fang (2009: 64) note that in face of discriminatory practices by local elites “well-meaning 
government programs directed to help the poor can easily be undermined.” 
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Yet, as soon as the deprivation of the poor is found to be dependent on (additional) 
factors not covered by this model, e.g. low soil fertility or isolation from markets, it has to be 
adapted. While asset-building is termed crucial for escapes from poverty (Moser & Dani 
2008), the potential for a sustainability of transfers might depend on context-related factors 
not accounted for in these situations. Analogously, Sen (2003: 527) emphasizes the combina-
tion of different escape routes from poverty for a sustainable transition above the poverty line. 
In his panel study from rural Bangladesh, those households succeeded that  
“integrate various anti-poverty strategies, resulting in relatively high savings-investment and income 
growth rate [; …] ‘structural’ factors related to the asset base of the household and market conditions 
were seen as the drivers of change” (Sen, Binayak 2003: 527). 
4.3 Policy Lessons 
Given the above argumentation, a general applicability of asset-based approaches is possible 
where managing capacity of implementing organizations and local determinants of poverty 
allows its application. For an implementation of the approach at a large scale, the case is not 
as clear-cut.187 But especially for a larger scale it must be clear that replications of the pro-
gram must be adapted to local circumstances. There is no ‘golden bullet’ approach to ultra-
poverty reduction. This concerns not only the selection of feasible IGAs for ultra-poor house-
holds but also the transformative project aspects: Lobbying for ultra-poor must always depend 
on the space possible for these actions in the socio-political context. Other project compo-
nents might have to be included in different contexts as well: A major point of departure in 
comparison with other asset transfer projects is e.g. the question of an additional inclusion of 
cash stipends188 to relieve ultra-poor from concerns with current deprivation. This cash sti-
pend can be a necessary project mean, but as IFSUP shows it is not necessary in every context 
and could just be a major driver of costs. At best, future intervention strategies differentiate 
treatment with and without additional stipends for only parts of the sample. Thereby, more 
can be learned about the contexts in which these stipends are necessary or where they are sub-
stitutable by quick-income generating IGAs. 
 
                                                 
187 Although far from universal coverage, evidence from BRAC’s TUP with 300000 beneficiaries as of 2010 can 
contribute to this question (Hashemi & de Montesquieu 2011@1).  
188 As e.g. in BRAC’s TUP program as reported by Hulme & Moore (2010: 153). 
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 5 Conclusion 
“[T]he best argument for the experimental ap-
proach: it spurs innovation by making it easy to 
see what works” (Banerjee 2006b: 19) 
 
This thesis presented in its first part the general approach to the counterfactual in program 
evaluation: How is it possible to ensure causality in the data gathered on the ground? This 
question is at the heart of the exogeneity assumption necessary for sensible evaluations. While 
randomization is providing a direct pathway to this causality, it is not always the optimal es-
timation strategy. But randomized control trials provide a benchmark for clear-cut research 
designs to compare to. This benchmark increases the standards for evaluations and potentially 
the quality of the evidence gathered.  
 
The second part of this thesis applied especially comparisons over time and bounds to solve 
possible endogeneity problems in the evaluation of an innovative approach to ultra-poverty 
reduction, based on an integrative social protection scheme centred on an asset transfer. While 
the point estimates for comparisons over time give a first indication of the project effect, va-
lidity is only added to them by a bounding approach to narrow down the endogeneity left in 
the data. With sensible assumptions both informative and worst-case bounds were constructed 
even for variables with only one natural bound. A look beyond point estimates can be sug-
gested as a viable strategy for impact evaluation, where endogeneity is pervasive.  
The estimations in this part led to a general conclusion: The entire data material con-
sidered indicates that the estimation strategy generated internally valid estimates. This con-
cerns the estimates as such, their height, significance and comparability over the estimation 
strategies. The findings are backed by analogous effects of measurement with summary indi-
ces, PCA based indices and value or expenditure related data. An overall conclusive picture 
for covariates and summary statistics adds to a good case for causality in the estimation as do 
first findings for further covariates and interaction terms. While measurement error could still 
be a concern and heterogeneity in impacts needs to be evaluated further, IFSUP has to a large 
extent proven its ability to support a sustainable livelihood for poverty strata previously ex-
cluded from development cooperation or addressed by short-term aid schemes. 
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But does this mean the evaluation has gathered knowledge beyond the single evaluation? As 
outlined in the third part of this thesis, the case for external validity is, beyond the estimation 
strategy, hinging on arguments, comparisons and theory. The selection of sites for the project 
and first evidence from other locations establish a good case for a general applicability of as-
set-based approaches to other contexts. The question remains open, however, whether these 
projects can work on a larger scale, without an intensive adaption to local livelihoods. Addi-
tionally, long-term evidence on IFSUP is necessary, since the major justification for the high 
unit costs of the project is the argument of long-term stability, or even an upward trajectory, 
of ultra-poor livelihoods.  
 
Credible data must prove this assumption, a fact the stakeholders of development cooperation 
industry need to give more attention to. Carefully planned evaluation designs are a challeng-
ing task and their costs can be high. However, as Duflo & Kremer (2005: 225) stress, evalua-
tions are “far cheaper than pursuing ineffective policies.”  
By a general drive for effective program evaluation not only donors but as well the im-
plementing organizations on the ground can increase their impact on poverty reduction be-
yond the current project and potentially to a global scale.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 114
Bibliography 
AHLIN, C., J. LIN, and M. MAIO (2011): "Where Does Microfinance Flourish? Microfinance 
Institution Performance in Macroeconomic Context," Journal of Development 
Economics, 95: 2, 105-120. 
AMIN, S., A. S. RAI, and G. TOPA (2003): "Does Microcredit Reach the Poor and Vulnerable? 
Evidence from Northern Bangladesh," Journal of Development Economics, 70: 1, 59-
73. 
ANGRIST, J. D., and J.-S. PISCHKE (2009): Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's 
Companion. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
ANGRIST, J. D., and J.-S. PISCHKE (2010): "The Credibility Revolution in Empirical 
Economics: How Better Research Design Is Taking the Con out of Econometrics," 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24: 2, 3-30. 
ARMENDÁRIZ, B., and J. MORDUCH (2010): The Economics of Microfinance. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press. 
AULT, J. K., and A. SPICER (2009): "Does One Size Fit All in Microfinance? New Directions 
for Academic Research," in Moving Beyond Storytelling: Emerging Research in 
Microfinance, ed. by T. A. Watkins, and K. M. Hicks. Bingley: Emerald, 271-284. 
BAKER, J. L. (2000): Evaluating the Impact of Development Projects on Poverty: A Handbook 
for Practitioners. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
BALKE, A., and J. PEARL (1997): "Bounds on Treatment Effects from Studies with Imperfect 
Compliance," Journal of the American Statistical Association, 92: 439, 1171-1176. 
BAMBERGER, M., V. RAO, and M. WOOLCOCK (2010): "Using Mixed Methods in Monitoring 
and Evaluation: Experiences from International Development," in Handbook of Mixed 
Methods in Social & Behavioral Research, ed. by A. Tashakkori, and C. Teddlie. 
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 613-643. 
BANERJEE, A. V. (2002): "The Uses of Economic Theory: Against a Purely Positive 
Interpretation of Theoretical Results," BREAD Working Paper, 7, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT, Bureau for Research in Economic Analysis of Development, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=315942. 
BANERJEE, A. V. (2006a): "Making Aid Work: How to Fight Global Poerty - Effectively," 
Boston Review, 31: 4, 7-9. 
BANERJEE, A. V. (2006b): "Making Aid Work: The Best Argument for the Experimental 
Approach Is That It Spurs Innovation," Boston Review, 31: 4, 19-19. 
BANERJEE, A. V., R. BANERJI, E. DUFLO, R. GLENNERSTER, and S. KHEMANI (2010a): 
"Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in 
Education in India," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2 1, 1-30. 
BANERJEE, A. V., and E. DUFLO (2010): "Giving Credit Where It Is Due," Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 24: 3, 61-79. 
BANERJEE, A. V., and E. DUFLO (2011): Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to 
Fight Global Poverty. New York: PublicAffairs. 
BANERJEE, A. V., E. DUFLO, R. CHATTOPADHYAY, and J. SHAPIRO (2010b): "Targeting the 
Hardcore-Poor: An Impact Assessment," Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest, 
http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.12411/, accessed 25.07.2011, cited with 
permission of the authors. 
BANERJEE, A. V., E. DUFLO, R. GLENNERSTER, and C. KINNAN (2010c): "The Miracle of 
Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation," MIT Department of 
Economics, http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/eduflo/papers, accessed 16.03.2011. 
BANERJEE, A. V., E. DUFLO, and K. MUNSHI (2003): "The (Mis)Allocation of Capital," 
Journal of the European Economic Association, 1: 2/3, 484-494. 
 115
BANERJEE, A. V., and S. MULLAINATHAN (2010): "The Shape of Temptation: Implications for 
the Economic Lives of the Poor," NBER Working Papers, 15973: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Inc, http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/15973.html, accessed 
27.11.2010. 
BARRIENTOS, A. (2011): "Social Protection and Poverty," International Journal of Social 
Welfare, 20: 3, 240–249. 
BARRIENTOS, A., and D. HULME (2008): "Social Protection for the Poor and Poorest: An 
Introduction," in Social Protection for the Poor and Poorest: Concepts, Policies and 
Politics, ed. by A. Barrientos, and D. Hulme. Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 3-24. 
BARRIENTOS, A., M. NIÑO-ZARAZÚA, and M. MAITROT (2010): "Social Assistance in 
Developing Countries Database - Version 5.0," Manchester: Brooks World Poverty 
Institute, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1672090, accessed 10.03.2011. 
BASTIAENSEN, J., T. DE HERDT, and B. D'EXELLE (2005): "Poverty Reduction as a Local 
Institutional Process," World Development, 33: 6, 979-993. 
BBS (2009a): Gender Statistics of Bangladesh 2008. Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. 
BBS (2009b): "Updating Poverty Maps of Bangladesh," Dhaka: Bangaldesh Bureau of 
Statistics, World Bank and UN World Food Program, 
http://www.bbs.gov.bd/WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/UpdatingPovertyMapsof
Bangladesh.pdf, accessed 04.05.2011. 
BBS (2011a): "GDP of Bangladesh at 2007-08 to 2010-11," Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics, http://www.bbs.gov.bd/WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/BBS/GDP_ 
2011.pdf, accessed 26.11.2011. 
BBS (2011b): "Millenium Development Goals: Bangladesh Progress at a Glance," Dhaka: 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics http://www.bbs.gov.bd/WebTestApplication/ 
userfiles/Image/Latest%20Statistics%20Release/Millenium_Development_Goals.pdf, 
accessed 22.11.2011. 
BBS (2011c): "Preliminary Report on Household Income & Expenditure Survey 2010," 
Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, http://www.bbs.gov.bd/ 
WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/HIES/HIES-PR.pdf, accessed 22.11.2011. 
BBS, and UNICEF (2007): "Bangladesh Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2006 - Final 
Report," Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics; Unicef, http://www.unicef.org/ 
bangladesh/2006-08_MICS_2006.Vol_II.FinalJuly08.pdf, accessed 15.12.2011. 
BEHNKE, J., J. HINTERMAIER, and L. RUDOLPH (2010): "Die Bedeutung Von Werten Für 
Verteilungsergebnisse Im Ultimatum- Und Diktatorspiel," in Jahrbuch Für 
Handlungs- Und Entscheidungstheorie Band 6: Schwerpunkt Neuere Entwicklungen 
Des Konzepts Der Rationalität Und Ihre Anwendungen, ed. by J. Behnke, T. 
Bräuninger, and S. Shikano. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften,, 165-
192. 
BEHRMAN, J. R., and J. HODDINOTT (2005): "Programme Evaluation with Unobserved 
Heterogeneity and Selective Implementation: The Mexican PROGRESA Impact on 
Child Nutrition," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 67: 4, 547-569. 
BENDAVID, E. (2011): "Those Who Fail to Learn from Medical History ..." Boston Review, 
36: 2, 19-20. 
BERESTEANU, A., and C. F. MANSKI (2000): "Bounds for STATA - Draft Version 1.0," 
Chicago: Northwestern University, http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/ 
~cfm754/bounds_stata.pdf, accessed 09.09.2011. 
BERTRAND, M., E. DUFLO, and S. MULLAINATHAN (2004): "How Much Should We Trust 
Differences-in-Differences Estimates?," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119: 1, 249-
275. 
 116
BJÖRKMAN, M., and J. SVENSSON (2009): "Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized 
Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 124: 2, 735-769. 
BLUNDELL, R., and M. COSTA DIAS (2000): "Evaluation Methods for Non-Experimental 
Data," Fiscal Studies, 21: 4, 427-468. 
BMZ (2009): "Sector Strategy on Social Protection," Strategies, 190, Berlin: Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, http://www.bmz.de/en/publications 
/topics/social_security/konzept190.pdf, accessed 07.01.2011. 
BOOYSEN, F., S. VAN DER BERG, R. BURGER, M. V. MALTITZ, and G. D. RAND (2008): "Using 
an Asset Index to Assess Trends in Poverty in Seven Sub-Saharan African Countries," 
World Development, 36: 6, 1113-1130. 
BRADHAN, P. (2011): "Experimental Fad," Boston Review, 36: 2, 20-21. 
BRAMBOR, T., W. R. CLARK, and M. GOLDER (2006): "Understanding Interaction Models: 
Improving Empirical Analyses," Political Analysis, 14: 1, 63-82. 
BRAUN, J. P. (2010): "Study on Conflicts in Adivasi Villages," Wetzlar: NETZ Partnership for 
Development and Justice, http://www.bangladesch.org/pics/download/Study-on-
conflict-in-Adivasi-villages.pdf, accessed 11.10.2011. 
CAMERON, A. C., and P. K. TRIVEDI (2009): Microeconometrics Using Stata. College Station, 
Tex.: Stata. 
CARTER, M. R. (2007): "Learning from Asset Based Approaches to Poverty," in Reducing 
Global Poverty : The Case for Asset Accumulation, ed. by C. O. N. Moser. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 51-61. 
CARTER, M. R., P. D. LITTLE, T. MOGUES, and W. NEGATU (2008): "Poverty Traps and 
Natural Disaster in Ethopia and Honduras," in Social Protection for the Poor and 
Poorest: Concepts, Policies and Politics, ed. by A. Barrientos, and D. Hulme. 
Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 85-120. 
CARTWRIGHT, N. (2007): "Are RCTs the Gold Standard?," BioSocieties, 2: 01, 11-20. 
CATTELL, R. B. (1966): "The Scree Test for the Number of Factors," Multivariate Behavioral 
Research, 1: 2, 245-276. 
CHAMBERS, R. (2009): "So That the Poor Count More: Using Participatory Methods for 
Impact Evaluation," Journal of Development Effectiveness, 1: 3, 243. 
CHAMBERS, R., U. KIRDAR, and L. SILK (1995): "Poverty and Livelihoods: Whose Reality 
Counts?," 1-16. 
CHAUDRY, P. (2010): "Unconditional Cash Transfer to the Very Poor in Viet Nam: Is It 
Enough to 'Just Give Them Cash'?," in What Works for the Poorest? Poverty 
Reduction Programmes for the World's Extreme Poor, ed. by D. Lawson, D. Hulme, I. 
Matin, and K. Moore. Rugby, Warwickshire: Practical Action Publ., 169-179. 
CHOWDHURY, S., A. M. MOBARAK, and G. BRYAN (2009): "Migrating Away from a Seasonal 
Famine: A Randomized Intervention in Bangladesh," Human Development Research 
Papers, 2009/41: United Nations Development Programme, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2009/papers/HDRP_2009_41.pdf, accessed 
10.09.10. 
COATES, J., P. WEBB, and R. HOUSER (2003): "Measuring Food Insecurity: Going Beyond 
Indicators of Income and Anthropometry," Washington DC: Food and Nutrition 
Technical Assistance Project, Academy for Educational Development,  
http://www.fantaproject.org/downloads/pdfs/foodinsecurity_bangladesh03.pdf, 
accessed 04.06.2011. 
COHEN, M., M. J. MCCORD, J. SEBSTAD (2005): "Reducing Vulnerability: Demand for and 
Supply of Microinurance in East Africa", Journal of Internatinal Development, 17: 3, 
319-325. 
 117
COX, N. J. (2000): "matselrc: Stata Module for Selection of Rows and/or Columns from 
Matrix," Durham: University of Durham, http://www.stata.com/users/vwiggins, 
accessed 14.12.2011. 
CRUMP, R. K., O. K. MITNIK, G. IMBENS, and V. J. HOTZ (2008): "Nonparametric Tests for 
Treatment Effect Heterogeneity," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90: 3, 389-
405. 
DASGUPTA, P. (1997): "Nutritional Status, the Capacity for Work, and Poverty Traps," 
Journal of Econometrics, 77: 1, 5-37. 
DAVIDSON, R., and J. G. MACKINNON (2000): "Bootstrap Tests: How Many Bootstraps?," 
Econometric Reviews, 19: 1, 55-68. 
DEATON, A. (2006): "Making Aid Work: Evidence-Based Aid Must Not Become the Latest in 
a Long String of Development Fads," Boston Review, 31: 4, 13-14. 
DEATON, A. (2010a): "Instruments, Randomization, and Learning About Development," 
Journal of Economic Literature, 48: 2, 424-455. 
DEATON, A. (2010b): "Understanding the Mechanisms of Economic Development," Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 24: 3, 3-16. 
DEVEREUX, S. (2001): "Sen's Entitlement Approach: Critiques and Counter-Critiques," 
Oxford Development Studies, 29: 3, 245. 
DEVEREUX, S. (2007): "The Impact of Droughts and Floods on Food Security and Policy 
Options to Alleviate Negative Effects," Agricultural Economics, 37: S1, 47-58. 
DIETZEL, P. (2003): "Hilfreich, praktisch, gut? Entwicklungsarbeit für die extrem arme 
Bevölkerung," NETZ, 2003: 3, 3-10. 
DIETZEL, P. (2006): "Ein Leben lang genug Reis," in Solidarität die Ankommt! Ziel-Effiziente 
Mittelverwendung in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, ed. by Global Marshall Plan 
Initiative. Hamburg: Global Marshall Plan Initiative, 219-249. 
DINARDO, J. (2006): "Constructive Proposals for Dealing with Attrition: An Empirical 
Example," NBER Working Paper, http://www.nber.org/public_html/confer/ 
2006/si2006/ls/dinardo.pdf, accessed 07.08.2011. 
DINARDO, J. (2008): "Natural Experiments and Quasi-Natural Experiments," in The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, ed. by S. N. Durlauf, and L. E. Blume. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
DIPRETE, T. A., and M. GANGL (2004): "Assessing Bias in the Estimation of Causal Effects: 
Rosenbaum Bounds on Matching Estimators and Instrumental Variables Estimation 
with Imperfect Instruments," Sociological Methodology, 34: 1, 271-310. 
DOWLING, J. M., and C.-F. YAP (2009): "Chronic Poverty in Asia: Causes, Consequences, and 
Policies," Singapore ; Hackensack, N.J.: World Scientific. 
DUFLO, E., R. GLENNERSTER, and M. KREMER (2008): "Using Randomization in 
Development Economics Research: A Toolkit," in Handbook of Development 
Economics, ed. by T. P. Schultz, and J. A. Strauss. Amsterdam/Oxford: Elsevier, 
3895-3962. 
DUFLO, E., and M. KREMER (2005): "Use of Randomization in the Evaluation of Development 
Effectiveness," in Evaluating Development Effectiveness, ed. by G. K. Pitman, O. N. 
Feinstein, and G. K. Ingram. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 205-231. 
EASTERLY, W. R. (2006): The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest 
Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
EC (2001): Country Strategy Paper - Bangladesh - 2002-2006. Brussels: European 
Commission - Directorate General External Relations. 
ELLIS, F. (2000): Rural Livelihood and Diversity in Developing Countries. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 118
ELLIS, F., S. DEVEREUX, and P. WHITE (2009): Social Protection in Africa. Cheltenham ; 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
EMRAN, M. S., C. S. STEPHEN, and R. VIRGINIA (2009): "Assessing the Frontiers of Ultra-
Poverty Reduction: Evidence from CFPR/TUP, an Innovative Program in 
Bangladesh," IIEP Working Papers: The George Washington University, Institute for 
International Economic Policy, http://ideas.repec.org/p/gwi/wpaper/2009-06.html, 
accessed 23.02.2011. 
ESCAP (2002): "Reducing Poverty and Promoting Social Protection," Social policy paper, 5, 
New York: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 
http://www.unescap.org/esid/psis/publications/spps/05/2168.pdf, accessed 04.02.2011. 
FARRINGTON, J., R. SLATER, and R. HOLMES (2004): "Social Protection and Pro-Poor 
Agricultural Growth," ODI Natural Resource PerspectivesLondon: Overseas 
Development Institute, http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/1664.pdf, accessed 
04.01.2011. 
FERGUSON, C., C. O. N. MOSER, and A. NORTON (2007): "Claiming Rights: Citizenship and 
the Politics of Asset Accumulation," in Reducing Global Poverty: The Case for Asset 
Accumulation, ed. by C. Moser. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 273-
288. 
FILMER, D., and L. PRITCHETT (2001): "Estimating Wealth Effects without Expenditure Data - 
or Tears: An Application to Educational Enrollments in States of India," Demography, 
38: 1, 115-132. 
FISMAN, R., and E. MIGUEL (2007): "Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence 
from Diplomatic Parking Tickets," Journal of Political Economy, 115: 6, 1020-1048. 
FOSTER, E. M., and L. BICKMAN (1996): "An Evaluator's Guide to Detecting Attrition 
Problems," Evaluation Review, 20: 6, 695-723. 
FRIEDMAN, M. (1957): A Theory of the Consumption Function. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
GARIKIPATI, S. (2008): "The Impact of Lending to Women on Household Vulnerability and 
Women's Empowerment: Evidence from India," World Development, 36: 12, 2620–
2642. 
GLENNERSTER, R., and M. KREMER (2011a): "Context Is Important, and Meticulous 
Experimentation Can Improve Our Understanding of It," Boston Review, 36: 2, 28-29. 
GLENNERSTER, R., and M. KREMER (2011b): "Small Changes Big Results," Boston Review, 
36: 2, 12-17. 
GLYNN, A. N., and K. M. QUINN (2011): "Why Process Matters for Causal Inference," 
Political Analysis, 19: 3, 273-286. 
GOLDIN, I., F. H. ROGERS, and N. STERN (2006): "Making Aid Work: We Must Tackle 
Development Problems at the Level of the Economy as a Whole," Boston Review, 31: 
4, 10-11. 
GREEN, D. P., T. Y. LEONG, H. L. KERN, A. S. GERBER, and C. W. LARIMER (2009): "Testing 
the Accuracy of Regression Discontinuity Analysis Using Experimental Benchmarks," 
Political Analysis, 17: 4, 400-417. 
GULLI, H. (1998): Microfinance and Poverty : Questioning the Conventional Wisdom. 
Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank. 
HAHN, J., P. TODD, and W. V. D. KLAAUW (2001): "Identification and Estimation of 
Treatment Effects with a Regression-Discontinuity Design," Econometrica, 69: 1, 
201-209. 
HALDER, S. R., and P. MOSLEY (2004): "Working with the Ultra-Poor: Learning from BRAC 
Experiences," Journal of International Development, 16: 3, 387-406. 
 119
HARPER, C., R. MARCUS, and K. MOORE (2003): "Enduring Poverty and the Conditions of 
Childhood: Lifecourse and Intergenerational Poverty Transmissions," World 
Development, 31: 3, 535-554. 
HASEEN, F. (2006): "Change in Food and Nutrient Consumption among the Ultra Poor: Is the 
CFPR/TUP Programme Making a Difference?," CFPR-TUP Working Paper Series, 
11, http://ideas.repec.org/p/ess/wpaper/id749.html, accessed 27.11.2011. 
HASHEMI, S., and A. DE MONTESQUIOU (2011): "Reaching the Poorest: Lessons from the 
Graduation Model," Focus Note, 69: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.50739/FN69.pdf, accessed 27.11.2011. 
HASHEMI, S., and W. UMAIRA (2011): "New Pathways for the Poorest: The Graduation Model 
from BRAC," CSP Research Report, 10, Sussex: Institute for Development Studies, 
Centre for Social Protection, http://socialprotectionasia.org/Conf-prgram-pdf/10-SPA-
Final-Paper-No-10.pdf, accessed 26.11.2011. 
HASHEMI, S., and A. DE MONTESQUIEU (2011): "Reaching the Poorest: Lessons from the 
Graduation Model," CGAP Focus Note, 69, Washington D.C.: Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poorest, http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.50739/FN69.pdf, accessed 
26.11.2011. 
HATLØY, A., L. E. TORHEIM, and A. OSHAUG (1998): "Food Variety - a Good Indicator of 
Nutritional Adequacy of the Diet? A Case Study from an Urban Area in Mali, West 
Africa," European Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 52: 12, 891-898. 
HAUGHTON, D., and J. HAUGHTON (2011): Living Standards Analytics: Development through 
the Lens of Household Survey Data. New York: Springer. 
HAUSMAN, J. A., and D. A. WISE (1979): "Attrition Bias in Experimental and Panel Data: The 
Gary Income Maintenance Experiment," Econometrica, 47: 2, 455-473. 
HECKMAN, J. J. (1979): "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica, 47: 
1, 153-161. 
HECKMAN, J. J., and E. VYTLACIL (2005): "Structural Equations, Treatment Effects, and 
Econometric Policy Evaluation," Econometrica, 73: 3, 669-738. 
HODGSON, J. M., B. H. H. HSUHAGE, and M. L. WAHLQVIST (1994): "Food Variety as a 
Quantitative Descriptor of Food-Intake," Ecology of Food and Nutrition, 32: 3-4, 137-
148. 
HOROWITZ, J. L., and C. F. MANSKI (2000): "Nonparametric Analysis of Randomized 
Experiments with Missing Covariate and Outcome Data," Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, 95: 449, 77-84. 
HOTZ, V. J., C. H. MULLIN, and S. G. SANDERS (1997): "Bounding Causal Effects Using Data 
from a Contaminated Natural Experiment: Analysing the Effects of Teenage 
Childbearing," The Review of Economic Studies, 64: 4, 575-603. 
HOWE, L. D., J. R. HARGREAVES, and S. R. HUTTLY (2008): "Issues in the Construction of 
Wealth Indices for the Measurement of Socio-Economic Position in Low-Income 
Countries," Emerg Themes Epidemiol, 5: 1, 3-17. 
HSIANG-KE, C. (2003): "Milton Friedman and the Emergence of the Permanent Income 
Hypothesis," History of Political Economy, 35: 1, 77-104. 
HUDA, K. (2009): "Mid-Term (12 Month) Trickle up India TUP Process Evaluation - CGAP-
Ford Foundation Graduation Pilot," New York: Trickle Up, 
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/document-
1.9.41179/Final%20eval%20MAY252009%20formatted.pdf, accessed 14.03.2010. 
HUDA, K. (2010): "Overcoming Extreme Poverty in India: Lessons Learnt from SKS," IDS 
Bulletin, 41: 4, 31-41. 
HULME, D., and D. LAWSON (2010): "What Works for the Poorest?," in What Works for the 
Poorest? Poverty Reduction Programmes for the World's Extreme Poor, ed. by D. 
 120
Lawson, D. Hulme, I. Matin, and K. Moore. Rugby, Warwickshire: Practical Action 
Publ., 1-24. 
HULME, D., and K. MOORE (2008): "Assisting the Poorest in Bangladesh: Learning from 
Brac's 'Targeting the Ultra-Poor' Programme," in Social Protection for the Poor and 
Poorest: Concepts, Policies and Politics, ed. by A. Barrientos, and D. Hulme. 
Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 194-210. 
HULME, D., and K. MOORE (2010): "Assisting the Poorest in Bangladesh: Learning from 
Brac's 'Targeting the Ultra-Poor' Programme," in What Works for the Poorest? 
Poverty Reduction Programmes for the World's Extreme Poor, ed. by D. Lawson, D. 
Hulme, I. Matin, and K. Moore. Rugby, Warwickshire: Practical Action Publ., 149-
168. 
HUMPHREYS, M., and J. M. WEINSTEIN (2009): "Field Experiments and the Political Economy 
of Development," Annual Review of Political Science, 12: 1, 367-378. 
IMBENS, G. W., and T. LEMIEUX (2008): "Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to 
Practice," Journal of Econometrics, 142: 2, 615-635. 
IMBENS, G. W., and J. M. WOOLDRIDGE (2009): "Recent Developments in the Econometrics 
of Program Evaluation," Journal of Economic Literature, 47: 1, 5-86. 
JAHNKE, H. E. (1982): Livestock Production Systems and Livestock Development in Tropical 
Africa. Kiel: Wiss.-Verl. Vauk. 
JANN, B. (2005): "Making Regression Tables from Stored Estimates," STATA Journal, 5: 3, 
288-308. 
JANN, B. (2007): "Making Regression Tables Simplified," STATA Journal, 7: 2, 227-244. 
JOLLIFFE, I. T. (2002): Principal Component Analysis. New York: Springer. 
KABEER, N. (2010): "Alternative Acounts of Chronic Disadvantage: Income Deficits Versus 
Food Security," in What Works for the Poorest? Poverty Reduction Programmes for 
the World's Extreme Poor, ed. by D. Lawson, D. Hulme, I. Matin, and K. Moore. 
Rugby, Warwickshire: Practical Action Publ., 59-78. 
KADIGI, R. M. J., N. S. Y. MDOE, and G. C. ASHIMOGO (2007): "Understanding Poverty 
through the Eyes of the Poor: The Case of Usangu Plains in Tanzania," Physics & 
Chemistry of the Earth - Parts A/B/C, 32: 15-18, 1330-1338. 
KAISER, H. F. (1960): "The Application of Electronic Computers to Factor Analysis," 
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 20: 1, 141-151. 
KAM, C. D., and R. J. J. FRANZESE (2007): Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses 
in Regression Analysis. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
KANBUR, R. (2001): "Economic Policy, Distribution and Poverty: The Nature of 
Disagreements," World Development, 29: 6, 1083-1094. 
KANBUR, R. (2010): "Foreword," in What Works for the Poorest? Poverty Reduction 
Programmes for the World's Extreme Poor, ed. by D. Lawson, D. Hulme, I. Matin, 
and K. Moore. Rugby, Warwickshire: Practical Action Publ., xv-xviii. 
KANBUR, R., and P. SHAFFER (2007): "Epistemology, Normative Theory and Poverty 
Analysis: Implications for Q-Squared in Practice," World Development, 35: 2, 183-
196. 
KEZDI, G. (2003): "Robus Standard Error Estimation in Fixed-Effects Panel Models," 
Budapest: Budapest University of Economics, http://129.3.20.41/eps/em/ 
papers/0508/0508018.pdf, accessed 30.12.2011. 
KHANDKER, S. R. (1998): Fighting Poverty with Microcredit: Experience in Bangladesh. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
KHANDKER, S. R. (2005): "Microfinance and Poverty: Evidence Using Panel Data from 
Bangladesh," World Bank Economic Review, 19: 2, 263-286. 
KHANDKER, S. R., M. A. B. KHALILY, and H. A. SAMAD (2010a): "Seasonal and Extreme 
Poverty in Bangladesh: Evaluating an Ultra-Poor Microfinance Project," Policy 
 121
Research Working Paper, 5331: World Bank, http://ssrn.com/paper=1620311, 
accessed 29.08.2010. 
KHANDKER, S. R., G. B. KOOLWAL, and H. SAMAD (2010b): Handbook on Impact 
Evaluation: Quantitative Methods and Practices. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
KLING, J. R., J. B. LIEBMAN, and L. F. KATZ (2007): "Experimental Analysis of 
Neighborhood Effects," Econometrica, 75: 1, 83-119. 
KOHLER, U., and F. KREUTER (2008): Datenanalyse mit Stata: Allgemeine Konzepte der 
Datenanalyse und ihre praktische Anwendung. Munich: Oldenbourg. 
KOLENIKOV, S., and G. ANGELES (2004): "The Use of Discrete Data in Principal Component 
Analysis with Applications to Socio-Economic Indices," CPC/MEASURE Working 
paper, 85, Chapell Hill: University of North Carolina, https://www.cpc.unc.edu/ 
measure/publications/pdf/wp-04-85.pdf, accessed 09.12.2011. 
KOLENIKOV, S., and G. ANGELES (2009): "Socioeconomic Status Measurement with Discrete 
Proxy Variables: Is Principal Component Analysis a Reliable Answer?," Review of 
Income and Wealth, 55: 1, 128-165. 
KONOLD, F., E. AHSAN, and B. NATH (2001): "Prospects and Limitations of Income 
Generating Activities (Igas) as an Instrument for Food Security for the Ultra-Poor - 
Volume I: Main Report," Dhaka: RESAL Bangladesh; GOPA unpublished. 
LALONDE, R. J. (1986): "Evaluating the Econometric Evaluations of Training Programs with 
Experimental Data," The American Economic Review, 76: 4, 604-620. 
LAWSON, D. (2010): "A 'Q-Squared' Approach to Enhancing Our Understanding of the 
Chronically Poor," in What Works for the Poorest? Poverty Reduction Programmes 
for the World's Extreme Poor, ed. by D. Lawson, D. Hulme, I. Matin, and K. Moore. 
Rugby, Warwickshire: Practical Action Publ., 45-58. 
LECHNER, M. (1999): "Nonparametric Bounds on Employment and Income Effects of 
Continuous Vocational Training in East Germany," Econometrics Journal, 2: 1, 1-28. 
LEE, D. S. (2002): "Trimming for Bounds on Treatment Effects with Missing Outcomes," 
NBER Technical Working Papers, 277: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberte/0277.html, accessed 22.11.2011. 
LEE, D. S. (2008): "Randomized Experiments from Non-Random Selection in U.S. House 
Elections," Journal of Econometrics, 142 2, 675-697. 
LEE, D. S. (2009): "Training, Wages, and Sample Selection: Estimating Sharp Bounds on 
Treatment Effects," The Review of Economic Studies, 76: 3, 1071-1102. 
LEHMANN, H. (2006): "Eigene Sprache, eigene Schule - Die indigene Gemeinschaft der 
Oraon," NETZ, 2006: 4, 8-11. 
LEIBBRANDT, M., J. A. LEVINSOHN, and J. MCCRARY (2010): "Incomes in South Africa after 
the Fall of Apartheid," Journal of Globalization and Development, 1: 1, 1-60. 
LEMIEUX, T., and K. MILLIGAN (2008): "Incentive Effects of Social Assistance: A Regression 
Discontinuity Approach," Journal of Econometrics, 142: 2, 807-828. 
LI, X., C. GAN, and B. HU (2011): "The Welfare Impact of Microcredit on Rural Households 
in China," Journal of Socio-Economics, 40: 4, 404-411. 
MALLICK, D. (2009): "How Effective Is a Big Push to the Small? Evidence from a Quasi-
Random Experiment," MPRA Paper, 22824, Munich: University Library of Munich, 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/22824.html. 
MANSKI, C. F. (1990): "Nonparametic Bounds on Treatment Effects," American Economic 
Review, 80: 2, 319-323. 
MANSKI, C. F. (1997): "Monotone Treatment Response," Econometrica, 65: 6, 1311-1334. 
MANSKI, C. F. (2007): Identification for Prediction and Decision. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
MATIN, I., and D. HULME (2003): "Programs for the Poorest: Learning from the IGVGD 
Program in Bangladesh," World Development, 31: 3, 647-666. 
 122
MATIN, I., M. SULAIMAN, and M. RABBANI (2008): "Crafting a Graduation Pathway for the 
Ultra Poor: Lessons and Evidence from a BRAC Programme," Chronic Poverty 
Research Centre Working Paper, 109: BRAC Research and Evaluation Division, 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/R4D//PDF/Outputs/ChronicPoverty_RC/109Matin_et_al.pdf, 
accessed 07.09.2011. 
MCKENZIE, D. (2005): "Measuring Inequality with Asset Indicators," Journal of Population 
Economics, 18: 2, 229-260. 
MCKERNAN, S.-M. (2002): "The Impact of Microcredit Programs on Self-Employment 
Profits: Do Noncredit Program Aspects Matter?," The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 84: 1, 93-115. 
MEDEIROS, R. A., and D. BLANCHETTE (2011): "mdesc: Stata Module to Tabulate Prevalence 
of Missing Values," Boston: Boston College Department of Economics, 
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s457318.html. 
MEENAKSHI, J. V., and R. RAY (2002): "Impact of Household Size and Family Composition 
on Poverty in Rural India," Journal of Policy Modeling, 24: 6, 539-559. 
MIAH, T. H. (2008): "Profitability and Risk Management of Income Generating Activities of 
Ultra-Poor – in Particular Adibasis under the Project of ‘Income and Food Security for 
Ultra-Poor (IFSUP)’," Mymensingh: NETZ Partnership for Development and Justice, 
http://www.netz-bangladesh.de/pics/download/IFSUP-Study-on-Profitability.pdf, 
accessed 19.09.2010. 
MIGUEL, E., and M. KREMER (2004): "Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health 
in the Presence of Treatment Externalities," Econometrica, 72: 1, 159. 
MOORE, M. (2006): "Making Aid Work: The New Private Philanthropies Could Challenge the 
Existing Aid Business," Boston Review, 31: 4, 11-12. 
MORDUCH, J. (2000): "The Microfinance Schism," World Development, 28: 4, 617-629. 
MOSER, C. O. N. (2007): "Introduction," in Reducing Global Poverty: The Case for Asset 
Accumulation, ed. by C. O. N. Moser. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
1-14. 
MOSER, C. O. N., and A. A. DANI (2008): Assets, Livelihoods, and Social Policy. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
MOSER, C. O. N., and A. FELTON (2007): "The Construction of an Asset Index Measuring 
Asset Accumulation in Ecuador," CPRC Working Paper, 87, Washington DC: The 
Brookings Institution. 
MOYO, D. (2009): Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is Another Way for 
Africa. London ; New York: Allen Lane. 
MUNRO, L. T. (2008): "Risks, Needs and Rights: Compatible or Contradictory Bases for 
Social Protection," in Social Protection for the Poor and Poorest: Concepts, Policies 
and Politics, ed. by A. Barrientos, and D. Hulme. Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 27-46. 
MURGAI, R., and S. ZAIDI (2004): "Poverty Trends in Bangladesh During the Nineties," 
SASPR Working Paper Series, 2B: Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Unit, South Asia Region, The World Bank, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/12/06/00001
2009_20041206122937/Rendered/PDF/308630PAPER0SA1Trends0in0Bangladesh.p
df, accessed 15.12.2011. 
NANDA, V. P. (2006): "The 'Good Governance' Concept Revisited", Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Space, 603: 1, 269-283. 
NETZ (2006): "Food Security 2003 Call for Proposals - Income and Food Security for Ultra-
Poor Project Application," EuropeAid/123246/C/ACT/BD, Wetzlar: NETZ Partnership 
for Development and Justice, unpublished. 
 123
NETZ (2009a): "Annual Report 2009," Wetzlar; Dhaka: NETZ Partnership for Development 
and Justice, http://www.bangladesch.org/set.php?id=english&uid=annual_report, 
accessed 16.11.2011. 
NETZ (2009b): "Out of the Black Hole of Poverty - Lessons Learnt from the Project Income 
and Food Security for Ultra-Poor (IFSUP)," Wetzlar; Dhaka: NETZ Partnership for 
Development and Justice, http://www.bangladesch.org/pics/download/IFSUP-
Lessons-Learnt.pdf, accessed 07.09.2010. 
NETZ (2010): "Final Narrative Report," Dhaka: NETZ Partnership for Development and 
Justice, unpublished. 
OECD-DAC (2010): "Evaluating Development Co-Operation: Summary of Key Norms and 
Standards," Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/56/41612905.pdf, accessed 30.07.2011. 
OECD (2005): "Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness – Ownership, Harmonisation, 
Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability," 2nd High-Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness, 2nd High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Paris, France. 
OFFENHEISER, R. C., AND D. JACOBS (2006): "Making Aid Work: The Global Poverty 
Challenge is Political as well as Technological," Boston Review, 31: 4, 17-18. 
PATTENGALE, N. D., M. ALIPOUR, O. R. BININDA-EMONDS, B. M. MORET, and A. 
STAMATAKIS (2010): "How Many Bootstrap Replicates Are Necessary?," J Comput 
Biol, 17: 3, 337-354. 
PEARL, J. (2009): Causality : Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
PEDROSA, J., and Q.-T. DO (2011): "Geographic Distance and Credit Market Access in 
Niger," African Development Review, 23: 3, 289-299. 
PÉREZ-ESCAMILLA, R., and A. M. SEGALL-CORRÊA (2008): "Food Insecurity Measurement 
and Indicators," Revista de Nutrição, 21, 15-26. 
PERRIN, B. (2011): "What Is a Results/Performance-Based Delivery System? An Invited 
Presentation to the European Parliament," Evaluation, 17: 4, 417-424. 
PITT, M. M., and S. R. KHANDKER (1998): "The Impact of Group-Based Credit Programs on 
Poor Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants Matter?," Journal of 
Political Economy, 106: 5, 958-996. 
RADHKRISHNA, R., K. HANUMANTHA RAO, C. RAVI, and B. SAMBI REDDY (2006): "Extreme 
and Chronic Poverty and Malnutrition in India: Incidence and Determinants," in 
Chronic Poverty and Development Policy in India, ed. by A. K. Mehta, and A. 
Shepherd. New Delhi ; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 148-167. 
RAHMAN, P. M. M., N. MATSUI, and Y. IKEMOTO (2009): The Chronically Poor in Rural 
Bangladesh: Livelihood Constraints and Capabilities. London: Routledge. 
RAVALLION, M. (2008): "Evaluating Anti-Poverty Programs," in Handbook of Development 
Economics, ed. by T. P. Schultz, and J. A. Strauss. Amsterdam/Oxford: Elsevier, 
3787-3846. 
RAVALLION, M. (2009): "Should the Randomistas Rule?," Economists' Voice, 6: 2. 
RAYHAN, M. I., and U. GROTE (2010): "Crop Diversification to Mitigate Flood Vulnerability 
in Bangladesh: An Economic Approach " Economics Bulletin, 30: AccessEcon, 
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2010/Volume30/EB-10-V30-I1-P54.pdf, 
accessed 21.12.2011. 
RIETBERGEN-MCCRACKEN, J., and D. NARAYAN-PARKER (1998): Participation and Social 
Assessment : Tools and Techniques. Washington, D.C.: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development/World Bank. 
ROBINSON, G., J. E. MCNULTY, and J. S. KRASNO (2009): "Observing the Counterfactual? 
The Search for Political Experiments in Nature," Political Analysis, 17: 4, 341–357. 
 124
ROODMAN, D., and J. MORDUCH (2009): "The Impact of Microcredit on the Poor in 
Bangladesh: Revisiting the Evidence," CGD Working Paper, 174, Washington D.C.: 
Center for Global Development, http://www.cgdev.org/files/1422302_file_Roodman_ 
Morduch_Bangladesh.pdf, accessed 28.08.2010. 
ROSENBAUM, P. R. (1995): Observational Studies. New York: Springer. 
ROSENBAUM, P. R., and D. B. RUBIN (1983): "The Central Role of the Propensity Score in 
Observational Studies for Causal Effects," Biometrika, 70: 1, 41-55. 
RUBIN, D. (1974): "Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and 
Nonrandomized Studies," Journal of Educational Psychology, 66: 5, 688-701. 
RUDOLPH, L. (2010): Subsidizing Asset Transfer Towards the Ultra-Poor - Evidence from 
Bangladesh. Munich: Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Faculty of Economics, 
Bachelor Thesis. 
RUDOLPH, L. (2011): "Increasing Food Security by Asset Transfer - Evidence from a Pro-
Ultra-Poor-Intervention in Bangladesh," First International Conference on 
International Relations and Development, First International Conference on 
International Relations and Development, 19.-20.05.2011, Bangkok, Thailand: 
Thammasat University, http://www.icird.org/2011/files/Papers/ICIRD2011_Lukas% 
20Rudolph.pdf, accessed 01.06.2011. 
SABATES-WHEELER, R., and S. DEVEREUX (2008): "Transformative Social Protection: The 
Currency of Social Justice," in Social Protection for the Poor and Poorest: Concepts, 
Policies and Politics, ed. by A. Barrientos, and D. Hulme. Basingstoke ; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 64-84. 
SCHNECKENER, U. (2004): States at Risk: Fragile Staaten als Sicherheits- und 
Entwicklungsproblem. Berlin: SWP. 
SCHUBERT, B. (2008): "Protecting the Poorest with Cash Transfers in Low Income Countries," 
in Social Protection for the Poor and Poorest: Concepts, Policies and Politics, ed. by 
A. Barrientos, and D. Hulme. Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 211-223. 
SEGERS, K., J. DESSEIN, P. DEVELTERE, S. HAGBERG, G. HAYLEMARIAM, M. HAILE, and J. 
DECKERS (2010): "The Role of Farmers and Informal Institutions in Microcredit 
Programs in Tigray, Northern Ethiopia," Perspectives on Global Development & 
Technology, 9: 3/4, 520-544. 
SEKHON, J. S. (2009): "Opiates for the Matches: Matching Methods for Causal Inference," 
Annual Review of Political Science, 12: 1, 487-508. 
SEMYKINA, A., and J. M. WOOLDRIDGE (2010): "Estimating Panel Data Models in the 
Presence of Endogeneity and Selection," Journal of Econometrics, 157: 2, 375-380. 
SEN, A. (1981): Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Oxford ; 
New York: Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press. 
SEN, B. (2003): "Drivers of Escape and Descent: Changing Household Fortunes in Rural 
Bangladesh," World Development, 31: 3, 513-534. 
SHAFFER, P. (2002): "Poverty Naturalized: Implications for Gender," Feminist Economics, 8: 
3, 55–75. 
SIMS, C. A. (2010): "But Economics Is Not an Experimental Science," Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 24: 2, 59-68. 
SINHA, S., M. LIPTON, and S. YAQUB (2002): "Poverty and "Damaging Fluctuations": How 
Do They Relate?," Journal of Asian & African Studies, 37: 2, 186-243. 
SMITH, J. A., and P. E. TODD (2005): "Does Matching Overcome Lalonde's Critique of 
Nonexperimental Estimators?," Journal of Econometrics, 125: 1-2, 305-353. 
STOCK, J. H., and M. W. WATSON (2007): Introduction to Econometrics. Boston, Mass. ; 
London: Pearson/Addison Wesley. 
STOCK, J. H., and M. W. WATSON (2008): "Heteroskedasticity-Robust Standard Errors for 
Fixed Effects Panel Data Regression," Econometrica, 76: 1, 155-174. 
 125
SULAIMAN, M., and I. MATIN (2006): "Using Change Rankings to Understand Poverty 
Dynamics: Examining the Impact of CFPR/TUP from Community Perspective," 
CFPR/TUP Working Paper Series, 14, http://ideas.repec.org/p/ess/wpaper/id651.html, 
accessed 20.11.2011. 
SUPPES, P. (1970): A Probabilistic Theory of Causality. Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing Co. 
TEDESCHI, G. A., and D. S. KARLAN (2010): "Cross-Sectional Impact Analysis: Bias from 
Dropouts," Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 9, 270-291. 
THISTLETHWAITE, D. L., and D. T. CAMPBELL (1960): "Regression-Discontinuity Analysis: 
An Alternative to the Ex Post Facto Experiment," Journal of Educational Psychology, 
51: 6, 309-317. 
TIB (2008): "National Household Survey 2007 on Corruption in Bangladesh," Dhaka: 
Transparency International Bangladesh, http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/research/ 
HHSurvey07full180608.pdf, accessed 08.01.2011. 
TODD, P. E. (2008): "Evaluating Social Programs with Endogenous Program Placement and 
Selection of the Treated," in Handbook of Development Economics, ed. by T. P. 
Schultz, and J. A. Strauss. Amsterdam/Oxford: Elsevier, 3847-3894. 
TOWNSEND, R. M. (1994): "Risk and Insurance in Village India," Econometrica, 62: 3, 539-
591. 
UDO, H., C. HERMANS, and F. DAWOOD (1992): "Seasonality of Cattle Feed Sources in Pabna, 
Bangladesh," Tropical Animal Health and Production, 24: 1, 50-56. 
UN (2000): "United Nations Millenium Declaration," Resolutions adopted by the General 
Assembly, A/RES/55/2, New York: United Nations General Assembly. 
UN (2011): "World Statistics Pocketbook 2010: Least Developed Countries," New York: 
United Nations, UN-OHRLLS, http://www.unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/ 
LDC%20Pocketbook2010-%20final.pdf, accessed 26.11.2011. 
VÁSQUEZ, I. (2006): "Making Aid Work: There Is a Huge Gap between the Expert Consensus 
and the Political Push for More Aid," Boston Review, 31: 4, 12-12. 
VYAS, S., and L. KUMARANAYAKE (2006): "Constructing Socio-Economic Status Indices: 
How to Use Principal Components Analysis," Health Policy and Planning, 21: 6, 459-
468. 
WATKINS, T. A., and K. M. HICKS (2009): "Moving Beyond Storytelling: Emerging Research 
in Microfinance," Bingley: Emerald. 
WHITE, H. (2006): "Making Aid Work: Technical Rigor Must Not Take Precedence over 
Other Kinds of Valuable Lessons," Boston Review, 31: 4, 16-17. 
WHITE, H. (2009): "Theory-Based Impact Evaluation: Principles and Practice," Journal of 
Development Effectiveness, 1: 3, 271. 
WIGGINS, V. (without year): "grc1leg: Graph Combine One Legend," 
http://www.stata.com/users/vwiggins, accessed 14.12.2011. 
WOOD, G. (2003): "Staying Secure, Staying Poor: The 'Faustian Bargain.'," World 
Development, 31: 3, 455-471. 
WOOLDRIDGE, J. M. (2009): Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Mason, OH: 
South Western, Cengage Learning. 
WOOLDRIDGE, J. M. (2010): Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
WOOLDRIDGE, J. M., and G. IMBENS (2007): "What’s New in Econometrics? Session 8: 
Cluster and Stratified Sampling," Sumer Institute Mini Course, July 31 - August 
1,Cambridge, MA, : National Bureau of Economic Research, 
http://www.nber.org/WNE/lect_8_cluster.pdf, accessed 27.12.2011. 
WORLD BANK (2000): Balancing Protection and Opportunity : A Strategy for Social 
Protection in Transition Economies. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 126
WORLD BANK (2006): "Table 4.14: Exchange Rates and Prices," World Bank - World 
Development Indicators, http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/ 
Table4_14.htm, accessed 26.09.2010. 
WORLD BANK (2010): "Bangladesh Country Assistance Strategy: 2011-2014," Dhaka: 
Bangladesh Country Management Unit, World Bank, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BANGLADESHEXTN/Resources/295759-
1271081222839/6958908-1284576442742/BDCASFinal.pdf, accessed 23.09.2010. 
YUNUS, M. (2006): "Nobel Lecture," The Nobel Peace Prize 2006 Stockholm, 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/yunus-lecture.html, accessed 
13.10.2010. 
ZUG, S. (2006a): "Monga - Seasonal Food Insecurity in Bangladesh - Bringing the 
Information Together," The Journal of Social Studies, 111: 4, 21-39. 
ZUG, S. (2006b): "Monga - Seasonal Food Insecurity in Bangladesh - Understanding the 
Problem and Strategies to Combat It " Sundarganj, Dhaka, Bochum: NETZ 
Partnership for Development and Justice, http://www.bangladesch.org/pics/download/ 
Final_Report_Monga_Sebastian_Zug.pdf, accessed 13.04.2010. 
ZWANE, A. P., J. ZINMAN, E. VAN DUSEN, W. PARIENTE, C. NULL, E. MIGUEL, M. KREMER, 
D. S. KARLAN, R. HORNBECK, X. GINÉ, E. DUFLO, F. DEVOTO, B. CREPON, and A. V. 
BANERJEE (2011): "Being Surveyed Can Change Later Behavior and Related 
Parameter Estimates," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108: 5, 
1821-1826. 
 
 
 
 
 127
Appendix 1: The Point of Departure in IFSUP Analysis 
The impact analysis in this thesis is an extension of a first evaluation in Rudolph (2010: 
Chapter 6, 2011). Rudolph (2010: Chapter 6) assumed that an overall indication of project 
success should be given by the impact of the project on overall food security – first evidence 
using a single-difference equation on the impact data-set and treating the project as quasi-
randomized experiment with random attrition indicated positive impacts of about 0.44 aver-
age meals per day. Using baseline and impact data and thus a difference-in-differences ap-
proach with two cross-sections, Rudolph (2011: 15) equally estimated an impact of about 0.45 
average meals per day.189 These results are estimated under the assumption of quasi-
randomized project implementation and random attrition, although the difference-in-
differences approach allowed for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Both approaches 
controlled for observable characteristic that could have influenced project placement, namely 
district of the intervention, household size, ethnicity, female headedness of households, edu-
cation of household heads, wage income and coverage by other GO/NGO programs. The re-
sults are significant on the 1% level and robust to the in- or exclusion of these controls. While 
food security measurement through recalls on meal intake is used in the literature (comp. e.g. 
Banerjee et al. 2010b: Table 9), the censoring of the data complicates the interpretation of the 
analysis: Figure 17 summarizes the distribution of average meals per day for control group 
and beneficiary group ultra-poor on upazila level, as used as outcome variable in Rudolph 
(2010) for single difference impact measurement. Both control group and beneficiary group 
distributions are very similar across upazilas: While control group distributions are centring 
on an average 2.3 to 2.8 meals per day, the IFSUP intervention seemed to be successful at 
lifting about 85% of the beneficiary group ultra-poor to food security with three meals per day 
throughout the year in all upazilas.  
But the natural upper bound of the indicator prohibits insights into the real quantitative 
difference between both groups (this is the question whether project participants would be in a 
position to afford even four, five or six meals per day). Additionally, heterogeneity in impacts 
cannot be assessed with this indicator, as wealth differences among various subgroups are 
hidden behind the censoring at three meals per day and the low variability of the impact indi-
cator for target group members. Analysis in Rudolph (2011: Table 3, 4) revealed only a first 
indication for a reduced project effect for target group participants with Adibasi ethnicity.  
                                                 
189 This similarity in baseline distributions is the reason for the quantitative similarity of the results in Rudolph 
(2010) and Rudolph (2011) and was interpreted as indication for as-if-randomization at baseline.  
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Figure 17: Censoring and low variability in the indicator meals per day thus far used for analysis 
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Foremost, further analysis is necessary to counter concerns that the positive impact is related 
to hidden bias not evident in the data so far, both related to attrition and endogeneity in pro-
gram placement. Secondly, unbounded indicators can give additional indications on the size 
of the effect of IFSUP. Third, theory suggested the project approach as viable option for ultra-
poverty reduction. But only a research design investigating a range of aspects relevant for 
ultra-poverty livelihoods is able to comprehensively link the evidence back to theory.  
For analysis beyond the scope of this thesis, impact variables with higher variability 
additionally allow for estimations of heterogeneity in impact. 
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Appendix 2: The IFSUP Project Intervention 
The IFSUP project190 aims at generating sustainable livelihoods for 4800 ultra-poor house-
holds with approximately 19000 family members in six upazilas191 of three Bangladeshi dis-
tricts192 (Rangpur, Joypurhat and Netrakona), intending to lift about 10% of the ultra-poor 
population in these upazilas over the upper poverty line of 2122 kcal per day per capita. In 
each district, a different PNGO193 of NETZ is responsible for the implementation. Upazilas 
with high incidence of ultra-poverty were selected. The project explicitly targets the senior 
women of households194 and pays attention to the inclusion of local ethnic minorities, termed 
Adibasis, who are to make up at least 40% of the project beneficiaries. The ultra-poor are dis-
aggregated into subgroups – group I, II and III. The main distinction between these groups 
lies in their capacity to work. Group I, the most marginalized ultra-poor, not embedded in 
supporting family structures and not capable of physical labor (e.g. elderly, physically or 
mentally ill, orphans), are not targeted by the project, as they cannot respond to self-
employment schemes. Group II and III differ mainly by their degree of poverty. In the project, 
this distinction is operationalized by defining group II as households with a food intake of less 
than 1600 kcal/day operationalized as a maximum of two meals in minimum nine months, a 
monthly income of less than 400 taka per capita, being completely without land and/or assets. 
Group III is characterized by a food intake of less than 1800 kcal/day operationalized as a 
maximum of two meals in minimum six months, a monthly income of less than 500 taka per 
capita and being functionally landless.  
Skepticisms prevail concerning self-employment schemes especially for the group II 
ultra-poor: The European Commission sees income generating activities (IGAs) by group II 
possible only “[s]poradic by highly motivated and capable beneficiaries” (EC 2001: Annex 
5)195, following a study highlighting exclusion and self-exclusion of ultra-poor households 
                                                 
190 This appendix draws to a large part on Rudolph (2010: Chapter 2.1). 
191 Upazila is an administrative unit in Bangladesh comparable to a county.  
192 IFSUP is implemented in the context of on of the least developed countries of the world, and within Bangla-
desh the most deprived part of the country, its northern and north-western Region. Appendix 4 provides a map 
and Appendix 3 describes this context in detail. 
193 These are ‘ASHRAI’ in Rangpur, ‘Jagorani Chakra Foundation (JCF)’ in Joypurhat and ‘Sabalamby Unnayan 
Samity (SUS)’ in Netrakona. 
194 Implicitly, the approach assumes that women are more responsible in caring for social outcomes. This is in 
line with a large part of the literature. Behrman & Hoddinott (2005: 552) e.g. summarize how studies on “poor 
populations have concluded that larger shares of resources that go to mothers are directed towards child health 
and nutrition than of resources directed to fathers”. 
195 Although the direct transfer of assets seems not to have been taken into account as program design feature. 
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leading to low entrepreneurial prospects requiring intensive up front training and motivation 
(Konold et al. 2001: Chapter 7.3).196
The IFSUP approach still centres on this approach to ultra-poverty reduction. Project-
instruments include the boosting of self-employment through asset tranfers to a level prevent-
ing hunger and distress. At the same time the project aims to reduce their vulnerability to an 
extent that a future fallback into poverty becomes unlikely. This approach is based on the 
identification of four major problems these ultra-poor are facing: They are suffering from 
hunger at least 6-9 months per year. Their state is vulnerable to an extent that they are at high 
risk of being locked in their situation and would slide back even if faced with a positive 
shock. To the social and political aspects of their vulnerability – social exclusion is assumed 
especially for female-headed and indigenous households, especially as faced with a govern-
ment largely unable to include their needs to its agenda – adds the risk of various natural dis-
asters and unfavorable macroeconomic conditions, as well as market forces.197 This leaves 
many households incapable to invest in human or physical capital and prevents emancipation 
from their status: Thus, Rahman et al. (2009: Chapter 1.2) find in their assessment of chronic 
poverty in Bangladesh that a large majority of the chronically poor (72%) inherited their 
status over generations and are likely to pass it on (comp. for a detailed overview on reasons 
Harper et al. 2003). Sinha et al. (2002: 186), using the concept of ‘damaging fluctuations’198, 
similarly note how this vulnerability is likely to influence the ultra-poor:  
 
“Such fluctuations cause immediate damage and may trigger responses leading to chronic poverty or 
intergenerational continuities of poverty. Moreover, just the possibility of [damaging fluctuations], even 
if they do not occur, may generate more risk-averse behavior, which hampers growth and (because it is 
likely to be more common among poorer people) increases inequality.” 
These poor are thus expected to be trapped in poverty, as noted in similar contexts (Carter et 
al. 2008). 
                                                 
196 As the authors subsequently conclude the “promotion of IGAs represent a valuable instrument in food secu-
rity for the ultra-poor within determined types of […] interventions [but] are not an appropriate approach for all 
ultra-poor. Our impression is that no more than 50% of the ultra-poor are able […] to run successful and sustain-
able IGAs” (Konold et al. 2001: 37). 
197 Much noted is especially their inability to get access to credit or savings facilities (Armendáriz & Morduch 
2010, Banerjee et al. 2003, Rudolph 2010). 
198 The commonly used concepts of ‘risks’ and/or ‘shocks’ are subsets of ‘damaging fluctuations’, as the latter 
include as well largely or wholly predictable changes, e.g. seasons, the (ultra-) poor are vulnerable to. Addition-
ally, the authors argue, the concept of ‘damaging fluctuations’ brings to light four central dimensions of shocks 
usually unnoted for in the literature: the source, the stress it imposes on systems, the resulting strain on persons, 
and the resulting damage.  
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 Appendix 3: Bangladesh and Its Northern Regions199
The IFSUP project intervenes in the context of one of the least developed countries (UN 
2011) of the world, with a per capita income of US$ 755200 for 2010/11 (BBS 2011a: 7).  
Still, Bangladesh experienced considerable economic and social progress in the last 
decade. Supported by steady GDP growth rates around 6.0%, poverty levels201 declined from 
57% in 1990 to 31.5% in 2010 and main health and education indicators improved: Life ex-
pectancy is up from 54.4 years in 1990 to projected 69 years for females and 66.5 years for 
males for the 2010-2015 period. Infant mortality per 1000 births declined from 92 in 1990 to 
projected 27.5 for the 2010-2015 period. Primary education indicators improved to almost 
universal gross enrolment with 98% in 2008, while closing the significant gender gap that had 
existed. While being among the most densely populated areas in the world with 964 inhabi-
tants per square kilometer and population growth remaining a concern, it is still down from 
about 2% in the 1990s to 1.3% in 2011.  
While relative figures might indicate improvements, overall poverty levels are still 
high. Convincing progress is lacking for a range of other variables as well: Secondary educa-
tion levels need to be improved, with the primary and secondary gross enrolment ratio being 
at 65.5 for females and 60.8 for males. Additionally, the quality of education remains poor, as 
indicated by primary drop out rates of 48%. As the World Bank (2010: 7) notes, “[l]earning 
outcomes are generally poor, especially among low income and disadvantaged groups.” 
Though down from 574 death per 100000 live births, the reduction in maternal mortality is 
high in regional comparative and stalling, with 320 deaths in 2001 and 348 in 2008. A major 
problem is as well malnourishment: Taking weight as well as height for age as indicators 
leads to estimates of malnourishment prevalence for about 46-48% of children. The poorest 
are especially affected: “Chronic malnutrition is pervasive across all socioeconomic strata, at 
56 % of all children among the poorest and 32 % among the wealthiest quintiles” (World 
Bank 2010: 6). Amongst the 31.5% of the population still living in poverty, about 17.6% are 
considered as being ultra-poor202, with a large rural-urban divide of 21.1% for rural and 7.6% 
for urban areas. They receive few aid by the government: Although social protection themes 
                                                 
199 This appendix draws on data published by the United Nations Statistics Division, the World Bank and the 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS 2011b, 2011c: 11, 2011d: 2f., United Nations 2011: 5, World Bank 2010a: 
62, 2010b: 5-7). It builds in part on the description in Rudolph (2010: Chapter 2.2) but is updated and extended. 
200 The figure is at current prices and preliminary. 
201 As defined by a direct calorie intake (DCI) of less then 2,122 kcal/day. 
202 As defined by a DCI of less than 1,805 kcal/day 
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are in place, “coverage is low, targeting is weak and government’s planning and delivery ca-
pacity needs significant strengthening” (World Bank 2010: 38). Additionally, large parts of 
the population live close to the poverty line and are highly vulnerable to being impoverished 
by small shocks. In this respect, the susceptibility of Bangladesh to natural disasters with its 
dense population and 80% of its area consisting of flood plains is especially noteworthy. 
Overall, economic progress is not reaching the bottom section of society as fast as it 
should and inequality is stalling even according to government figures as the BBS (2011c: 3) 
reports:  
“Incomes accruing to households belonging to Decile-1 to Decile-5 are recorded at 2.00 percent, 3.22 
percent, 4.10 percent, 5.00 percent and 6.01 percent respectively at national level in 2010. These shares 
have not changed relative to 2005. These five deciles continue to share only 20.33 percent of total in-
come, although they comprise 50 percent of the population.”  
 
Rural northern and northwestern Bangladesh, where the project is implemented203, is an espe-
cially deprived part of the country: Politically neglected, prone by national disasters and re-
current seasonal food crisis. For the latest region-specific data from 2005, the poverty head-
count ratio is at about 50% compared to the then 40% nationwide, with ultra-poverty at 43% 
compared to 25% nationwide (BBS 2009b: 2, 2011b: 2, Chowdhury et al. 2009: 1, FN 1).204 
The region is prone by natural disasters, with river floods being a concern especially for the 
project areas in Rangpur along the Teesta River and flash floods for the project region in Ne-
trakona (BBS 2009b: 10). The special political problems of the region become evident in the 
targeting failures of GOB safety net programs: The poverty incidence of the population not 
targeted by these government programs is e.g. in Rangpur at 37.6% compared to 27.5% na-
tionwide (BBS 2011c: 5). The weak industrialization in the northwest of the country leads to 
lacking off-farm employment in the lean seasons which in turn drives a seasonal pattern of 
chronic food shortages, called monga, prevalent especially in the Rangpur and to a lesser ex-
tent in the Joypurhat area of the project(Zug 2006b). Monga is leading to a vicious cycle of 
second-best coping strategies and increased vulnerability for the next hunger season (Zug 
2006a: 30-32, 2006b: Chapter 27). Wood (2003: 468) in this respect refers to a “Faustian bar-
gain” where the poor and poorest, faced with life threatening distress, are forced to discount 
the future in favor of short term security “whatever the longer term costs”. IFSUP is intended 
to overturn this context. 
                                                 
203 See Appendix 4 for a map. 
204 The deprivation of the north-western region is recognized by other donors besides NETZ as well: The World 
Bank (2010: 61) e.g. notes, that government efforts to improve completion rates for primary education failed – 
rates remained “very low” – in the northwestern region and especially in the local monga-prone areas. 
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Appendix 4: IFSUP Working Area in Bangladesh 
Figure 18: Map of Bangladesh with Target Districts (Grey) and Upazilas of the IFSUP working area 
 
Picture source: NETZ (2009b: 2). 
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 Appendix 5: PCA Analysis 
Index construction for socio-economic status (SES), secondary outcomes (SOS), productive 
and durable assets as well as housing quality in this thesis draws on principal component 
analysis (PCA) (see for a general overview Jolliffe 2002). This approach is based on the idea 
that the ownership of different asset types is correlated with each other based on some under-
lying latent variable. This latent variable is unobservable, but “manifests itself through owner-
ship of the different assets” (Moser & Felton 2007: 3). Concerning socio-economic status this 
unobserved variable can be interpreted as general wealth level of households and extracted 
with PCA from various indicators – from education over housing quality to asset ownership. 
As Moser (2007: 3f.) outlines, PCA is technically similar to regression analysis, just that “re-
siduals are measured against all of the variables”. PCA is directed at maximizing the variance 
of the different possible linear combinations by the variables involved, to which the solution 
is given by the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the covariance matrix of these variables 
(Kolenikov & Angeles 2009: 133). It is especially appealing that interpretation is straightfor-
ward: The higher the loading of a variable, the more information this variable contains about 
the occurrence of other variables, in positive or negative direction depending on the coeffi-
cient sign. The intuition behind the approach then is to find the, at best single, sometimes few 
components “that underlie all of the structure in (covariance of) the data” (Kolenikov & 
Angeles 2009: 134) and aggregate their information to an index.  
 
There is a clear distinction in approaches between choosing several as compared to choosing 
only the first principle component for index construction.  
When choosing several components to be used for the explanation of variance in the 
sample, the researcher has to choose between different possibilities: One way is the inclusion 
of principal components so that their combined explained variance reaches more than a cut-
off point of about 70-90%. The concrete cut-off is flexible, based on the interest in the vari-
ance structure remaining and the impracticability of including too many principal components 
(Jolliffe 2002: 112f.). Very popular throughout the literature is the usage of the ‘Kaiser crite-
rion’, which would imply the usage of all principal components with an eigenvalue greater 
than one – intuitively, this leads to a usage of principal components which explain more than 
only their own variance.205 Another popular method, despite being criticized for its subjec-
                                                 
205 Interesting enough, Kaiser (1960: 145) himself speaks only of a reliability criterion: “[F]or a principal com-
ponent analysis to have positive Kuder-Richardson reliability, it is necessary and sufficient that the associated 
eigenvalue be greater than one”. What he cites as prime reason for the Kaiser criterion should make the re-
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tiveness, is the analysis of scree-plots, following the proposal of Cattell (1966). In this, plots 
of eigenvalue against component numbers are examined, choosing the component as cut-off 
where the graph “becomes fairly constant for several subsequent values” (Jolliffe 2002: 117). 
Joliffe (2002: 117-130) discusses further methods of choosing the optimal number of princi-
pal components, although “it still remains true that attempts to construct rules having more 
sound statistical foundations seem, at present, to offer little advantage over the simpler rules 
in most circumstances” (Jolliffe 2002: 133).  
Recently, and especially for the construction of SES and asset indices, only the first 
principle component is used (as e.g. proposed by Filmer & Pritchett 2001, McKenzie 2005, 
Vyas & Kumaranayake 2006), although “[i]t is also possible to use the sum of a number of 
eigenvectors, based on some criteria” (Moser & Felton 2007: 3, FN 4). But as has been 
shown, the first component can plausibly be assumed to be a measure of economic wealth, 
with further components adding substructures to this interpretation (Vyas & Kumaranayake 
2006: 463). As outlined in the literature, results from indices based on the first principle com-
ponent are strikingly robust to the inclusion of more dimensions (see the tests conducted by 
e.g. Filmer & Pritchett 2001, McKenzie 2005). This thesis will follow this approach. 
 
A second point of discussion concerns the inclusion of discrete, including ordinal, variables in 
PCA. This is technically not straightforward as PCA is classically assuming multivariate nor-
mal data input (Kolenikov & Angeles 2009: 134). As Jolliffe (2002: 134) stresses, 
“[h]owever, the basic objective of PCA – to summarize most of the ‘variation’ that is present 
in the original set of p variables using a smaller number of derived variables – can be 
achieved regardless of the nature of the original variables.” Much debate surrounds the best 
practice for the inclusion of discrete data. While Filmer & Pritchett (2001) advocated the 
splitting up of ordinal data into binary variables and Booysen et al. (2008: 1114) the use of 
“multiple correspondence analysis”, more recently polychoric PCA as developed by 
Kolenikov & Angeles (2004) emerged as method of choice (Moser & Felton 2007: 5).  
But importantly, as Kolenikov & Angeles (2009: 161f.) advice and test in Monte Carlo 
simulations, using discrete data with PCA is a feasible approach and due to computational 
power concerns even preferable in many instances:  
„The gain [of polychoric PCA] is only related to more accurate estimation of the proportion of ex-
plained variance that other methods tend to underestimate […] If there is a reliable and well established 
ordering of categories, the ordinal PCA should be used. However, if the proportion of explained vari-
ance is of importance, the polychoric method should be used.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
searcher cautious of its application: The “most important viewpoint [is that eigenvalues greater than one lead in 
practice to] the number of factors which practicing psychologists were able to interpret.” 
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This approach was subsequently adopted for the construction of asset indices for the IFSUP 
data. Variables used for the respective indices are presented in Table 11, columns one to five, 
and range from the maximum education level in households, the quality of construction mate-
rial for houses and the amount of land owned by households to dummies indicating the own-
ership of productive and non-productive assets. Variables were measured and included on 
household level, not adjusting for family sizes, as benefits of these variables (e.g. construction 
material, durable assets owned) are available on household level as well (comp. the similar 
argument in Filmer & Pritchett 2001: 120). The measured index thus has a “focus on inequal-
ity across households” (McKenzie 2005: 233).  
 
Straightforward criteria for the in- or exclusion of variables to indices have not been found. 
As Vyas & Kumaranayake (2006: 467) summarize “studies using asset-based indices appear 
to have relied on the ‘face validity’ of the variables included, i.e. they appear to capture 
household wealth.” The construction in this thesis including as many variables as present in 
the data indicative for asset ownership and quality, though thorough tests on the robustness of 
the indices to the in- or exclusion of variables are beyond the scope of this thesis. Subse-
quently, the case for project effectiveness is not exclusively build upon these indices, but on a 
combined interpretation with other variables, in order to increase the validity of conclusions.  
 As proposed by McKenzie (2005: 234), in order to be able to compare over time and 
communities, the calculation of factor scores was computed in a pooled data set for both 
cross-sections, “since it is likely that the weights on the asset variables which most explain 
variation among households in the current cross-section may differ from the weights which 
explained the cross-sectional variation 10 [3] years before.” For the purpose of comparison, 
certain sets of variables had to be aggregated (chairs and tables were e.g. separately reported 
in baseline data, but aggregated in the impact survey) and coded as dummy variables indicat-
ing ownership. As dummy variables are the commonly used data input for PCA asset index 
construction (comp. e.g. the approach of Filmer & Pritchett 2001, McKenzie 2005), this is 
unproblematic besides the data on quantities lost in the process.  
In principle, the recommendations of Vyas & Kumaranayake (2006) were followed in 
index construction. Crucial question is whether the indices following the first component are 
really a measurement of wealth (for the SES), wealth besides direct project outcomes (for the 
SOS) and respective asset endowments (for asset and housing quality indices). For this, the 
factor loadings presented in Table 11 are an important indicator: The positive association of 
factor scores with the indices provides a first reassurance. The negative association of ‘further 
interior’ is plausible as well, given it is indicative of owning low quality furniture substituting 
the presence of especially chairs/tables. Owning ‘further interior’ can then be correlated to 
other variables indicative of a lower SES/SOS. Additionally, the eigenvalue of the first com-
ponent, at least for the SES and SOS, as well as the variance associated is in line with indices 
constructed in similar conditions (comp. the summary of Vyas & Kumaranayake 2006: 463). 
 
Last but not least, clumping and truncation as potential confounders (McKenzie 2005: 235) 
seem not to be of concern at least for SES, SOS, and housing quality, as a detailed look at 
histograms and densities of the estimates reveals. As presented for the distribution of scores 
for the SES index in Figure 19, scores are smoothly distributed, giving no hint to clumping 
and truncation and indicating that the variables chosen suffice for adequately distinguishing 
the wealth of households. The two maxima evident in the data are due to a positive shift in the 
distribution between 2007 and 2009. This pattern is similar with the secondary outcomes and 
housing quality indices, although the latter reveals various spikes. For productive and durable 
assets indices, truncation and clumping could be problematic, which is mainly due to the few 
variables included (detailed results available on request). Their results therefore have to be 
interpreted cautiously and only in complementing other asset indicators.  
Figure 19: Distribution of scores for the SES index 
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The figure displays the histogram and kernel density of the distribution of scores constructed from
the first principle component of the variables presented below for both cross-sections and all households.
Density: SES index
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Table 11: Factor loadings and descriptive statistics for variables involved in PCA index construction 
 factor loadings for first component of PCA analysis descriptive statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 2007  2009  total  
 SES secondary 
outcomes 
housing 
quality 
product. 
assets 
durable 
assets 
mean sd mean sd mean sd 
highest education level in HH 0.191 0.318    4.013 1.834 4.593 1.722 4.296 1.804 
size of homestead (decimal) 0.155 0.276 0.473   4.352 3.285 4.918 3.671 4.628 3.490 
ownership homestead 0.204 0.297 0.435   0.190 0.393 0.576 0.494 0.378 0.485 
number of rooms 0.240 0.316 0.526   1.118 0.323 1.370 0.572 1.241 0.478 
ownership house 0.084 0.130 0.253   0.944 0.231 0.973 0.163 0.958 0.201 
quality of roof material 0.063 0.060 0.224   4.898 2.067 5.232 1.801 5.061 1.949 
quality of wall material 0.110 0.212 0.443   2.910 1.552 3.293 1.670 3.097 1.622 
dietary diversity score 0.302 0.438    4.300 2.262 7.167 1.158 5.698 2.308 
productive land size (decimal) 0.220     1.574 7.344 14.466 31.095 7.860 23.251 
tropical livestock units 0.302     0.283 0.450 0.874 0.697 0.571 0.654 
index of diversification of in-
come sources 
0.404     2.415 1.199 4.286 1.191 3.328 1.518 
ownership rickshaw/van 0.187   0.456  0.026 0.160 0.190 0.392 0.106 0.308 
ownership trees/bamboo/ vege-
table garden 
0.364   0.582  0.278 0.448 0.852 0.355 0.558 0.497 
ownership net 0.184   0.449  0.029 0.168 0.156 0.363 0.091 0.288 
ownership boat 0.044   0.193  0.002 0.041 0.007 0.084 0.004 0.065 
ownership tubewell 0.166   0.457  0.222 0.416 0.382 0.486 0.300 0.458 
ownership husking machine 0.023   0.075  0.007 0.086 0.004 0.062 0.006 0.075 
ownership electronics 0.108 0.162   0.362 0.072 0.258 0.087 0.282 0.079 0.270 
ownership jewels 0.289 0.398   0.649 0.086 0.280 0.507 0.500 0.291 0.454 
ownership chair/table 0.310 0.439   0.639 0.321 0.467 0.869 0.337 0.589 0.492 
ownership further interior -0.024 -0.031   0.199 0.801 0.399 0.497 0.500 0.653 0.476 
eigenvalue of first component 4.203 2.394 1.396 1.443 1.436       
Variance associated 0.200 0.200 0.233 0.241 0.359       
N 11649 11649 11663 11785 11785 5969  5680  11649  
Explained proportions are approximations for SES, SOS and housing quality due discrete variables included (Kolenikov & Angeles 2009: 161). For these discrete variables (edu-
cation, roof/wall quality, diversification index) mean/sd are not directly interpretable. Other variables besides TLU, land/homestead-size and rooms are dummies.
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Appendix 6: Further Analysis of Internal Validity 
Below, further evidence on the validity of conclusions derived and causality of the impact is 
presented, on the one had concerning interactions with coverage of GOB programs, on the 
other hand concerning the inclusion of additional controls for education levels, outside wage 
labour income and education of household heads to the impact estimation.  
 
These analysis are driven by concerns for additional bias in the data: One possible confounder 
could be related to the fact that IFSUP could have lead to a greater coverage of beneficiary 
households by GOB programs, as lobbying for inclusion of ultra-poor in GOB programs was 
explicit aim of the transformative project component. Outcomes could then be due not to the 
combined IFSUP approach as such (with its costly asset transfer component), but only to its 
transformative pillar. In this respect, Table 12 provides SD estimates, Table 13 DD estimates 
and Table 14 within estimates for the impact regression on overall outcomes with additional 
controls for the coverage by government programs and the interaction of beneficiary group 
status with this coverage (for SD and within estimates respectively the interaction of benefici-
ary status with GOB coverage and year 2009).  
The inclusion of these interaction terms serves the purpose of singling out the impact 
of IFSUP apart from influences accruing from a possible increased coverage by GOB pro-
grams. As indicated in the tables below, the conclusions of the main part of this thesis hold: 
The variable support by NGOs/GOB206 is generally positive but not significant for most out-
come measures.207 The interaction between NGO/GOB coverage and year for the within and 
DD estimates is, besides SES, negatively related to estimates, but again not significant for 
most variables208. 
Most important for the effect of IFSUP are the findings for the interaction term benefi-
ciary group with NGO/GOB support and, for DD and within data, year 2009: For these esti-
mates, the general picture is again a negative relationship.209 This is to say that project effects 
are in tendency diminished (though insignificant for most variables210) for the IFSUP house-
holds additionally included in GOB schemes.  
 
206 The variable ‘support by NGOs/GOB’ is constructed as dummy variable indicating for baseline and impact 
data the coverage of households by any kind of NGO/GOB program besides IFSUP. 
207 Support as such is significantly positively related only to SES for the within and DD estimation and meals per 
day and pc expenditure for the DD estimates 
208 Support in 2009 is significantly negatively related only for SES and SOS for the DD and meals per day for 
the within estimates. 
209 Besides food expenditure for the SD estimate and household expenditure for the within estimate. 
210 Besides SES and SOS for the within and value of collected food for SD estimates.  
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At the same time, the positive estimates for the project as measured by the inclusion of 
households in the beneficiary group is overall positive and remains significant for all variables 
but yearly pc expenditure (within estimates) and expenditure figures (DD estimates).211
The estimates for beneficiary ultra-poor additionally covered by NGO/GOB-programs 
are indicative in another aspect: As the transformative project elements aimed at local gov-
ernment-lobbying with the purpose of rightful coverage of GOB schemes, it is likely that the 
poorer strata among the beneficiary ultra-poor were included in GOB schemes. While they 
additionally benefit from GOB programs, their lower status as such serves to explain the 
negative sign of estimates.  
 
Lastly, Table 15 presents findings for additional covariates in the restricted panel data set, 
again for the variables related to the overall project impact. The general conclusions still hold 
when controlling the impact of IFSUP for government support, income by outside wage la-
bour, maximum education levels of household heads and household size. Impacts are still 
positive and highly significant on the 1% level (but for pc expenditure, significant on the 5% 
level). Additionally the impact size is comparable, though in general slightly lower (but for pc 
expenditure) to estimates in the reduced controls-model as estimated in Table 4.  
 The correlation of these additional covariates is generally conclusive as well: Outside 
wage labour is positively associated with outcomes (but for SOS) and significant for educa-
tion related variables. Higher education levels to the reference category ‘illiterate’ are in gen-
eral positively related to outcomes, though especially for expenditure estimates inconclusive. 
But clear-cut findings were not expected in this case as the absolute number of ultra-poor with 
higher education levels is very small.212 Additionally, as in the SD and DD estimations of 
Chapter 3.3, household size is positively related to outcomes besides pc expenditure.  
 As the within estimates control for changes in control variables for the same individu-
als, the conclusion can be drawn that IFSUP beneficiaries profited from the program even 
beyond changes in education level, household size and government support and even if out-
side wage labour was substituted away from.213  
 
211 Robust regressions instead of clustered regressions lead to overall significant positive impacts. Point esti-
mates are by this not affected; therefore the general conclusions above can only be strengthened if robust stan-
dard errors were superior to clustered standard errors (comp. the discussion in 3.2.5).  
212 Absolute number for maximum education of households are as follows: illiterate 289; can sign 1092; can read 
and write 48, class 1-2 passed 91; class 3-5 passed 221; class 6-8 passed 136; class 9-10 passed 53; secondary 
school certificate obtained 8; higher school certificate obtained 3. 
213 At least concerning the individuals in the reduced panel data set. 
Table 12: Difference estimation for the overall project impact conditional on GOB/NGO support of BG by year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 average meals 
per day per 
capita 
average food 
expenditure per 
capita per day 
value of col-
lected food pc 
per day 
socioeconomic 
status index 
(PCA) 
secondary out-
comes index 
(PCA) 
yearly house-
hold expendi-
ture 
yearly expendi-
ture per capita 
HH part of benefici-
ary group 
0.440*** 
(6.78) 
0.798** 
(2.68) 
0.405*** 
(4.91) 
1.447*** 
(15.08) 
0.689*** 
(7.91) 
4921.2** 
(2.77) 
1359.7** 
(3.14) 
        
support of BG by 
NGOs/GOB 
-0.109 
(-1.63) 
0.0281 
(0.16) 
-0.141** 
(-3.00) 
-0.132 
(-1.31) 
-0.123 
(-1.72) 
-447.7 
(-0.28) 
-185.3 
(-0.46) 
        
support by 
NGOs/GOB 
0.113 
(1.83) 
0.116 
(0.58) 
0.157 
(1.89) 
0.313 
(1.73) 
0.177 
(1.42) 
715.2 
(0.50) 
144.9 
(0.41) 
        
female headed HH -0.0423** 
(-2.61) 
-0.270** 
(-2.98) 
-0.0254 
(-0.22) 
-0.416*** 
(-7.69) 
-0.245*** 
(-9.68) 
-1801.4* 
(-2.15) 
-148.9 
(-0.58) 
        
Adibasi ethnicity -0.0310 
(-1.23) 
0.482*** 
(11.76) 
0.289** 
(2.91) 
0.421*** 
(6.23) 
0.341*** 
(4.44) 
1210.3** 
(3.83) 
229.3 
(1.03) 
        
group II poverty 
status 
-0.0186*** 
(-7.32) 
-0.147 
(-1.17) 
-0.0925 
(-1.32) 
-0.391** 
(-2.62) 
-0.341** 
(-3.13) 
-1015.5 
(-1.17) 
-253.6 
(-1.27) 
        
number of HH 
members 
0.0150* 
(2.19) 
0.906*** 
(27.12) 
0.181*** 
(7.57) 
0.320*** 
(6.96) 
0.236*** 
(8.41) 
3991.5*** 
(21.97) 
-857.1*** 
(-10.56) 
        
Constant 2.414*** 
(39.47) 
1.589*** 
(6.04) 
0.637** 
(3.04) 
-1.159*** 
(-5.10) 
-0.279** 
(-2.58) 
13097.9*** 
(10.81) 
10856.1*** 
(31.93) 
        
upazila dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.374 0.490 0.171 0.342 0.298 0.352 0.237 
N 5210 5362 5369 5273 5273 2218 2218 
Single difference estimation of the outcome variable in the heading on project participation and the indicated controls. Regression includes upazila-level fixed effects. In paren-
theses t-statistics from upazila-cluster-robust standard errors. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 13: Difference-in-Differences estimation for the overall project impact conditional on GOB/NGO support of BG by year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 average mpd per av. 
family member 
socioeconomic status 
index (PCA) 
secondary outcomes 
index (PCA) 
yearly household 
expenditure 
yearly expenditure 
per capita 
project impact 0.338*** 
(13.22) 
1.505*** 
(10.06) 
0.683* 
(3.33) 
5888.1 
(2.39) 
2132.8 
(2.47) 
      
HH part of beneficiary 
group 
-0.00557 
(-0.48) 
-0.172 
(-2.31) 
-0.0211 
(-0.49) 
-180.0 
(-0.37) 
-640.9 
(-2.17) 
      
year 2009 0.633*** 
(15.22) 
1.306** 
(5.43) 
1.131*** 
(14.45) 
7170.5 
(1.97) 
1034.8 
(1.03) 
      
support of BG by 
NGOs/GOB in 2009 
-0.0578 
(-2.04) 
-0.150* 
(-3.30) 
-0.173 
(-2.76) 
-808.3 
(-0.33) 
-262.9 
(-0.47) 
      
support by NGOs/GOB in 
2009 
-0.0777 
(-1.31) 
-0.463* 
(-2.98) 
-0.116** 
(-5.27) 
-1062.8 
(-0.49) 
-354.2 
(-0.73) 
      
support by NGOs/GOB 0.180*** 
(42.57) 
0.676* 
(3.63) 
0.340 
(2.07) 
1705.0 
(2.36) 
487.9*** 
(11.55) 
      
Constant 2.002*** 
(77.51) 
-1.824*** 
(-20.79) 
-1.119*** 
(-12.49) 
6768.2*** 
(24.69) 
8660.3*** 
(10.90) 
      
fixed HH characteristics 
(ethnicity, group II poverty, 
HH size, female headed) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
upazila dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.824 0.610 0.575 0.703 0.425 
N 5816 5874 5874 4249 4249 
mean 2009 2.900 1.358 0.851 33774.7 7680.7 
Difference-in-differences estimation of outcome variable in heading on project participation and the indicated controls. Impact estimation only for upazilas Panchibi, Joypurhat 
and Kalmakanda. Regressions include upazila-level fixed effects. In parentheses t-statistics from upazila-cluster-robust standard errors. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 14: Within estimation for the overall project impact conditional on GOB/NGO support of BG by year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 average meals per 
day per average fam-
ily member 
socioeconomic status 
index (PCA) 
secondary outcomes 
index (PCA) 
yearly household 
expenditure 
yearly expenditure 
per capita 
project impact 0.433*** 
(11.31) 
2.273*** 
(9.74) 
1.013*** 
(12.49) 
6592.0** 
(2.67) 
926.4 
(1.90) 
      
year 2009 0.643*** 
(14.28) 
1.326*** 
(4.28) 
1.432*** 
(6.73) 
10793.8*** 
(4.54) 
2049.3*** 
(4.83) 
      
support by the NGOs/GOB 
for BG in 2009 
-0.0374 
(-0.44) 
-0.671** 
(-2.66) 
-0.337* 
(-2.30) 
1168.2 
(0.52) 
-95.53 
(-0.12) 
      
support by the NGOs/GOB 
in 2009 
-0.205** 
(-3.08) 
0.379 
(0.72) 
-0.0431 
(-0.15) 
-1475.1 
(-0.23) 
554.2 
(0.34) 
      
support by the NGOs/GOB 0.182* 
(2.34) 
0.205 
(0.57) 
0.347 
(1.25) 
909.1 
(0.14) 
-335.0 
(-0.23) 
      
Constant 1.922*** 
(69.35) 
-1.601*** 
(-12.96) 
-1.160*** 
(-10.12) 
17372.8*** 
(68.12) 
5133.5*** 
(51.65) 
N 1904 1926 1926 1389 1389 
R² 0.888 0.778 0.734 0.750 0.402 
mean 2009 2.967 1.863 1.257 35731.9 8029.5 
Within estimation of the outcome variable in the heading on project participation for the restricted panel data set with household fixed effects. Regressions include upazila-level 
fixed effects. In parentheses t-statistics from upazila-cluster-robust standard errors. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 15: Within estimation with additional control in the panel data set on overall outcome related variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 av. mpd per av. HH member SES (PCA) SOS (PCA) yearly HH expenditure yearly expenditure pc 
project impact 0.394*** 
(6.32) 
1.717*** 
(16.23) 
0.634*** 
(18.29) 
5537.8*** 
(4.18) 
1590.5** 
(3.93) 
 
year 2009 
     
0.644*** 
(17.85) 
1.507*** 
(6.10) 
1.476*** 
(7.46) 
11680.5*** 
(6.59) 
2429.6*** 
(10.26) 
      
support by the NGOs/GOB -0.0370 
(-0.65) 
0.0812 
(1.09) 
0.0742 
(1.35) 
-659.1 
(-0.69) 
-30.93 
(-0.10) 
      
total outside wage labor income 0.000000769 
(0.45) 
0.00000447 
(0.78) 
-0.00000292 
(-0.89) 
0.280*** 
(13.89) 
0.0706*** 
(5.39) 
 
education 2: signature only;  
     
0.0293 
(0.90) 
0.272* 
(2.28) 
0.256** 
(2.70) 
567.6 
(1.03) 
-201.7 
(-0.74) 
      
education 3: basic reading/writing 
skills;  
0.0277 
(0.49) 
0.158 
(0.70) 
0.114 
(0.68) 
5847.8** 
(3.18) 
1332.9* 
(2.24) 
      
education 4: class 1-2 passed;  0.0119 
(0.32) 
0.343* 
(2.56) 
0.450** 
(3.06) 
-873.7 
(-0.58) 
-716.1 
(-1.49) 
 
education 5: class 3-5 passed 
     
-0.00110 
(-0.02) 
0.725** 
(3.32) 
0.654** 
(3.62) 
819.1 
(0.52) 
-746.9 
(-1.06) 
 
education 6: class 6-8 passed 
     
0.0537 
(1.20) 
0.728** 
(3.55) 
0.830*** 
(6.32) 
1913.3 
(1.11) 
307.8 
(0.39) 
      
education 7: class 9-10 passed 0.0830 
(0.84) 
0.993** 
(3.28) 
1.192*** 
(4.16) 
-1037.3 
(-0.60) 
-1028.5 
(-0.93) 
      
education 8: secondary school 
certificate obtained; 
-0.0663 
(-0.48) 
0.752 
(1.47) 
0.918** 
(2.78) 
180.2 
(0.11) 
-967.8 
(-1.04) 
 
education 9: higher school certifi-
cate obtained 
     
0.106 
(0.90) 
-0.253 
(-0.57) 
0.292 
(0.52) 
-9143.0*** 
(-4.12) 
-3219.7** 
(-3.19) 
      
HH size 0.0225* 
(2.46) 
0.321*** 
(4.98) 
0.269*** 
(13.88) 
1605.9*** 
(5.00) 
-1390.9*** 
(-6.15) 
      
Constant 1.811*** 
(49.52) 
-3.146*** 
(-13.25) 
-2.397*** 
(-16.02) 
6349.7*** 
(4.17) 
9590.3*** 
(11.76) 
N 1892 1916 1916 1385 1385 
R² 0.887 0.800 0.765 0.817 0.598 
mean 2009 2.967 1.863 1.257 35731.9 8029.5 
Within estimation of the outcome variable in the heading on project participation for the restricted panel data set with household fixed effects. Regressions include upazila-level 
fixed effects. In parentheses t-statistics from upazila-cluster-robust standard errors. Reference category for HH heads max. educ. is ‘illiterate’. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
 
Appendix 7: Variable Definitions and Construction     
Procedure214
Household Characteristics and Regression Controls 
 
Adibasi ethnicity Household self-classified as belonging to Adibasi ethnicity, an 
umbrella term for the indigenous population of Bangladesh (and 
as well parts of India) with many individual sub-groups and 
tribes. 
 
Adult equivalent HH size  Adult equivalents give an indicator for demographic composi-
tion of households. Aggregation follows Townsend (1994: 554, 
FN 512): “for adult males, 1.0; for adult females, 0.9. For males 
and females aged 13-18, 0.94, and 0.83, respectively; for chil-
dren aged 7-12, 0.67 regardless of gender; for children 4-6, 0.52; 
for toddlers 1-3, 0.32; and for infants 0.05.” As specific age in-
formation is available only in the panel data set, adult equivalent 
household size can be used only for analysis of baseline data. 
 
Female headed HH Household classified as female-headed, i.e. without primary 
male earner (widowed, divorced, deserted or with disabled hus-
band) 
 
Group II Poverty Status Classification of a HH as belonging to group II is defined by 
NETZ as HH with a food intake of less than 1600 kcal/day, op-
erationalized as a maximum of two meals in minimum nine 
months, a monthly income of less than 400 BDT per capita and 
being completely without land and/or assets. In comparison, 
group III is characterized by a food intake of less than 1,800 
kcal/day, operationalized by a maximum of two meals in mini-
mum six months, a monthly income of less than 500 BDT per 
capita and being functionally landless (<0.01 acres).  
 
Highest education level Highest level of education reported in the household ranging 
from one to nine (1: illiterate; 2: signature only; 3: basic read-
ing/writing skills; 4: class 1-2 passed; 5: class 3-5 passed; 6: 
class 6-8 passed; 7: class 9-10 passed; 8: secondary school cer-
tificate obtained; 9: higher school certificate obtained). 
 
Household /family size Size of the household. A household is for IFSUP defined as the 
sum of individuals eating from the same cooking. 
 
Maximum education level  The maximum of reported education  levels of  household  heads 
of household heads/spouse or their spouse ranging from one to nine (values as above).  
                                                 
214 Variables are alphabetically ordered within their respective categories as introduced in Table 1. Construction 
procedure is outlined where appropriate. Expenditure figures between the years are not corrected for inflation 
given the insecurity on the adequate points of reference (indicative for the problem is e.g. Figure 2 of Chapter 
2.2, though only reporting national rice prices). Generally, ‘missing’ was treated as zero for some variables in the 
impact survey, as zero was partially not separately coded by interviewers. 
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Upazila Household found living in the upazila in question (Durgapur, 
Gangachara, Kalmakanda, Kaunia, Joypurhat and Panchibi); an 
upazila is the fourth level of administration in Bangladesh (ad-
ministration levels are division – district – upazila – union – 
mouza) comparable to a county. 
 
Overall Outcome Indicators 
 
Average meals per day per For the baseline, households reported the amount of months with 
average family member one, two or three meals over the last twelve months from the 
point of interviewing. For the impact survey, households re-
ported these figures by male, female and underage family mem-
bers – these figures were averaged over household members and 
aggregated for comparison. 
 
Collected food value pd Self-reported value of the household’s food (variables rice, 
pulse, vegetable, fruit, meat, fish, oil, egg, fuel) collected in na-
ture or by begging, unsystematically reported for the last month, 
week or day, recalculated to daily figures (only available in the 
impact data set). 
 
Food expenditure pd Self-reported value of household’s food (see above for vari-
ables) expenditure unsystematically reported for the last month, 
week or day, recalculated to daily figures (only available in the 
impact data set). 
 
Socio-economic status The   SES-index   is    primarily    based  on   the   first  principal 
(PCA) component of physical assets (productive assets, durable con-
sumer goods and housing) and human capital (maximum educa-
tion levels). Comp. Appendix 5: PCA Analysis for a detailed de-
scription on construction and variables included. 
 
Secondary outcomes (PCA) The status of secondary outcomes (SOS) is based on variables 
not explicitly influenced by IFSUP, primarily the first principle 
component of physical non-productive assets (housing, durable 
consumer goods) and human capital (maximum education lev-
els). Comp. Appendix 5: PCA Analysis for a detailed descrip-
tion on construction and variables included. 
 
Yearly expenditure Expenditure in the respective areas (food, health, clothing, hous-
ing, education, others) is reported yearly expenditure of house-
holds partly calculated from more detailed accounts (e.g. health 
treatment cost), partly reported as such. For the baseline, only an 
aggregate figures is available. 
 
Yearly expenditure pc Per capita yearly expenditure is the family size average of 
household’s yearly expenditure. 
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Asset Outcome Variables 
 
Durable assets (PCA) The durable asset index is based on the first principle component 
of HH ownership indicators for the variables 
chair/bench/table/bedstead, TV/mobile, jewellery and safe (for 
baseline additionally radio, dress-stands, blankets, clocks and 
others, besides the mentioned TV/mobile and safe). Partially, 
variables were grouped to asset complexes for comparability be-
tween data-sets. Comp. Appendix 5: PCA Analysis for a de-
tailed description on construction and variables included. 
 
Durable assets value Sum of reported value of all (as above) non-productive assets in 
taka. 
 
Livestock value Sum of the self-reported value of livestock (subcategories as in 
TLU) owned in taka. 
 
Productive assets (PCA) The productive asset index is based on the first principle com-
ponent of HH ownership indicators for the variables fruit trees, 
vegetable gardens, bamboo clumps, tubewells, fishnets, boats, 
rickshaws/vans, husking machines, irrigation pumps and, for 
baseline, cots. Partially, variables were grouped to asset com-
plexes for comparability between data-sets. Comp. Appendix 5: 
PCA Analysis for a detailed description on construction and 
variables included. 
 
Productive asset value Sum of the self-reported value of all (as above) productive assets 
in taka. 
 
Productive land in acre Acre of land self-reported as being in economic use of the 
household (status self-owned, share-cropping, leasing or mort-
gaged out and status share-cropping, leasing or mortgaged in). 
Original accords are given in decimal which are equivalent to 
1/100th of an acre and recalculated in impact estimation tables. 
 
Tropical livestock units TLUs are computed based on the proposal of Jahnke (1982: 9f.), 
standardizing one TLU to 250 kg liveweight. As suggested by 
Jahnke (1982: 9f.), weights of 0.7 for cattle, horse and buffaloes, 
0.2 for pigs, 0.1 for sheep and goats and 0.01 for chickens, hens 
and ducks were used. For the category ‘other’ value was used as 
conversion factor with 9164 taka (mean cow value) as 0.7 TLU. 
TLU represent all livestock in economic use by the household, 
thus as well e.g. share rearing arrangements. 
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Vulnerability Indicators 
 
Children’s vaccination status Vaccination status is counted as complete if all relevant vaccines 
were received by a child age of 18 months (otherwise as incom-
plete) for households reporting children of age 18-60 months. 
 
Credit Amount of taka taken as credit from informal sources (money-
lender, neighbours, self help group, advance selling of labour, 
land mortgages) as reported by household. For the baseline sur-
vey, credit constitutes the mean value of reported credit ranges. 
 
Dietary diversity score Dietary diversity score, theoretically ranging from zero to eight, 
practically from one to eight, is a simple index aggregating the 
reported consumption of several food groups (rice, pulse, vege-
tables, egg, fish, meat, fruits, oil). Dietary diversity is supposed 
to capture the nutritional adequacy of the diet, as proposed by 
Hatløy et al. (1998: 892) for Malawian children, though substi-
tuting the category milk by oil and green leaves by pulse as 
available in the IFSUP data. 
 
Diversification Index (DIS) Index ranging from zero to eight counting the number of income 
sub-classes of the household: Land usage; livestock usage; fruit 
trees, bamboo clumps or vegetable gardens used; productive as-
sets of the type rickshaw/van, fishing net, boat, husking machine 
used, small business capital; number of household members pur-
suing wage labour occupations (maximum in the data: 4 [at 
baseline]). Begging is not counted as separate income source. 
 
Housing quality (PCA) The housing quality index is based on the first principle compo-
nent of the number of rooms owned by the household, the qual-
ity of materials for the walls as well as the quality of materials 
for the roof (concrete and brick, tin, jute stick, bamboo, clay, 
clay/straw mixture, straw; in descending order; order derived by 
mean reported value of rooms by construction type), the size of 
the homestead (in decimal) and ownership of the homestead 
(self-owned vs. rented). Comp. Appendix 5: PCA Analysis for a 
detailed description on construction and variables included. 
 
Pregnant mothers’ age Age of the pregnant mother in the household. In case of several 
pregnancies occurring at the same time, it contains the minimum 
of the respective pregnant mothers’ ages.  
 
Mothers’ checkup status  Coded 1 if pregnant mothers in the households received both 
antenatal and postnatal checkup of any kind. 
 
Savings Amount of taka in savings accounts as reported by households. 
 
Sick days per capita Number of self-reported days household members fell sick per 
month averaged by household size. Figures were inquired as 
yearly data for the impact survey and subsequently recalculated. 
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